An economic analysis of the councils of the United Nations by Gould, M. & Gould, M.
  
 
 
WestminsterResearch 
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/research/westminsterresearch 
 
 
An economic analysis of the councils of the United Nations. 
 
Matthew Gould 
 
Westminster Business School 
 
 
 
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2014. 
 
This is an exact reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of 
Westminster library. 
 
 
 
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
  
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
COUNCILS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
 
 
Matthew Gould 
 
 
 
A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
September 2014 
 
i 
 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... iii 
Declaration .................................................................................................................... iv 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... v 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background Information ............................................................................................ 2 
1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings ......................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 14 
2 Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security Council .......................... 19 
2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 19 
2.2 The election process ................................................................................................. 25 
2.3 Hypotheses ............................................................................................................... 27 
2.4 Econometric Model and Methodology ..................................................................... 31 
2.5 Results ...................................................................................................................... 40 
2.6 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 50 
3 Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and 
Application .................................................................................................................... 61 
3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 61 
3.2 Theory ...................................................................................................................... 64 
3.3 Application ............................................................................................................... 76 
3.4 Conclusion................................................................................................................ 88 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 90 
  
ii 
 
4 Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency ................ 98 
4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 98 
4.2 Equity and Efficiency in the UNSC ....................................................................... 101 
4.3 Proposed UNSC Reforms ...................................................................................... 107 
4.4 Simulation .............................................................................................................. 110 
4.5 Results .................................................................................................................... 116 
4.6 Robustness.............................................................................................................. 123 
4.7 Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 126 
Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 128 
5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 135 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 137 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Peter Urwin, Dr. Franz Buscha and Dr. 
Anna Conte for their help and assistance over the course of my research. They performed 
their supervisory duties in a friendly and efficient manner. I would also like to give special 
thanks to Dr. Matthew Rablen for his help and encouragement throughout. 
 
In respect of Chapter 2, I am thankful for the suggestions of several participants at the 
Political Economy of International VI conference in Heidelberg. I also thank Professor 
Axel Dreher and Professor James Vreeland for providing data, and three anonymous 
referees. 
  
I am grateful for the receipt of three years funding from Westminster Business School, 
without which I would not have been able to complete this work.
iv 
 
Declaration 
 
I hereby declare that I have not used before any material contained in this thesis and that 
this thesis is my own work. A version of Chapter 2 has been published in Public Choice 
and a version of Chapter 3 has been submitted for publication. 
 
I declare that this thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
v 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of three pieces of research focussed on the Councils of the United 
Nations, predominantly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We consider three 
broad questions: which countries typically get on to the UNSC in its current form; which 
countries ought to get on to the UNSC; and how well might proposed changes to the 
UNSC steer it towards such ideals.  
In order to address the latter two questions it is sensible to begin by investigating how the 
current system works and if there are any particular characteristics which influence the 
chances of a country being elected to the UNSC. In Chapter 2 we develop a model to test 
the significance of a country’s characteristics on their probability of election to the UNSC. 
Chapter 3 then starts by developing a set of theoretical tests which can be applied to 
council voting systems, such as the selection of UNSC members from the UN General 
Assembly. The tests score a voting system based on how well the distribution of power in 
the council meets the power one would expect under a system where country 
representatives cast their vote in the council based on the outcomes of country or regional-
level referendums. We then apply this, using the implied probabilities of election which are 
a consequence of the results of Chapter 2, to the UNSC election process. We then finish by 
applying the tests of Chapter 3, which consider how equitable a proposal is, together with a 
further test of procedural efficiency, to each of the proposed reforms to the UNSC election 
process.  
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The United Nations (UN) is the leading international body responsible for maintaining 
international peace and security. Recent conflicts that have occurred without UNSC 
approval have brutally highlighted the need for reform of the UNSC and its voting system 
as part of a package of wider UN reform. In particular, the UNSC has been charged with 
being indecisive and slow to react to such situations, with particular blame being placed on 
the right of veto of the permanent members. Several deadlocks between opposing 
permanent members (as was the case in the developing Syrian civil war when China and 
Russia blocked resolutions which would have imposed sanctions on Syria in 2011 and 
2012) have called into question the effectiveness of the UNSC as it is currently formed.  
Why should economists be interested in the UNSC and its reform? In maintaining peace, 
the UNSC is important for culturing the conditions of macro-economic stability that are 
conducive for economic growth (As supported by findings from empirical studies such as 
Fischer (1993), Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993)). In respect 
of UNSC reform, a core element of the economic discipline is the study of how resources 
should be allocated across agents. Thus economic theory offers a perspective on how 
votes, or more precisely voting power, should be allocated across collections of agents 
(nations) in international political organisations.  
We employ an approach to voting system design and evaluation which is explicitly 
analytic, thereby filling a gap in the literature on the UNSC and its reform left by the 
largely qualitative work in the political sciences. Whereas qualitative work has summarised 
the dimensions of the debate, the analytical tools used here enable one to perform critical 
analysis and make firm recommendations.  
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1.1 Background Information 
The UN began on the 24
th
 October 1945 aiming to maintain international peace and 
security, and promote international co-operation towards solving cultural, economic, 
humanitarian and social problems. Since its founding the UN has expanded from fifty-one 
members to 193 members as of 2014, representing over 99 per cent of world’s population 
(Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Source: United Nations 
 
Figure 1.1 – UN Membership since 1945 
 
Our focus in this thesis is on two UN bodies: the General Assembly (UNGA) and the 
Security Council (UNSC). The UNGA is the main deliberative body of the UN it makes 
non-binding resolutions and provides a platform for multilateral. Each of the 193 member 
governments has a representative in the UNGA, each of which hold one vote in accordance 
with the UN principle of sovereign equality. Votes are determined by a simple majority 
with the exception of some important decisions, such as electing members of the UNSC, 
which require a two-thirds majority (UN Charter 18). The UNSC, the main focus of our 
research, has evolved into the dominant political body of the UN. The UNSC, unlike the 
UNGA, makes binding decisions on narrowly focussed and well-defined subjects. The UN 
Charter specifically tasks it with the maintenance of international peace and security and it 
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can take enforcement action in the form of economics sanctions, suspension of diplomatic 
relations, blockades and the use of military action.  
Despite the UN increasing in membership from 51 to 193 nations since 1945, the UNSC 
has seen reform only once when its membership increased from eleven to fifteen members. 
The UNSC comprises fifteen members, five of which are Permanent Members (PMs), 
who, as implied by their name, are continual members of the UNSC, and ten Non-
Permanent Members (NPMs) who each serve two year overlapping terms. The Permanent 
Members are China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA, i.e., the main Allies who were 
victorious in the Second World War. Elections to determine the ten NPMs are held in the 
UNGA towards the end of every year. The elections are subject to the further requirement 
of paying due regard to equitable geographic distribution, which means in practice that 
member-states are drawn in fixed numbers from within regional caucusing groups 
partitioning the UN membership.
1
 These groups are the African Group (AF), Asian Group 
(AS), Eastern European Group (EE), Latin America and the Caribbean Group (GRULAC), 
and the Western European & Others Group (WEOG). At present, five NPMs must come 
from AF and AS, two from GRULAC, two from the WEOG, and one from EE. There is 
tacit agreement the five states allocated to AF and AS, should be divided as three from AF 
and two from AS. Prior to an election each caucusing group declares to the UNGA a list of 
candidate countries that will participate in the election. Groups such as AF work by near 
strict rotation and typically put forward one candidate for each available seat, leaving the 
UNGA to ratify their decision. Other groups such as the WEOG generally submit more 
candidate states than available seats, ensuring a competitive election in the UNGA. The 
sole guidance given to UNGA members on the criteria they should use to elect UNSC 
members is that they should pay due regard to a candidate state’s contributions to 
international peace and security.  
                                                 
1
 The USA is technically not a member of a caucusing group. However, it sits as an observer in WEOG 
meetings and is considered part of the group for electoral purposes. Israel for many years was not a member 
of any grouping, but in 2000 achieved temporary membership of the WEOG. 
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Like the UNGA, the UNSC members each have one vote. For procedural matters a 
resolution can pass if at least nine members (60 per cent) vote in favour of it. However, for 
all non-procedural matters decisions are made by an affirmative vote of nine or more 
members including the concurring votes of the PMs. That is, each PM has an individual 
right of veto. Each member can abstain from a vote if they so wish and it has become 
established that by ‘concurring’ it is meant that a PM’s abstention does not constitute the 
exercise of its veto. We focus entirely on the voting system used for non-procedural 
matters. 
There is wide consensus that the UN, and in particular the UNSC, are in serious need of 
reform and have become less relevant. In 2013, having been elected for the first time to the 
UNSC, Saudi Arabia made a very public statement of its desire for reform by rejecting its 
seat on the UNSC. Most recently, the UNSC was slow to act in preventing escalating 
violence in Syria owing to vehemently differing positions of PMs. Similarly, in 2003 the 
US and its allies took multilateral action in Iraq without UNSC approval, because Russia 
would have exercised its veto. The UNSC has also failed to resolve the long-standing 
conflict between Israel and Palestine. The UN has had great difficulty in persuading 
member-states to volunteer troops for its peacekeeping missions, and has suffered high 
profile embarrassments in Bosnia and Somalia in 1995, when peacekeeping forces were 
deployed in areas with no peace to keep. Also the UN is suffering an enduring financial 
crisis, which puts its ability to perform its responsibilities in danger. This is caused by 
many member-states failing to pay their budget assessments. As of the end of 2011 USD 
3.08 billion in assessed contributions to the regular budget and peacekeeping operations 
were unpaid. This amounts to around a half of the combined budget for that year, a 
significant proportion of which is owed by the USA (UN, 2012b). 
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1.2 Voting Theory Essentials 
In this thesis we examine the Councils of the United Nations, in particular the UNSC. 
There is by now a substantial literature that applies the insights of a-priori voting to 
international voting bodies – Felsenthal and Machover (1997a, 1997b, 2001, 2004, 2007), 
Laruelle and Widgrén (1998) and Leech (2002a) to the Council of the European Union; 
Napel and Widgrén (2006) to the European Parliament; Manno (1966), Newcombe, Wert 
and Newcombe (1971), and Dixon (1983) to the UNGA; Leech (2002b), Leech and Leech 
(2013), and Rapkin and Strand (2006) to the IMF Executive Board; and Leech and Leech 
(2005) to the World Bank Executive Boards – but the UNSC stands out as the only major 
international body not to have been addressed by this literature.
2
 
What lies behind this lacuna? The square-root rule is predicated on a two-stage voting 
model – first a national vote, second an international vote – which anticipates that all 
members vote in the second stage. When international decision-making is by a council, this 
framework cannot be applied directly for at least two reasons. First, only a subset of 
members votes in the second stage. Second, this subset is not constant over time (the 
membership of the UNSC changes each year, for instance). Third, the UN Charter does not 
specify the probabilities with which each UN member gains membership of the UNSC.  
 
1.2.1 A-priori voting theory 
The stance we take here is, when designing and evaluating a voting system it should be 
measured against objectively chosen benchmarks that good voting systems should achieve. 
We put forward a theoretical model of voting in international bodies in order to facilitate 
the construction of precise criteria. We employ an analytical tool known as a-priori voting 
power, which is a measure of the ability of a member of a voting body to influence voting 
                                                 
2
 The IMF Executive Board is composed of only 24 Executive Directors, and the World Bank Executive 
Board of only 25 Executive Directors. In both bodies, however, the Executive Directors represent all 188 
member-countries, so each can be interpreted as fully representative.   
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outcomes (Leech, 2002c). The theoretical approach to measurement of voting power is to 
model a voting body as an n-person game. One should not, however, place much 
significance on the use of the word ‘game’ here. The principal power indices we employ 
are not born of co-operative game theory but rather from a probabilistic theory of voting. 
Although we employ a ternary representation of the UNSC (in which players can vote for a 
motion, against a motion, or abstain), for the sake of introducing the theory, we begin by 
describing how the UNSC might be modelled in a binary context (in which players can 
vote only for or against a motion).  
We define a simple voting game (SVG), as set out by Shapley (1962), as a pair (N, W), 
where N  is a set of the n members of the voting body. W  is a collection of subsets of N  
with the following properties: 
i) W   
ii) N W  
iii) If S T N   and S W  then also T W  
The rules above simply mean that: (i) if all members of the voting body vote against a 
motion then the motion fails; (ii) if all members of the voting body vote for the motion 
then it succeeds; and (iii) for a given successful coalition, if the level of support is 
increased, i.e. some members who voted against changed their vote to ‘yes’, then the 
motion must still succeed.  
Suppose a voting body is taking a vote on a motion and that each of its members can only 
vote for or against and casts their vote with equal probability independent of all other 
members. Then all the 2
n
 possible voting outcomes occur with equal probability. Any 
theory of voting power derived from such an assumption of random voting is one of a-
priori power whereby we describe everything that might happen in a voting body from 
behind a veil of ignorance, before the members’ preferences are fixed in any fashion. If we 
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were to develop a theory of actual, or a-posteriori, voting power one would take into 
account additional factors such as members’ actual interests and preferences. This would 
lead to some coalitions being more likely than others (Felsenthal and Machover, 2000). 
Some authors, such as Garrett and Tsebelis (1996, 1999a, 1999b), believe a-priori theory is 
flawed since power indices systematically underestimate the power of members with 
mainstream preferences, and overstate that for marginal members. We, however, argue that 
a-priori theory is the more appropriate approach when it comes to voting system evaluation 
and design. Actual power, even if it can be measured objectively, is in constant flux; but by 
design it must be the case that the measure of a-priori power is the long-run average around 
which actual power deviates (Lane and Berg, 1999). Therefore a-priori power is the stable 
criterion against which we should design and evaluate voting systems.  
1.2.2 Voting Power Indices 
It would be reasonable to develop a notion of voting power by deriving it from the 
probability that a member of the voting body in on the winning side. There are 2
n
 equi-
probable voting outcomes under the assumptions set out above. A member i ∈ N is said to 
be critical if by switching its vote, i can change a coalition from a winning coalition to a 
losing coalition, that is, i ∈ S, S ∈ W and S ∖ {i} ∉ W. Define a dummy in ( ,  )N W  as a 
member for whom S ∈ W if and only if S ∖ {i} ∈ W for all S ⊆ N and a dictator for whom 
S ∈ W if and only if i ∈ S for all S ⊆ N.  
Let ηi denote the number of times member i is critical, then the probability that i votes on 
the winning side is: 
r(i) = 
2ηi + 
1
2
( )2n - 2ηi
2
n  = 
1
2
 + 
ηi
2
n,   for all i ∈ N. 
Unfortunately, ( )r i mingles luck and influence since even a dummy is given 0.5. If we 
apply the linear transformation 2r(i) - 1 we can remove this, giving: 
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2r(i) – 1 = 2






 
1
2
 + 
ηi
2
n  - 1 = 
ηi
2
n - 1 ≡ βi',   for all i ∈ N. 
βi' is the Banzhaf measure (BZM), named after John Banzhaf, who proposed it in Banzhaf 
(1965).
3
 It is the a-priori probability that player i is a critical voter in ( ,  )N W  and takes a 
value zero for a dummy and one for a dictator. It measures the absolute power of a 
member, but does not sum to one across all members. Thus this measure of voting power 
does not conceive of a fixed amount of power that can be divided amongst members. 
Rather, the power of the voting body as a whole varies from specification to specification.  
Often it is useful to normalise the BZM to sum to unity across members, giving a measure 
of the relative voting power between members. The Banzhaf Index (BZI) is given by 
βi = 
βi'

j = 1
n βj'
 ,    for all i ∈ N. 
An alternative and explicitly game theoretic measure of voting power, the Shapley-Shubik 
Index, was been proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954). It is derived as a special case of 
the Shapley value for cooperative games. Consider an ordering of N as representing the 
order in which members of N will join a coalition in support of some bill. The member 
whose joining turns the developing coalition from a losing coalition into a winning 
coalition is called the pivotal voter. The SSI is then 
SSIi = 
number of orderings in which i is critical
n!
 = 
S ⊆ N
( )n - |S| ! ( )|S| - 1 !
n!
 ( )ι(S) - ι(S∖{i})  
, 
where S  is the number of members in S and ι(S) = 1 if S ∈ W and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
3
 The Banzhaf indices are sometimes termed the Penrose indices after Lionel Penrose, who in Penrose (1946) 
stated the central idea behind Banzhaf’s indices using exactly the intuition presented here. 
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This study principally employs the Banzhaf indices for several reasons. Firstly the SSI 
does not weight each instance of criticality equally, with the weight depending upon the 
size of the coalition in which a member is critical. This is a perverse property for a measure 
of a priori power and has been criticised by Coleman (1971). Secondly, the SSI measures 
fundamentally the wrong notion of voting power to that desired. The SSI views ‘the 
acquisition of power’ as the payoff of the winning coalition as though power is a prize that 
can be shared out amongst the winning coalition. A ballot for a US Presidential candidate, 
in which there is a winning nominee who can share the spoils of office amongst his 
supporters would fit this model of voting power. However the vast majority of the 
decisions made in the UNSC are policy issues, where the relevant notion of the power of a 
member is ability to influence the collective outcome of the voting body. Felsenthal and 
Machover (1998) have labelled these two different conceptions of voting power as P-
Power (power as a prize) and I-Power (power as influence). They suggest that the Banzhaf 
indices are the most appropriate mode of analysis for a study of I-Power. Other indices of 
voting power in the literature, such as those by Deegan and Packell (1978, 1982), Johnston 
(1978) and Holler (1982) are not considered because they have each been shown to display 
pathological behaviour in certain situations (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998). 
 
1.2.3 Ternary Voting Rules 
Much of the existing literature on the UNSC (e.g., Shapley and Shubik, 1954; Straffin, 
1983), uses the theory above to model the UNSC decision rule as a binary rule in which 
members can vote only for or against a resolution. In the UNSC, however, the UN Charter 
states that decisions over non-procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of nine 
or more members, including the concurring votes of the PMs. A “concurring” vote has 
come to be understood, in practice, as either an affirmative vote or an abstention (see 
Blum, 2005: 636), so a negative vote by a PM is distinct from an abstention. As 
10 
 
commented by Felsenthal and Machover (1997c: 348), this feature of the UNSC decision 
rule implies that it “cannot be faithfully represented” as a binary decision rule.4 In this 
thesis we therefore employ ternary voting rules.  
We can generalise the definitions given in 1.2.1 to a ternary setup, allowing voters the 
option of abstention.
5
 We define a ternary voting game (TVG) as a pair (N, W), where N is 
a set of the n members of the voting body. W is a collection of pairs of disjoint subsets of N 
(i.e. pairs of subsets (S
+
, S
0
) of N such that S
+
 ∩ S0 = ∅) satisfying the following properties: 
i) (∅, ∅) ∉ W 
ii) (N, ∅)  W 
iii) If S+ ⊆ T+ ⊆ N, T0 ⊆ N ∖ S+ ⊆ N and (S+, S0)  W then (T+, T0)  W 
 
The intuition behind these are the same as in the binary case above, they mean: (i) if all 
members vote against a motion then it must fail; (ii) if all members vote in favour of a 
motion then it succeeds; (iii) if for a given successful vote one or more members were to 
increase their level of support, i.e. a member who voted against changed their vote to 
‘abstain’ or ‘yes’ or an abstaining member decided to vote in favour, then the motion 
would still succeed. In a TVG the notion of a member being critical to a coalition is 
slightly different. We say member i is critical to a coalition if by decreasing his level of 
support (i.e. changing from Yes to Abstain or from Abstain to No) he can change the 
coalition from winning to losing. That is, i  S+ ∪ S0, (S+, S0)  W and either (S+ ∖ {i}, S0 
∪ {i}) ∉ W or (S+, S0 ∖ {i}) ∉ W.  
Under the assumption that abstention is as equally likely as an affirmative or negative vote 
there are 3
n
 equi-probable possible outcomes to a vote by the members of N. This is the 
                                                 
4
 The same point is also made in Freixas and Zwicker (2003). 
5
 See Felsenthal and Machover (1997c) for an alternative and more formal definition. 
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assumption we make throughout this thesis. However, note that rather than treating the 
vote as a single event in which a voter can choose three possible actions one could instead 
think of it as a two-stage process in which first the voter decides whether to participate in 
the vote or not (i.e. abstain) and then if they do participate they decide how to cast their 
vote (‘yes’ or ‘no’). Under this alternative interpretation it would be more natural to treat 
each of the actions in the two stages as being equally likely, thus implying probabilities of 
0.5 for abstaining and 0.25 for voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Letting ηi denote the number of times member i is critical, then in a TVG the probability 
that i votes on the winning side, given that they have a preference, is:
6
 
r(i) = 
ηi + 
1
2
 ( )3n-1 – ηi
3
n-1  = 
1
2
 






1+
ηi
3
n-1  . 
As with the binary voting game, a dummy has a non-zero probability of being on the 
winning side in a TVG, namely r(i) = ½ for a dummy voter. Taking the linear transform 
2r(i) – 1 yields the ternary extension to the (absolute) Banzhaf measure: 
2r(i) – 1 = 
ηi
3
n – 1 ≡ β'i . 
1.2.4 Computing power indices 
The naïve way to compute the measures above would be to simply check every possible 
vote of the SVG or TVG and make a record of which members are critical. While this is 
acceptable for very small systems it involves looking at 2
n
 (or 3
n
) combinations, and so 
quickly becomes unmanageable. One alternative, which works out very efficient for many 
                                                 
6
 We assume that an abstaining voter is indifferent between the outcomes of the vote and thus is always on 
the winning side. 
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practical voting games, is the method of generating functions which we employ in 
Chapters 3 and 4.
7
  
Generating functions make use of noticing that if we have a polynomial of the form: 
F(x,y) = 
i = 1
n
 ( )xi + yi , 
each factor can be thought of as representing the two possible voting options for member 
i.
8
 If we then expand the factors of this polynomial to 
F(x,y) = 
ε ∈ {0¸1}n
0
00 
i = 1
n
 xi
ε(i)
yi
1-ε(i)
, 
then each of the 2
n
 monomial terms can be thought of as representing a vote in the SVG as 
it involves exactly one choice of xi or yi for each member i. In general this does not really 
achieve much other than to encode the SVG in the form of a polynomial. However, in 
reality most SVGs impose additional rules which make them much simpler. For example, a 
large proportion of real life voting systems are set up so that the influence of a member’s 
vote does not depend on how the other voting body members cast their votes. Such games 
can be represented as a sub-class of SVGs called Weighted Voting Games (WVGs).
9
 When 
restricted to such a sub-class the generating function, F, above simplifies greatly. Such 
simplification then leads to a highly efficient algorithm for partitioning all possible votes 
according to, say, how many members have voted in favour by following the method one 
would use to expand the polynomial F. This in turn allows the computation of how many 
times a given member is critical. 
                                                 
7
 See Leech (2002d) for a more detailed explanation of generating functions in the binary case along with 
alternative methods. See Freixas (2012) and Lidner (2004) for details of the use of generating functions for 
ternary (weighted) voting games. 
8
 This is for a binary voting game, for the ternary case one would add a third term zi. 
9
 In a WVG each member is assigned a ‘weight’ for which their positive vote counts towards meeting a set 
threshold or ‘quota’. The success of a vote is then determined by checking whether the sum of the weights of 
those members who voted in favour meets the quota. See Leech (2002d) for a formal definition of a WVG 
and its associated generating function. 
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Let us consider a more concrete example for the case of the UNSC. Suppose that we have a 
SVG (N, W) satisfying the following property: 
 There exist q1, q2 > 0 and N1, N2 ⊆ N, such that N = N1 ⊔ N2 and S ∈ W ⇔ | |S ∩ N1   
≥ q1 and | |S ∩ N2   ≥ q2. 
The UNSC would satisfy this with q1 = 5, q2 = 4, N1 = {Permanent Members}, N2 = {Non-
permanent Members}. Let p = | |N1 , q = | |N2  and consider the following polynomial: 
F(x, y) = ( )1 + x q( )y + x p. 
We can interpret this in the following way. Each of the q terms (1 + x) can be thought of as 
representing the actions available to a non-permanent member, 1 representing a vote 
against and x an affirmative vote. Similarly each of the p terms (y + x) can be thought to 
represent a permanent member’s voting options: y for a vote against and x for a positive 
vote. Each monomial term ajk x
j
 y
k
 in the expansion of F encodes how many members 
voted in favour of the motion, j, and how many members in N1 voted against it, k. The 
coefficient, ajk, tells us how many of the 2
n
 possible votes have exactly j members voting 
‘yes’ and k members in N1 voting ‘no’. 
Define 
Fr (x, y) = 



1     if r = 0
(1 + x) Fr-1 (x, y)    if r ≤ q
(y + x) Fr-1 (x, y)    if r > q
. 
Suppose 
Fr (x, y) = 
j + k ≤ r
 
 a
r
j,k
 x
j
 y
k
, 
Then, for 1 ≤ r ≤ n, we have 
a
r
j,k
 = 



 
a
r-1
j¸k
  + a
r-1
j-1¸k
    if r ≤ q
a
r-1
j¸k-1
 + a
r-1
j-1¸k
    if r > q
, 
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where a
r
j¸k
 is taken to be zero if not otherwise defined and a
0
0¸0
 = 1. Also note that since F 
(x, y) = Fn (x, y), then a
n
j¸k
 = a
j¸k
.. Hence, this gives us an iterative method for working out 
a
j¸k
, using O(n
3
) computations.
10
 
Figure 1.2 shows the values of a
r
j¸k
 for r = 0, …, 4. 
 
(j,k) (0,0) (1,0) (2,0) (3,0) (4,0) (0,1) (1,1) (2,1) (3,1) (0,2) (1,2) (2,2) (0,3) (1,3) (0,4) 
r = 0 1               
r = 1 1 1    0          
r = 2 1 2 1   0 0   0      
r = 3 1 3 3 1  0 0 0  0 0  0   
r = 4 1 4 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 1.1 – First five iterations in computing F 
Continuing in this manner we obtain a
15
j¸k
 as shown in Table 1.2 below. 
 
j 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
k 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
1 0 0 0 0 5 50 225 600 1050 1260 1050 600 225 50 5 0 
2 0 0 0 10 100 450 1200 2100 2520 2100 1200 450 100 10 0 0 
3 0 0 10 100 450 1200 2100 2520 2100 1200 450 100 10 0 0 0 
4 0 5 50 225 600 1050 1260 1050 600 225 50 5 0 0 0 0 
5 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 1.2 – a
j¸k
 coefficients of F 
Once we have computed a
j¸k
 we still have some work to do in order to obtain values for ηi. 
To work out how many times member i is critical we need to consider not the possible 
votes of all members of the voting body but rather all members other than member i. As 
such, having constructed F, we need to remove the factor coming from member i. That is, 
                                                 
10
 We can do better, by representing the binary interpretation of the UNSC as a WVG F reduces to a 
polynomial in a single variable and thus requires O(n
2
) computations. 
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in the case of the UNSC, we wish to find G(x, y) = Σbj¸k x
j
y
k
 and H(x, y) = Σcj¸k x
j
y
k
 such 
that 
(1 + x) G = F
(y + x) H = F
. 
Here G corresponds to possible votes of all voting body members excluding a given 
member i2 ∈ N2  and H the same but for a given member i1 ∈ N1. By expanding the left 
hand side and equating coefficients we find 
bj¸k = aj¸k - bj-1¸k
cj¸k = aj¸k+1 - cj-1¸k+1
. 
Applying these formulas to the values in Table 1.2 yields: 
 j 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
k 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 1 
1 0 0 0 0 5 45 180 420 630 630 420 180 45 5 0 
2 0 0 0 10 90 360 840 1260 1260 840 360 90 10 0 0 
3 0 0 10 90 360 840 1260 1260 840 360 90 10 0 0 0 
4 0 5 45 180 420 630 630 420 180 45 5 0 0 0 0 
5 1 9 36 84 126 126 84 36 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 1.3a – bj¸k coefficients 
 j 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
k 
0 0 0 0 0 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 
1 0 0 0 4 40 180 480 840 1008 840 480 180 40 4 0 
2 0 0 6 60 270 720 1260 1512 1260 720 270 60 6 0 0 
3 0 4 40 180 480 840 1008 840 480 180 40 4 0 0 0 
4 1 10 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 1.3b – cj¸k coefficients 
In the UNSC a motion is successful if at least nine members are in agreement and no 
permanent members vote against it. This means that a non-permanent member is critical if 
eight other members vote ‘yes’ and no permanent members vote ‘no’. There are 84 
possible ways in which the other member votes can be rearranged, see the highlighted cell 
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in Table 1.3a. A permanent member is critical if at least eight members vote in favour and 
no other permanent members vote against. We see from Table 1.3b that there are 848 votes 
in which a permanent member is critical. 
This means that 
β'NPM = 0.0051 and β'PM = 0.0518. 
 
As we previously mentioned, the UNSC cannot be faithfully represented by an SVG, a 
ternary framework is required. The generating function method of computing β generalises 
in a straightforward manner to a TVG. For a ternary UNSC we would use the following as 
our generating function: 
F
t
(x, y) = ( )2 + x q( )1 + y + x p. 
F
t
 performs the same role as F above. Each factor corresponds to the voting options of a 
member of the voting body, but now with one extra term. Abstention is the same as a ‘no’ 
vote for a non-permanent member in the UNSC, in terms of its effect on the success or 
failure of a motion, hence the (2 + x) factors. The permanent member factors change by the 
addition of 1, corresponding to the option of abstention, which is genuinely distinct for a 
PM. 
If as above we suppose 
F 
t
r
 (x, y) = 
j + k ≤ r
 
 d
r
j,k
 x
j
 y
k
, 
then, for 1 ≤ r ≤ n, we have 
d
r
j,k
 = 



 
2d
r-1
j¸k
  + d
r-1
j-1¸k
    if r ≤ q
 d
r-1
j¸k
 + d
r-1
j¸k-1
 + d
r-1
j-1¸k
    if r > q
. 
We can then proceed as in the SVG case. We find that for the ternary UNSC: 
β'NPM = 0.0111 and β'PM = 0.0227. 
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1.3 Chapter Summary 
The thesis is comprised of three chapters, each of which builds on the contributions of the 
preceding chapter(s). In Chapter 2 we empirically estimate the probability that a country 
with given characteristics is elected to the UNSC. Addressing this question empirically is 
not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional 
and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. 
Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyse a dataset of 180 elections from 
1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between 
the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving 
each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing 
world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability. 
By contrast, development aid does not predict election.  
In Chapter 3 we develop a new class of voting game that is sufficiently general to describe 
the UNSC. We term this class of games council voting games. In a council voting game 
(CVG), a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the 
members, as describes, e.g., UNSC. Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante 
(procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts 
are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no 
CVG can meet all three concepts. We then use the empirically estimated membership 
probabilities from Chapter 2 to apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the 
UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.   
In Chapter 4 we use equity measures developed for council voting games in Chapter 3 to 
formally appraise alternative reform options for the UNSC. In particular, we analyse eight 
“structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals, and consider 
separately the effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals – 
the European Union acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for 
18 
 
permanent members – robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and 
efficiency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to 
resolve. 
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Chapter 2 
Determinants of Election to the United Nations 
Security Council 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Endowed with the legal power to authorise whatever foreign policies it deems necessary to 
maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has become the preeminent 
organ of the United Nations. It has the legal authority to suspend economic and diplomatic 
relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorise the use of armed force (see 
Hurd, 2007; Chapman, 2011; Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Voeten, 2001). The body 
includes 15 members: the five ever-present Permanent Members, and the ten Non-
Permanent Members, who must win election to serve limited two-year terms.  
Our study seeks to explain which countries win election to the UNSC as NPMs. Note that 
at least four NPMs must vote in favour of a resolution for it to pass, giving these members 
a central role on the world stage. The President of the Security Council – a position that 
rotates among the members – has influence over the agenda and the order of voting (Bailey 
and Daws, 1998: 130-131). Most importantly, the UNSC votes by open ballot so that the 
voice of an elected member has a global reach on central matters of world security. 
Accordingly, some countries appear willing to bribe and reward NPMs. For instance, the 
United States increases bilateral foreign aid by more than 50 per cent when a country 
serves on the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). Also, NPMs become more likely to 
receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with 
relatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2010). Asian NPMs see their 
loans from the Asian Development Bank rise around 30 per cent (Lim and Vreeland, 
2013).  
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Understanding which countries receive these rewards can serve to inform longstanding 
economic questions over the allocation and effects of foreign aid and IMF/World Bank 
loans (see, e.g., Easterly, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith, 2010). Does the UNSC election process direct these funds towards countries with 
particular characteristics? Kuziemko and Werker (2006; 909), following Malone (2000), 
assert that “Service on the Council is by no means random”. Yet, to our knowledge, no 
established study details the systematic determinants of election to the Security Council.
11
 
The power to elect the NPMs formally rests in the hands of the United Nations General 
Assembly, which includes delegates from all UN member countries. Usually, however, the 
UNGA vote serves as a mere ratification of decisions made by regional caucuses, which 
play a privileged role in the nomination process. The determinants of UNSC election may 
therefore differ across regions. Only when there remains disagreement at the regional level, 
which happens in 20 per cent of elections by our count, does the UNGA vote become 
meaningful. On these occasions, the interplay of two separate sets of preferences – those at 
the regional level, and those at the global level (the UNGA) – determine election to the 
UNSC.  
What shapes these preferences? To choose NPMs, the UN Charter calls on government 
representatives to consider “the contribution of members of the United Nations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the 
Organization.” In practice, however, matters are more complex. A detailed set of 
procedural rules and at least two unwritten gentlemen’s agreements also shape the UNSC 
election procedure. Moreover, UN Ambassadors appear to consider factors beyond 
                                                 
11
 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) contains a brief analysis using a probit model, though the authors’ 
primary concern is with the effects of UNSC membership. Narrower analyses of election from particular 
regions include Lim and Vreeland (2013), who use a logit model conditioned on year to examine the election 
of Asian countries to the UNSC. Also, Scharioth (2010) presents an analysis of election to various UN 
committees, including the UNSC, but solely for Western European countries. Two working papers on the 
broader election of members to the UNSC that have been presented include Iwanami (2012) and Schmitz and 
Schwarze (2012). In contrast, thorough qualitative accounts of the selection of specific UNSC members have 
been published, such as those found in Malone (1998, 2000), Jayakumar (2011), and, for the early years of 
the UNSC, Padelford (1960).  
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contributions to peacekeeping: political affiliations, economic strength, and foreign aid 
may all play a role. For instance, Iceland’s sudden financial collapse in 2008 seemingly 
derailed what had previously looked a secure candidacy, while US support for the 
candidature of Guatemala appeared important in stymieing the rival candidacy of 
Venezuela in 2006. Cases such as these might just represent idiosyncrasies, but they may 
also be part of a regular pattern. How then should one go about investigating the systematic 
determinants of UNSC election? 
To investigate discrete choice settings, scholars often employ the conditional (fixed 
effects) logit model in which a single decision-maker chooses a single option according to 
utility maximisation (see McFadden, 1973). The UNSC election process differs from this 
model in at least two respects. First, as discussed above, up to two different sets of 
preferences can be in play: the regional and the global. Second, in some election years the 
UNGA regularly elects two candidates from one region, not just a single candidate. We 
therefore develop a multiple-discrete choice model that extends the conditional logit model 
to allow, in a simple way, for the separate identification of two intermingling sets of 
preferences, and for the number of choices from the set of alternatives to vary (from zero 
to two). 
Our empirical analysis of election to the UNSC considers five broad theoretical 
perspectives: (i) Does the UNGA follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace, 
as directed by the UN Charter? (ii) Does the receipt of foreign aid predict UNSC election? 
(iii) Is election driven by international power or close relationships with powerful 
countries? (iv) Do cultural traits play a role? (v) Do governments practice a turn-taking 
norm of sharing seats by rotating through the eligible candidates? The last hypothesis 
derives from the common misconception that membership on the UNSC “rotates” through 
the UN membership. Formally, membership does not rotate, but in practice the regional 
groups and the UNGA might follow such a norm.  
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Analysing data on UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005
12
, we find some evidence of a 
commitment to peace. At least countries engaged in intra- or inter-state conflict since the 
end of the Cold War are less likely to win election from Africa or from Latin America and 
the Caribbean. There is also a positive link between troop contributions to UN 
peacekeeping missions and election probability for Africa and Asia. 
As for international power, all regions bar one exhibit some evidence of a preference for 
populous countries. We also find evidence that richer countries, measured by gross 
national income (GNI) per capita, enjoy an advantage in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  
We find only patchy, and somewhat mixed, evidence that foreign financial support 
determines election. US economic assistance does not predict election from the developing 
world. US military support similarly plays little role in regional decisions. When the 
UNGA votes, however, countries that receive US military aid – as opposed to development 
aid – are more likely to win election.  
Political-cultural factors appear to hold occasional influence within regions. Countries that 
share a common political ideology with their region are more likely to be elected in some 
regions, but not in others. There are also mixed effects for countries with a history of 
colonialism. A British colonial legacy helps in Asia, Latin America and Western Europe 
but not in Africa. Attitudes to corruption are also mixed: corruption pays only in Africa 
and Latin America, and the effect in Africa is of marginal statistical significance. 
Contrasting these findings, the UNGA has shunned corrupt countries since the end of the 
Cold War. Indeed, our results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity in the 
determinants of UNSC election across regions. Therefore, while culture and history do not 
seem to matter for UNSC election within regions, they may nevertheless drive differences 
across regions. 
                                                 
12
 Although some variables are available past 2005, a significant number of the variables we use only exist up 
to 2005. Extending the dataset beyond this would therefore require much more significant imputation and 
likely negate the benefit of the extra data. 
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The data analysis does reveal a “turn-taking” norm in the regional selection process. A 
country whose turn arrives is more likely to receive regional nomination, which accords 
with the common “rotation” perception. This finding stands as the only one that holds 
across all regions and time periods without exception. As seems reasonable, however, the 
turn-taking rights that influence selection at the regional level do not seem to influence 
UNGA voting over contested seats. 
The results of this study contribute to a number of literatures. First, they relate to the 
ongoing discussion of UN reform, and reform of the UNSC in particular (Franck, 2003; 
O’Neill, 1996; Hosli et al., 2011). This debate centres on the question of representation but 
strangely lacks a systematic understanding of the current determinants of UNSC 
membership. Our findings may help to mitigate this difficulty by clarifying whom the 
election practices advantage. With an understanding that the two main determinants centre 
on a tendency to choose populous countries and to respect an egalitarian norm of turn-
taking, we can recast the debate as connected to a central theme in democratic theory: 
majoritarian principals versus minority rights. 
Our analysis also connects to the wider literature on whether the selection of leaders is fair 
in the sense that it can be explained solely by the quality of the candidates (e.g., 
Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003; Diamond and Toth, 2007). Although “quality” is not 
easily defined in the context of UNSC membership, we include in our analysis certain 
country characteristics that seem unrelated to quality, such as religion (the proportion of 
the population that is Muslim) and voting patterns in the UNGA (how often a country 
votes with the United States/Russia), and thereby provide an implicit test of the “fairness” 
of the election process. As we find that these factors do not have systematic effects, 
reformers can focus on the influences that do appear to matter and judge as to whether 
populous countries deserve to win election more often or if everyone should have a turn – 
the two patterns that the data analysis does support. 
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Our study further contributes to the related literature on the selection of political leaders 
more generally. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) find that democracies 
select better educated leaders as compared to autocracies. A link between democracy and 
UNSC membership might therefore arise if better-educated leaders are better-able to 
negotiate for UNSC membership. To explore this, we consider whether democracy indeed 
predicts UNSC membership – we find, however, mixed results: Western Europe has long 
had a preference for democracy, and we see similar preferences emerging in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. We do not detect a robust effect of 
democracy in Africa or Asia.  
Finally, we offer a generic econometric model of elections where there is a nomination 
process at one level and an endorsement vote at another. In our case, the levels are regional 
and global, and the model has applicability to a wide range of selection processes including 
the selection of membership in other UN bodies and other international organisations. 
Scholars may further employ the model to analyse the selection of leaders within federalist 
systems or within countries with primary rounds of voting at different district-levels.
13
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the UNSC election process, and 
Section 2.3 presents various hypotheses about the determinants of election to the UNSC. In 
Section 2.4 we formally develop the econometric model, providing a likelihood equation 
for UNSC election, and we discuss other details of our methodology. Section 2.5 presents 
the results, and Section 2.6 concludes with a summary discussion of the implications of our 
main findings. 
 
                                                 
13
 Recent contributions in this area with relevance to our approach include Glasgow et al. (2012) and Golder 
et al. (2012).  
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2.2 The election process 
The UNSC election process for NPMs follows certain rules and agreements.
14
 The ten 
NPM seats are divided among five regional caucusing groups: one country from Eastern 
Europe (EE); two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); two from the 
Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño); 
and five from Africa and Asia.
15
 An unwritten, but unbroken, gentlemen’s agreement 
divides the five seats for Africa and Asia into three seats for Africa and two seats for Asia. 
Around 1968, a further unrecorded agreement between Africa and Asia reserved one of 
their five seats for an Arab state with the regions taking turns every two years to provide a 
suitable candidate (Security Council Report, 2011: 7). This seat is often called the “Arab 
swing seat.” We control for this institutional arrangement in the empirical analysis. 
The UNGA conducts staggered elections for five seats each autumn. Terms begin in 
January the following year.
16
 To be eligible for election as a NPM, a country must, first, 
belong to one of the five regional caucusing groups. Prior to 2000, when it gained 
temporary membership in the WEOG, Israel was not a member in any group (Security 
Council Report, 2011: 6); and Estonia, having joined the UN in 1991, did not become a 
member in EE until 2004 (Estonia, 2011) while it awaited the outcome of an (ultimately 
unsuccessful) application to the WEOG (Daws, 1999). Kiribati, which has never delegated 
a permanent representative to the UN, is the only country to presently belong to no group 
(UN, 2012). Second, NPMs in the final year of their term cannot run for immediate re-
                                                 
14
 Much of the background for this section can also be found on the web site of the Security Council Report, 
an independent non-profit organisation affiliated with Columbia University. We also draw on Luck (2006). 
15
 Before 1966, there were only six elected members of the UNSC. Composition was typically: two Latin 
American countries; one Middle Eastern country; one East European country; and two from the British 
Commonwealth countries. The “others” in the modern-day WEOG include descendent countries of Western 
Europe, mainly from the British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The United States 
also caucuses with this group, as do Turkey and, more recently, Israel (see, e.g., Security Council Report, 
2011). See Daws (1999) for a further account of the development of the UN regional groups. 
16
 The term of the single Eastern European representative begins in even years. The two representatives of the 
WEOG group begin their terms in odd years. The terms for the two representatives of the GRULAC are 
staggered; the UNGA elects one each year. The Asia group’s two seats are similarly staggered. The three 
seats filled by the Africa group are also staggered with two terms beginning in even years and one term 
beginning in odd years. The term of the Arab representative (shared between Asia and Africa) begins in even 
years. 
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election (UN Charter 23(2)). The Permanent Members of the UNSC – China, France, 
Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, and the United States – cannot 
be elected as NPMs.  
Countries may declare candidacy by notifying the Chairman of their regional group.
17
 
Before voting begins in the UNGA, the Chairman of each group is invited to announce the 
countries that have declared candidacy (the Chairman’s list).18 Despite this apparent ease 
of candidacy, in practice, few countries make the Chairman’s list. Although details of the 
negotiations at the regional level are scarce, there appears to be a preference for the choice 
of NPMs to be kept “in house,” insofar as is possible. The vote in the UNGA is, as a result, 
usually sidelined by regional groups offering a “clean slate,” whereby the Chairman 
announces only as many candidatures as seats available.
 
Contested elections, when the 
Chairman announces more candidatures than seats available, appear to occur when efforts 
at agreement at the regional level have failed.
19
  
Africa appears to have the most disciplined rules for selecting candidates.
20
 It operates a 
system of turn-taking within sub-regional groups, which should, in theory, ensure that all 
countries in Africa eventually serve on the Security Council.
21
 Even here, however, the 
situation is more complex than might first appear. According to Security Council Report 
(2011: 6) there are at least three complications. First, countries that can claim to straddle 
more than one geographic region have chosen to shift from one group to another. Second, 
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 We know from the UNGA minutes that the group Chairmen stand up in sequence before the vote and 
announce the group candidacies. The Chairman position rotates among the region members, and terms last 
one month. See various issues of the Journal of the United Nations for details on specific elections 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/journal.asp, accessed 5 April 2012). 
18
 Sometimes countries announce their intention to run years in advance. Other times they do so much later, 
even in the midst of the elections themselves. The timing of such announcements appears idiosyncratic and 
data are, unfortunately, not kept.  
19
 For the 36 election-years (1970-2005) we analyse, the WEOG is the most competitive group, with nine 
contested elections, and EE is the least competitive, with just five. As we detail further in footnote 23, we 
define an election as “contested” if an additional candidate receives ten votes or more. Using this threshold, 
there are a total of 36 “contested” elections out of 180 total elections, or 20 per cent. 
20
 Africa is the only region for which we have found explicit rules, codified by the African Union in their 
“Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System – Doc. 
EX.CL/213 (VIII).” See African Union (2006: 8). 
21
 North Africa and Central Africa rotate one seat every two years; Western Africa has one seat every two 
years; and Eastern Africa and Southern Africa rotate one seat every two years. See Security Council Report 
(2011: 6). 
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challengers can emerge within the same sub-regional grouping, upsetting the rotation.
22
 
Last, within a subgroup, some members may choose to run more often, while others 
choose, or are persuaded, to run less frequently or not at all. 
To win election, a country must receive at least two-thirds of the votes in the UNGA (UN 
Charter 18(2)). When no candidate meets this threshold, the UNGA holds runoff elections. 
On rare occasions, there are many rounds, and no country can garner the required two-
thirds majority; compromise candidates have emerged in these instances. In theory, 
members of the UNGA face no requirement to vote for “Chairman’s list” countries, though 
in practice, they seldom do otherwise (save for isolated protest votes). Therefore, to date, 
after a Chairman has announced a “clean slate” the UNGA has almost always ratified the 
regional selection.
23
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Who wins election to the UNSC? Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) present a cursory 
examination of this question using a simple probit model in an effort to show the 
exogenous nature of UNSC membership selection for their study of the effects of 
membership.
24
 No published study has presented, however, an exclusively focused 
examination of the question of UNSC election using quantitative methods. In the next 
section, we offer the main contribution of this chapter: a multiple-discrete choice model to 
examine the joint determinants of UNSC election at the regional and global levels. First, 
however, we draw on the broad literature in international relations and political economy, 
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 According to Security Council Report (2009: 6), such queue-jumping occurred three times in the sample 
period: Nigeria queue-jumped Niger in 1977, and Guinea-Bissau in 1993, and Ghana queue-jumped Liberia 
in 1985. 
23
 We are aware of only one exception. In the elections of 1993, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau were nominated 
by the group Chairman for the two African seats. Rwanda garnered sufficient votes (153) in the first round to 
win election, while Guinea-Bissau only received 82 votes, at which point Nigeria entered the race, eventually 
winning election in four rounds, when Guinea-Bissau withdrew its candidacy. 
24
 Bashir and Lim (in press) challenge this assumption. 
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as well as qualitative accounts of UNSC election, to develop the testable hypotheses that 
we apply to our statistical model. 
We begin with the UN Charter, which asks members of the UNGA to elect UNSC 
members on the basis of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. We thus propose to test the impact of the contributions that countries make to UN 
peacekeeping missions, measured as the log of the number of troops supplied. We also 
include indicator variables of whether a country is involved in conflict, such as an 
international military dispute or a civil war. We further test for an effect of democracy, 
which is linked to the idea of peace in the sense that it is associated with a commitment to 
openness and the principles of justice.
25
 
Two further hypotheses reflect ideas coming from the political economy literature. A 
growing literature shows that countries receive perks from UNSC membership, including 
US foreign aid (e.g., Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), World Bank projects (Dreher et al., 
2009a), and IMF loans with comparatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al., 2009b, 2010). 
If these same perks that result from UNSC membership were also found to predict UNSC 
membership, this would point to the presence of development cycles whereby countries 
that gain election receive perks that, in turn, increase their prospects of future election. 
Countries outside of this cycle would, however, lose out. To test this possibility, we 
consider whether US economic and military assistance, IMF program participation, and the 
number of new World Bank projects, predict election to the UNSC.
26
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 On the association of democracy with openness, see Hollyer et al. (2011). On the association with justice 
see Dowding et al. (2004). On the general proclivity of democracies to peace, see Russett and Oneal (2001). 
For a contrasting view, see Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008). 
26
 IMF programs themselves come in cycles (Conway, 2007). Omitting participation in IMF programs might 
thus bias our results in favour of finding a turn-taking norm. A substantial literature argues that IMF and 
World Bank loans might be given for political-economic reasons rather than need (e.g., Copelovitch, 2009; 
Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Kaja and Werker, 2010; Kilby, 2009, 2013; Reynaud and Vauday, 2009; Stone, 2002, 
2004). As for bilateral foreign aid, we limit our attention to the US role for two reasons: (1) its prominent 
place – both in quantitative magnitude and in the literature, (2) parsimony. If we include foreign aid from all 
potential countries, degrees of freedom become low in certain regions. Preliminary analyses of foreign aid 
patterns from other OECD countries did not reveal any statistically significant correlation with UNSC 
election. We suggest that more in depth analyses – for example Japan’s use of foreign aid to win favour – be 
explored in country- or region-specific studies. 
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If countries expect perks from membership on the UNSC, then perhaps more heavily 
indebted governments push harder to be elected. Or causality may run the other way: 
perhaps when governments anticipate that they will be elected to the UNSC, they allow 
their countries to go deeper into debt, anticipating a bail-out on the horizon. Either way, 
levels of indebtedness may predict UNSC membership. We test this hypothesis using the 
log of debt service as a percentage of gross national income. 
If UNSC membership is valuable, heavily indebted countries may well desire membership, 
but they may not be in a strong position to win. Stiff competition for UNSC seats may lead 
the most powerful countries to win election most often. Having worked with the Canadian 
government in their successful 1998 election bid, Malone (2000) notes the importance of 
campaign funds. Canada, for example, apparently spent USD 1.3 million. Scharioth (2010) 
argues that “realist” variables measuring a country’s power predict election to a wide range 
of UN committees, at least for the WEOG. To test the impact of a country’s strength, we 
consider three measures: population size (logged), per capita income (logged, measured in 
constant USD), and territorial size (logged).
27
  
A government’s connections to powerful countries might also affect its country’s election 
prospects. We measure international connections in four ways. First, we include two 
variables to capture how frequently each country votes in the UNGA with the United 
States and USSR/Russia, respectively. Second, we include an indicator for countries with 
“pariah” status in the eyes of one or more of the major powers, and hence subject to US 
and/or UN sanctions, as defined by Morgan et al. (2006). Third, we test whether 
membership of various political groupings that operate within the UN – the Group of 77 
(G77), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and 
JUSCANZ (a subset of the WEOG including Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and 
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 We use GNI/capita, as opposed to the more common GDP/capita, as it is the measure of income used by 
the UN in the computation of member state contributions to the General and Peacekeeping budgets. We also 
follow the UN’s methodology in using USD exchange rate estimates of GNI. These, we argue, are more 
appropriate than PPP estimates in this context, as what is more relevant is international, rather than domestic, 
purchasing power. 
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New Zealand) – predicts UNSC election.28 Last, membership in other non-UN groupings 
may also be important, so we allow for an effect of membership of the European Union 
(EU) and NATO. 
Cultural affinity may also matter. Variables we use to test the influence of culture include 
the percentage of the country that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. We also test if a 
history of British or French colonisation plays a role.
29
 Beyond religious and historical 
affinities, we test the importance of political affinity within the region, measuring the 
percentage of the region with which the chief executive shares the same broad political 
ideology (either left, centre, or right).
30
 We also consider another variable that may be 
related to culture: the level of corruption associated with a country. On the one hand, 
perceived corruption may hurt if regions and the UNGA disdain such countries. On the 
other, corruption may help if such countries willingly disregard norms of turn-taking, 
jumping the queue while paying whatever bribes necessary to win support. 
Finally, behavioural norms that have evolved within the decision-making process may also 
play a role. One such norm, which is widely observed in human evolution, as well as in a 
wide range of other species, is that of turn-taking (Colman and Browning, 2009; Franz et 
al., 2011). In the context of the UNSC election process, the turn-taking norm implies that 
membership on the UNSC should rotate among the members of each caucusing group. 
This turn-taking norm relates to the egalitarian norm, which features importantly in the 
literature on distributive justice (e.g., Rawls, 1971; Deutsch, 1985), and is consistent with 
recent models of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).  
The Africa group explicitly claims to operate according to the turn-taking norm, but 
whether some degree of turn-taking occurs among the remaining regions is less clear. To 
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 Because of substantial overlap in membership between G77 and NAM, indicator variables for membership 
of each cannot be included in the same regression equation. Instead we create three separate indicator 
variables: one for countries that are members of both groupings, and one for countries that are members only 
of NAM or only of G77, respectively. 
29
 Given that UNSC membership is consequential for foreign aid, membership is a transmission channel by 
which colonial history can affect current development. See Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Iyer (2010) and 
Bruhn and Gallego (2012) for recent analyses. 
30
 The variable is coded zero for non-ideological governments.  
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test the possibility that a region practices the turn-taking norm, we construct a variable, 
“turn-taking,” which is calculated as the number of years a country has waited to serve on 
the UNSC divided by the number of countries currently eligible for election.
31
 If the turn-
taking norm holds, this variable should be positively correlated with election.  
Thus, we consider five broad perspectives: (i) a commitment to peace, (ii) a foreign aid 
story, (iii) a realist international relations perspective, (iv) a cultural approach, and (v) a 
turn-taking norm. Table 2.1 summarises our hypotheses and the variables we use to test 
them along with their sources. 
2.4 Econometric Model and Methodology 
2.4.1 Preliminaries 
Let the set of members of the UNGA in year t be decomposed into the set of member 
countries with permanent member status (PM) and the set of all other “ordinary” member 
countries. Denote J = { }Africa,Asia,EE,GRULAC,WEOG  as the set of caucusing groups 
(regions), and let the set of ordinary member countries belonging to region j in year t be 
denoted Rjt, where t  {0,…,T}. We let Rj = t Rjt 
denote the set of all past and present 
members of caucusing group j, and we define Cij as the i
th
 country within Rj. The set of 
ordinary member countries belonging to a caucusing group in year t (a necessary condition 
to serve as a NPM in year t + 1) is therefore Rt = j Rjt.  
Let NPMt denote the set of NPMs on the UNSC in year t, then the UNSC in a given year, t, 
is defined by 
.PMNPMUNSC tt   
It is helpful to partition Rt to reflect different categories of eligibility. In any given year a 
                                                 
31
 Using the empirical model, which we present in the next section, we tested several possible measures of a 
turn-taking norm against a benchmark of perfect turn-taking. In a given year, let ti denote the number of years 
since Cij was last elected to the UNSC (or since it entered the UN, if no such instance), t   denote the mean of 
ti and η denote the number of countries, excluding Cij, eligible for election. The measures we considered 
were: (1) ti; (2) ti / η; (3) ti - η; (4) 1{ti > t   }; and (5) (ti - t   )1{ti > t   }, where 1{A} is the function taking the value 1 
if condition A is true and 0 otherwise. We found the second of these measures to be best suited for capturing 
turn-taking effects. 
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set of ordinary member countries – NPMs in the first year of their terms – gain automatic 
membership of the UNSC in the following year (At): 
.\ 1 ttt NPMNPMA  
A second set of ordinary member countries, those that are in the final year of their term on 
the UNSC, are ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (It): 
.1 ttt NPMNPMI  
The remaining ordinary member countries are eligible for election to the UNSC in the 
following year (Et): 
.\ ttt NPMRE   
Each of the sets {At,Et,It,NPMt} can, in turn, be partitioned by region to give the sets 
{Ajt,Ejt,Ijt,NPMjt}. Last, historical data on non-permanent membership of the UNSC are 
summarised by the indicator variable dijt, where:
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2.4.2 Preferences 
Denote the utility to the members of region j from electing country i in period t to the 
UNSC (to serve in periods t + 1 and t + 2) as uijt = βjxijt, where xijt contains the 
characteristics of Cij in year t and βj contains the preference weights of region j. Similarly, 
denote by uGAit   = β
GA
xijt the utility to the members of the UNGA of electing country i in 
period t.  
Election to the UNSC can be conceived as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the 
regional groups make nominations, resulting in the Chairman of each region announcing to 
the UNGA a set of candidate countries Njt  Ejt for election to the UNSC. In the second 
                                                 
32
 UNSC membership data are found on its official Web site (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc).  
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stage, the UNGA votes. As discussed in Section 2.2, because members of the UNGA 
almost always choose to vote for members of Nt, the vote in the second-stage can be 
viewed as taking place over these countries only.  
One approach to estimation is to model this two-stage process explicitly (see, e.g., de Vries 
et al., 2009). The resulting likelihood function is complex, however, and often fails to 
converge in estimations that include more than a few variables.  
Instead, we simplify the problem in two important ways. First, we treat the decision-maker 
in the first stage (the region) as myopic. That is, the region’s selection does not depend on 
how the UNGA will act. To allow for strategic interdependence would make our model 
intractable. Moreover, we suspect that regions do not act strategically in proposing 
candidates, although we acknowledge that individual countries have made strategic 
decisions to enter – and not to enter – specific elections.  
Second, we treat the actors in each stage as unitary decision-makers. We make this 
simplification because we are interested in a country’s overall chance of election onto the 
UNSC. Our reduced-form representation of the real election process should be a good 
approximation, for the vast majority of elections result in landslides for the winning 
candidate. Regions tend to operate by consensus while the two-thirds majority rule in the 
UNGA tends to produce a single dominant candidate – with some exceptions. These 
exceptions notwithstanding, our decision to model each collective decision-maker as a 
unitary actor allows us to construct an estimable model that proxies the typical election 
process fairly well. Future work might explore modifications of one or more of these 
assumptions.
33
 One could, for instance, model the UNGA as a collective and estimate how 
many votes the candidate-countries receive.  
Under these assumptions we may employ a simple mathematical formulation to capture the 
idea that election to the UNSC may be co-determined by two separate sets of preferences: 
                                                 
33 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these two possible extensions.  
 34 
those of the caucusing group (which shape the nominations) and those of the UNGA 
(which votes over nominated candidates). Specifically, we model UNSC election as arising 
from a composite latent utility function, U, of electing Cij at time t, given by 
                                               ,1 ijtijtjtGAitjtijt uuU    (2.1) 
which is a weighted average of the underlying regional and UNGA preferences, plus a 
stochastic component εijt. The parameter αjt  [0,1] measures the weight attributable to the 
preferences of the UNGA, and may vary by region and year. In particular, we relate αjt to 
the size of Njt. If |Njt| equals the number of eligible seats, njt, the UNGA merely “rubber 
stamps” the clean slate of nominations from the caucusing group, and its preferences play 
no role (αjt = 0). At the other end of the spectrum, if |Njt| = |Ejt| (every eligible member of a 
region is nominated to the UNGA), then the regional preferences play no direct role, thus 
αjt = 1. We assume that αjt adjusts linearly between these two extremes, such that:
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2.4.3 Election Probabilities 
We view the elections to the UNSC as choosing, for each region, njt  {0,1,2} countries 
from the set of eligible countries according to the utility function Uijt, where njt = |NPMjt| – 
|Ajt|. This setting extends the well-known choice model of McFadden (1973) in two 
important respects. First, the set of alternatives is time varying. This occurs because (i) 
countries move between the sets (Ajt,Ejt,Ijt) from year-to-year as a result of the realisations 
of dijt; and (ii) entry and exit from Rt, principally as new members join the UN and others 
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 We compute αjt using Costa Rica (2005), which contains full UNGA voting records for all UNSC elections 
prior to 2004. Voting records for 2004 onwards are taken directly from the relevant UNGA minutes. Costa 
Rica (2005) does not explicitly identify the “Chairman’s list” countries. In the overwhelming majority of 
elections the patterns of voting in the UNGA clearly identify the “Chairman’s list” countries (who garner 
large numbers of votes) from countries who are merely recipients of votes cast in protest or error (who garner 
only one or two votes). In a small number of cases the voting patterns identify the “Chairman’s list” countries 
less clearly, as a country garners an intermediate number of votes between five and fifteen. In these cases we 
identify the set of “Chairman’s list” countries as those that received ten or more votes. Our main results are, 
however, robust to any choice of threshold between three and twenty votes.          
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leave.
35
 Second, the number of members to be chosen from Ejt is also time-variant, and 
need not be unity. 
The tractability of McFadden’s model is lost when, as in the UNSC, more than a single 
alternative is chosen simultaneously. To retain tractability, we therefore model election by 
the UNGA as a sequential process, in which countries are elected one-by-one. This 
methodology develops that of Manski and Sherman (1980), who use a multiple-discrete 
choice model to examine household car purchases. Whereas a family may buy two of the 
same car, however, a country cannot have dual membership of the UNSC in any year, so 
we must explicitly rule out this possibility. Formally, in each of njt rounds, there is a new 
realisation of ε and a single country from Ejt is elected according to utility maximisation 
(dij = 1 ⇔ Uij > Ukj k  i). In the case when njt = 2, if the same country is elected in both 
rounds, the result is annulled and the whole process repeated until two distinct countries 
are selected. 
If we assume, following Manski and Sherman (1980), that the εijt in equation (1) are 
independent across regions and time and have identical type-1 extreme value distributions, 
we then have that:
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 In the sample period 68 countries joined the UN, and four (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yemen Arab 
Republic, and Yugoslavia) left. Table 2.3 provides further details. 
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 Elections are not independent across time, however. Each year’s election depends on the outcome of the 
previous year’s election in a recursive manner, owing to the evolution of Et.  
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When only one seat is contested in a region, the distributional assumptions on εijt imply 
that the probability in equation 2.5 of a single country being elected to the UNSC from Ejt 
follows the conditional logit form.
37
 We then use pijt
1  to form equation 2.6 as the binomial 
probability of observing a distinct country pair containing Cij, where the denominator 
corrects for the impossibility of a single country obtaining dual membership. Note that, by 
construction, ∑kEjt pijt
njt = njt. Equations 2.2-2.4 require no further explanation. 
Using equations 2.1-2.6 the likelihood of having observed a given NPMjt is therefore 
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where Ljt
2 uses the relevant multinomial distribution to compute the joint probability of 
having observed a given country pair. The likelihood function for having observed 
{ }NPMt : t  { }1,…,T  is then 
                                                        
.loglog
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  (2.7) 
2.4.4 Imputation 
Table 2.2 summarises the descriptive statistics of our data. Less than three per cent of our 
data points are coded as missing, yet a significant number of country-years are incomplete 
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 Although these distributional assumptions are strong, we note their necessity for retaining the conditional 
logit form. Also, when estimating the final likelihood in equation 2.7, we can allow for the possibility of 
within-group clustering. Because we model the probability of choosing Cij in year t as conditional on the 
number of eligible countries in year t, our model, like the original conditional logit, implicitly addresses fixed 
effects for year. For an approach that relaxes our distributional assumptions at some conceptual and 
computational cost see Hendel (1999).  
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for at least one variable (2,853 of 5,330). Dropping incomplete country-years is 
problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, as 
the probability of election in equations 2.5 and 2.6 are functions of the characteristics of 
every member of the eligible set, artificially excluding a country-year biases the estimates 
for the remaining countries in that year. From a practical perspective, the sample size 
becomes unduly small for some regions, leading to a failure of model convergence. 
We therefore employ multiple imputation techniques (with ten imputations).
38
 Of the 
variables that contain missing values, those that are continuous are each imputed using a 
truncated regression (to reflect, e.g., non-negativity constraints) that includes as 
independent variables all those that are fully observed. IMF program participation (the 
only binary variable to have missing observations) is similarly imputed, but with a logistic 
regression. 
2.4.5 Preference change 
Preferences, both regional and global, may change over time. In particular, Kim and 
Russett (1996) present evidence of a shift in preferences around the end of the Cold War: 
voting patterns in the UNGA shifted from an East-West orientation towards a North-South 
orientation.
39
 Accordingly, we consider two distinct time periods – during and after the 
Cold War, where we deem the Cold War to end in 1989. We report separate estimates for 
these two periods for variables where the effects for each period differ. 
 
2.4.6 Country-specific effects 
We would like to control for country-specific effects, as outlying countries that exhibit an 
idiosyncratic effect might drive some results, and obscure others. Indeed, as is observed by 
Schwartzberg (2003) and Zacher (2004), the UNSC membership data in Table 2.3 do 
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 The variables that contain missing values are: United States and Russia voting in the UNGA; debt service; 
shared regional ideology; control of corruption; and IMF program participation. 
39
 Although Voeten’s (2000) analysis suggests much subtler changes between the two periods. 
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contain some surprises. In particular, these studies highlight Saudi Arabia, which has never 
served on the UNSC, and before 2013 had not even gained a regional nomination, and 
Panama, which has been a UNSC member unusually often – it served three terms on the 
UNSC in the sample period (only Brazil and Argentina served more). We are also aware of 
the case of Mexico, whose participation in the UNSC elections of 2001 marked the end of 
two decades in which it had adopted a policy of not seeking election to the UNSC 
(Malone, 2000: note 7).
40
 
A complication is that a country-specific effect, if present at all, may exist at either the 
regional or global (UNGA) level, or at both levels. We therefore allow separately for 
country-specific effects at the regional and global levels. 
 
2.4.7 Model selection 
The discussions above imply that there is a vector of explanatory variables x = (s,s × w,c,r) 
we would like to use to explain UNSC election, where s denotes the vector of substantive 
variables relating to the hypotheses discussed in Section 2.3 (see Table 2.1), s × w denotes 
the vector of interaction terms between each substantive variable and a Cold War indicator 
variable, c is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the region utility 
function, and r is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the UNGA utility 
function. Estimating this “full” model is infeasible however, for x contains some 436 
variables, which exhausts the degrees of freedom for certain regions in the earlier years, 
and prevents estimation of the model.  
Instead, we adopt a model selection procedure that chooses a subvector of the explanatory 
variables for inclusion in the model. Our approach to model selection reflects a number of 
factors. First, because the full model cannot be estimated, backward-looking approaches 
cannot be applied. Second, because of the large number of explanatory variables, methods 
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 For more on the Mexican case, see, for example, Serrano and Kenny (2006: 298-314). We are grateful to 
Diego Dewar for this suggestion. 
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based upon computing a reasonable criterion for all possible subsets of x are also 
infeasible. These two considerations point to a forward-looking approach. As our model is 
non-linear, however, popular forward-looking algorithms for linear regression, such as the 
least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (Tibshirani, 1996) and least angle 
regression (Efron et al., 2004), are inapplicable in this context.  
We therefore employ a stepwise forward selection procedure that, in each stage, selects 
one additional variable into the model. In each stage, all elements of x not already selected 
into the model are added individually into the model, and the t-statistic of each variable is 
recorded. The variable recording the highest t-statistic is added to the model (and a new 
stage commenced) if it records statistical significance at the ten per cent level. Otherwise, 
the procedure ends.
41
 
We employ this model selection procedure to select two independent models. Model 1 is 
intended to provide a broad-based analysis of UNSC election in the presence of a full set of 
control variables. It is selected under the a-priori assumption that the elements of s belong 
to the model, such that the model selection procedure is applied only to the selection of 
Cold War interactions and regional and global country-specific effects. Model 2 is a test of 
the robustness of the substantive variables with respect to model selection, for it is selected 
without a-priori assumptions on inclusion. 
A subtlety that arises in the selection of Model 2 is that it is possible that the interaction 
between a substantive variable and a Cold War indicator is selected into the model, but the 
substantive variable itself is not. Because the interaction variable takes the value of the 
substantive variable during the Cold War and zero thereafter, this implies that the 
substantive variable is, in effect, included in the model for the Cold War period only. As it 
stands, however, there is no means for the selection procedure to include a substantive 
variable in only the post-Cold War period. In selecting Model 2, we therefore augment x 
with a further vector, s × (1 – w), which contains the interaction between each substantive 
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 This is the same as the ‘stepwise regression procedure’ described by Draper and Smith (1981: 307-309). 
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variable and a post-Cold War indicator variable.  
We also note that, because of the different assumptions maintained in selecting the two 
models, it is not, in general, expected that the variables selected into Model 2 will form a 
proper subset of those selected into Model 1. Also, although every variable selected into 
Model 2 shows statistical significance at ten per cent or better in the stage where it is 
selected, in some cases variables already included in the model may gradually lose 
statistical significance as further variables are included. Some variables may, therefore, not 
show statistical significance at the ten per cent level in the final model.  
 
2.5 Results 
We present two sets of results, which are both estimated using the likelihood function in 
equation 2.7 for UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005. The first set (presented in 2.4a) 
results from the procedure for Model 1 and thus includes the full set of control variables, as 
described in the previous section. The second set (presented in Table 2.4b) results from the 
procedure for Model 2 and thus includes the more robust findings, again, as described in 
the previous section. To match the timing of the election process, we lag the independent 
variables by one year relative to UNSC membership. We report robust standard errors, 
adjusted for the imputed data, and clustered on region × year, thereby allowing for within-
region and within-year correlation, respectively, and heteroskedasticity.
42
 We control for 
the operation of the Arab swing seat by the inclusion of an indicator for Arab countries 
eligible for election to the seat in a given year (see Table 2.1). 
The model selection procedure described in Section 2.4.7 selects 17 Cold War interaction 
effects into each of Models 1 and 2, although note that these 17 effects differ between 
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 As in other contexts, we are unable to adjust the standard errors for the effective degrees of freedom used 
by the model selection procedure itself. As such, it is appropriate to urge caution in the interpretation of 
findings on the margin of statistical significance at conventional levels. We note the necessity of such model 
selection, however, given the weak steer provided by theory, and the number of potential explanatory 
variables. 
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models. In Table 2.4a, cases where a Cold War interaction is selected show two separate 
coefficients side-by-side in the relevant column. The left-side coefficient is only for the 
period during the Cold War, and the right-side coefficient is only for the post-Cold War 
period. 
To present the results in this form, we re-analysed the final selected model, and, instead of 
including the substantive variable alongside its interaction variable, we include instead the 
two interaction variables associated with the substantive variable – one for the interaction 
with the Cold War indicator and the other for the interaction with the post-Cold War 
indicator. The coefficients for these two interaction variables are those reported in Table 
2.4a. Hence, the estimated coefficient we obtained for the Cold War interaction variable 
when included alongside the substantive variable corresponds to the difference between the 
two coefficients we report.
43
 The interpretation of the results in Table 2.4b is similar. In 
instances, however, where the selection procedure selected either the Cold War interaction 
variable or the post-Cold war interaction variable but not the associated substantive 
variable, two coefficients appear side-by-side, of which one is missing.  
The model selection procedure also selects a regional country-specific effect for 16 
countries into Model 1, and a global country-specific effect for nine countries.
44
 We 
include indicator variables for these countries in the model of Table 2.4a, though, for 
reasons of space, we do not report their effects in the Table. As well as selecting the known 
outliers discussed in Section 2.4.6, the other countries identified as possible outliers 
include Nigeria, an African country which has pursued an overt policy of queue-jumping 
(Security Council Report, 2009: 6).  
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 We do not include a separate Cold War intercept dummy because the conditional logit model has the 
property that any variable that takes the same value for every country in a group in a particular year (a Cold 
War dummy would come into this category) simply cancels out of the numerator and denominator (see 
equation 2.5 and footnote 37 above). 
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 The regional country-specific effects we allow for are (by region), Africa: Benin, Guinea, Madagascar, 
Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; EE: Bulgaria; the 
GRULAC: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama; the WEOG: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland. We allow for a global 
country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Greece, Madagascar, Romania and 
Slovakia. 
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As discussed previously, the country-specific effects selected into Model 2 need not 
correspond to those of Model 1. In practice, however, we observe a high degree of 
congruence: each of the 16 region country-specific effects allowed for in Model 1 are also 
selected into Model 2; only one global country-specific effect not selected into Model 1 is 
selected into Model 2 (the Philippines); and only one global country-specific effect 
selected into Model 1 is not selected into Model 2 (Egypt). 
Before discussing the results, we stress special caution in interpreting the results for 
Eastern Europe and the UNGA because of the limited number of observations that they 
include. The EE group contains the fewest countries and the most imputed data, while only 
36 out of the 180 elections in our sample are contested in the UNGA.
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2.5.1 Commitment to peace 
Turning to the results, we hypothesise above that a country’s commitment to peace should 
influence UNSC membership because of the explicit guidelines in the UN Charter. We test 
this hypothesis using a measure of inter- and intra-state conflict, a measure of peace-
keeping contributions, and a measure of democracy. At the regional level, we find some 
evidence to support the commitment-to-peace conjecture, albeit in somewhat different 
guises in each region. We find no evidence supporting the conjecture at the UNGA level – 
if anything, we find dictatorships more likely to win contested UNGA elections.  
During the Cold War period we find little evidence of an association between UNSC 
election and engagement in intra- or inter-state conflict. The effect of conflict for the 
GRULAC is actually positive during the Cold War (in both models). The finding is mainly 
driven by the nomination of Peru in 1983, which was engaged in civil conflict with 
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 The estimates for the UNGA in Tables 2.4a-b seem of a different order of magnitude compared to the 
estimates for the regional groups. This can be explained with reference to equation 2.1, which weights 
UNGA preferences by αjt, and group preferences by (1 – αjt) in the composite utility function. Even for 
election years with non-zero values of αjt, its value is typically close to zero; E(αjt | αjt ≠ 0) = 0.039, so the 
apparently large UNGA effects we estimate are offset by the very low weight UNGA preferences receive in 
the composite preference.  
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Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Note, however, that Barbados contested that election as 
a second GRULAC candidate. Since the end of the Cold War, Table 2.4b shows that, for 
Africa and the GRULAC, involvement in an international conflict significantly reduces a 
country’s chances of sitting on the UNSC; for both regions, the negative effect is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. The implied marginal effects of the model 
in Table 2.4a suggest, for instance, that engagement in conflict reduces the probability of 
election by around 0.01 in Africa – post-Cold War.46 This may seem small, but note that 
the average election probability in Africa for this period was only around 0.05. Hence, 
involvement in international conflict cuts this probability by around one-fifth.  
The UNGA does not appear to have strong preferences over engagement in conflict: during 
the sample period it twice elected conflict countries in contested elections: Nicaragua in 
1982, Peru in 1983. In 1993 it also elected Rwanda – then engaged in civil war – in a clean 
slate election, but did not elect the other African country on the slate, Guinea-Bissau, 
which was then not coded as being engaged in conflict (see footnote 23 for further details 
of this election). Overall, in neither time period do we observe a statistically significant 
effect at the ten per cent level. 
We also detect a role for peacekeeping troop contributions, although not in every region. 
Specifically, Table 2.4b shows that in Africa and Asia, the more troops a country 
contributes, the more likely it is to gain UNSC membership. The effect is significant at the 
one per cent level in Asia and at the five per cent level in Africa. A one per cent increase in 
troop contributions is associated with a 0.41 per cent rise in election probability in Asia, 
and a 0.19 per cent rise in election probability in Africa. We find no evidence of a role for 
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 We calculate elasticity and marginal effect estimates (marginal effects shown in tables 2.5a and b) for 
2006, the final year of our sample, using equation 2.5. We evaluate these using the mi predict command in 
Stata 12, at the group-specific means x¯jt. Different estimates apply to “clean slate” and “contested” elections. 
The former are evaluated at αjt = 0, and the latter at Ej( )αjt | αjt ≠ 0 . We find negligible differences between 
these estimates, however, so we do not report each separately. Estimates also vary according to njt: we report 
estimates for njt = 1, but in group-years with njt = 2, a different estimate based on equation 2.6 does apply in 
practice. Last, the estimates vary across years due to the evolution of the eligible set. We have evaluated the 
estimates for 2006 under different assumed eligibility conditions, and find this source of variation to be of 
minor proportions. 
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troop contributions in EE, the GRULAC, or the WEOG. Peacekeeping contributions do not 
appear to influence the UNGA either. 
Both models indicate that democratic countries in EE and the GRULAC are more likely to 
be elected in the post-Cold War era. This contrasts with the effect of political regime in 
these regions during the Cold War, when autocracies were more likely to be selected 
(although the autocracy effect in Eastern Europe is essentially artifactual – only one 
country-year is coded as a democracy, Poland in 1989). Table 2.4a also shows that 
democracy is positively associated with regional nomination in the WEOG. As may be 
seen from Table 2.4b, this result is driven by the Cold War era, for all countries in the 
WEOG are coded as democratic in the post-Cold War era. The only authoritarian regime 
ever elected to represent the WEOG was Spain in 1968. The dictatorships in Portugal and 
Greece never won election. Since democratising, Spain has been elected three times, and 
Portugal and Greece have each been elected twice. Democratic countries are less likely to 
be elected in the UNGA in Table 2.4a, but this result may not be robust, as democracy is 
not selected for the UNGA in Model 2. 
 
2.5.2 Foreign aid and debt 
With respect to foreign aid, we find only weak evidence that it plays a role, and not always 
in a consistent direction. In Table 2.4a, IMF program participation plays a role in the 
WEOG, where it is positively associated with election, and in Asia, where it is negatively 
associated with UNSC election. The IMF has become supremely unpopular in Asia since 
the East Asian Financial Crisis, so Asian support may genuinely decline for governments 
cooperating with the institution. Alternatively, IMF program participation might indicate 
political or economic weakness, reducing the incentives to apply, and the probability to 
receive, temporary UNSC membership. Neither of the IMF findings, however, is robust to 
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the stricter selection procedure of Model 2, and IMF program participation is thus not 
present at all in Table 2.4b.  
New World Bank projects are positively associated with receiving a regional nomination in 
Asia in both sets of results. The same finding also holds for the WEOG in Table 2.4a – but 
this effect does not survive in Table 2.4b – and for Africa during the Cold War in Table 
2.4b, but the effect is not robust to the presence of further controls in Table 2.4a. Both sets 
of results show, however, that countries with more newly approved World Bank projects 
are actually less likely to be elected by the UNGA. As there are contrasting effects at the 
regional and global levels, it is unclear whether, even in Asia, new World Bank projects 
have an overall positive effect upon election probability. 
US economic assistance plays a role only in the WEOG, where it associates negatively 
with UNSC election during the Cold War (Table 2.4b). This result, however, does not hold 
in the presence of wider controls in Table 2.4a. A somewhat stronger role is found for US 
military assistance, which, in both sets of results, associates positively with the probability 
of election by the UNGA. We also find that, during the Cold War, receipt of US military 
assistance associated negatively with obtaining a regional nomination in the WEOG. This 
result is present at the one per cent level in Table 2.4b, but at only the ten per cent level in 
Table 2.4a. Table 2.4a shows a negative correlation with nomination in Africa, statistically 
significant at the ten per cent level. A final result, seen only in Table 2.4b, is that US 
military assistance is positively associated with regional nomination in EE.  
Of interest, more heavily indebted countries are more likely to be elected in Africa and the 
GRULAC. As debt service contains the most imputed values of our variables, it is sensible 
to be cautious in interpreting these results. Indeed, the result for the GRULAC holds only 
in Model 2 (Table 2.4b), not in the presence of all the control variables. Still, as we find 
evidence of a turn-taking norm in these regions, governments may have a good idea of 
when they will get their chance to serve on the UNSC, and thus pursue lax macroeconomic 
policies in anticipation of the windfall in foreign aid that UNSC membership brings.  
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2.5.3 International power: population, economic development, political ties, and Pariah 
states 
Strictly speaking, US military aid does not count as official overseas development 
assistance, according to the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development. 
The fact that this variable influences UNGA contested elections may indicate that 
politically powerful countries strategically employ their influence in the UNSC election 
process. Further exploring the role of international power, we find that the statistical 
significance of one of our measures holds across all-but-one regions: the more populous a 
country, the more likely it is to take a seat on the UNSC. In both sets of results the 
statistical significance of the effect holds at least at the one per cent level in all regional 
groups except EE (although only during the post-Cold War period for the GRULAC). The 
coefficient estimates in Table 2.4b imply that a one per cent increase in population 
generates an increase in election probability of between 0.46 per cent (Africa) and 3.6 per 
cent (Asia). Interestingly, however, we find no evidence that the UNGA takes population 
into account in its voting decisions. 
In light of the significance of population, one might expect the statistical significance of a 
country’s level of economic development. We find a robust effect in Africa, Asia and the 
GRULAC (significant at the five per cent confidence level or better in Table 2.4b): richer 
countries in these regions are more likely to gain representation on the UNSC. Territorially 
large countries are also more likely to obtain a regional nomination in Asia and the 
GRULAC, as well as in EE, but these findings hold only in Table 2.4b. The UNGA does 
not appear to take either income or territorial size into account in its election decisions.  
As for political connections to powerful countries, we find no evidence that voting with the 
United States in the UNGA has an effect upon election to the UNSC. Voting with the 
Soviet Union/Russia is, however, positively associated with gaining group nomination in 
 47 
Africa and the GRULAC (Table 2.4b). Interestingly, Table 2.4b also shows that voting 
with the Soviet Union/Russia is associated with a large positive effect in the UNGA, 
significant at the five per cent level. The finding suggests a strong Soviet influence within 
the UNGA. None of these findings hold, however, in the presence of further controls in 
Table 2.4a. 
The “Pariah state” indicator for countries subject to US and/or UN sanctions shows 
evidence of a change in preferences over time. During the Cold War, sanctioned countries 
were largely unable to obtain regional nomination, as indicated by the strong negative 
findings in Africa and Asia. The principal exception was Cuba, which won election from 
the GRULAC in 1989. Since the Cold War, however, Table 2.4b indicates that sanctions 
do not predict UNSC election, with the exception of a negative association in the 
GRULAC. In the post-Cold War period, Nigeria in 1993, Indonesia in 1994, Sudan in 
2000, and Syria in 2001 have all obtained a regional nomination. Indonesia and Syria went 
on to win election in “clean slate” votes in the UNGA, Nigeria triumphed in a contested 
vote, and Sudan lost in a competitive vote. 
We also investigate whether membership in particular political groupings influences 
election to the UNSC. We find evidence that such membership matters in some regions, 
but not in the UNGA. Moreover, the effects on regional nomination go in different 
directions. In both models, we see that membership in the G77 – but not in the NAM – has 
a negative effect in Asia, but a positive effect in the GRULAC. In the GRULAC, dual 
membership in NAM and G77 also positively predicts regional nomination. No statistically 
significant effects from OIC membership are found in Table 2.4a, and it is, unsurprisingly, 
missing from the model in Table 2.4b. Similarly, membership in JUSCANZ is included 
only in the UNGA in Table 2.4b, and the estimated positive effect falls short of 
significance at the ten per cent level. As for groupings external to the UN, EU membership 
appears to raise a country’s probability of receiving a regional nomination in EE, but not in 
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the WEOG. NATO membership has a pronounced negative effect on regional nomination 
probability for members of EE, but also has no effect in the WEOG. 
 
2.5.4 Culture: colonial heritage, religion, and corruption 
Do cultural traits of a country influence its election prospects? In both sets of results we 
find evidence that countries with a history of British colonialism experience a greater 
probability of election in Asia, the GRULAC, and the WEOG, but the effect does not hold 
for Africa or the UNGA.
47
 In contrast, countries with a history of French colonialism do 
not appear to experience a greater probability of election. A common political ideology is 
seen in Table 2.4b to be associated with an increased probability of election for EE and the 
GRULAC. The finding survives the presence of further controls for the GRULAC but not 
for EE. We find no evidence of an effect of shared political ideology for the other regions 
or the UNGA.
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We also consider religion, in particular the proportion of the country’s population that is 
Muslim or Catholic. There are three findings regarding Muslim countries that appear in 
both sets of results. The first is that in the GRULAC Muslim countries are less likely to be 
elected to the UNSC in the post-Cold War era. Note that this finding may just be an artifact 
of the data, however, and not evidence of a real bias against Muslim countries in the 
GRULAC region. After all, there are only three countries coded as having a significant 
Muslim population (Suriname: 19.6 per cent, Guyana 9.0 per cent, and Trinidad and 
Tobago 5.9 per cent). Both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago served on the UNSC during 
the Cold-War era, but none have served in the post-Cold War era.  
The second finding is that in the WEOG Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to 
the UNSC. Here the effect appears driven by one country, Turkey, which never won 
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 The former British colonies in the WEOG are Ireland (elected twice) and Malta (elected once).  
48
 Note, however, that Potrafke (2009) finds that government ideology affects a country’s UNGA voting 
behaviour. 
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election to the UNSC during the sample period, but served three earlier terms representing 
Asia and one subsequent term representing the WEOG. The third finding is that Muslim 
countries are more likely to be selected to represent Asia. This finding may, however, owe 
to the effect of political groupings for all Asian countries with significant Muslim 
populations are members in OIC.
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 As for the Catholic variable, a higher proportion of 
Catholics among the population is associated with a lower probability of election in Asia 
(the finding holds in both Tables 2.4a and 2.4b). A much smaller negative effect is also 
found for the WEOG in Table 2.4b, but this result does not hold in the presence of further 
controls.  
The regions appear to have heterogeneous preferences over the control of corruption. In 
Table 2.4b we find no role for corruption in Asia or the WEOG. In Africa and the 
GRULAC, however, we find that corruption pays: we find a negative effect of the control 
of corruption on a country’s chances of becoming a UNSC member (significant at the ten 
and, respectively, five per cent levels). Ironically, Africa’s commitment to fairness in 
taking turns may be what makes corruption pay in this region, while in more competitive 
regions corruption plays no role because countries disregard turn-taking norms regardless 
of how corrupt their governments may be. On the other hand, the UNGA has tended to 
shun more corrupt countries at the global level, at least in the post-Cold War era (Table 
2.4b). 
 
2.5.5 The norm of taking turns 
We find widespread evidence of the operation of a turn-taking norm – not only in Africa: 
the longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of 
receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus. Both sets of results show the importance 
of the effect at the five per cent significance level or stronger. The estimates in Table 2.4b 
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 We do not control for OIC in Asia due to collinearity with the Muslim variable. When we do include them 
together, neither variable is statistically significant.  
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imply a range of substantive effects across regions: a one per cent increase in waiting time 
increases election probability by 6.1 per cent in the WEOG and 5.7 per cent in Asia, down 
to an increase of just 1.8 per cent in the GRULAC.
 
The common misperception that 
membership on the UNSC rotates therefore finds some support in the electoral patterns at 
the regional level. As might be expected, the UNGA does not appear influenced by the 
turn-taking rights that apply within the regions.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The Security Council is the preeminent organ of the United Nations. Membership confers 
significant international influence and also economic benefits. We set out to consider the 
characteristics of countries toward which the UNSC election process diverts these 
economic benefits. To that end, we considered five different perspectives as to the 
determinants of election to the UNSC.  
As candidature decisions at the regional level follow no codified rules (with the exception 
of Africa), and governments keep their negotiations behind closed doors, many factors 
likely remain unobserved. It is thus appropriate to treat our results with caution. 
Nevertheless, if election to the UNSC were entirely random, we would not expect the types 
of systematic relationships we report in Section 2.5. 
Our results suggest that the regional nomination process tends to allocate membership, and 
its associated economic benefits, according to a compromise between a norm to elect more 
powerful countries – populous countries from throughout the world and richer countries 
from Africa, Asia, and the GRULAC – and a norm for each country to receive a turn. 
Mediating this central compromise are a norm against nominating countries involved in 
civil or international war (in post-Cold War Africa and the GRULAC) and a norm in 
favour of countries that contribute more personnel to UN peacekeeping missions (in Africa 
and Asia). During the Cold War, the regions of Africa and Asia may have followed a norm 
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against nominating pariah countries whose presence on the UNSC would have upset one or 
more of the permanent members. If so, the norm seems to have weakened or disappeared 
in these regions during the post-Cold War era, and it may have emerged in the GRULAC.  
The UNGA has the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the UNSC election process 
in only around one election in five. When it does have a say, we see some evidence of the 
influence of powerful countries. Governments receiving US military aid are more likely to 
win contested elections, while countries voting with the Soviet Union/Russia in the UNGA 
also win contested elections more frequently. The UNGA appears less likely, however, to 
select countries heavily reliant on projects funded multilaterally through the World Bank. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the UNGA has also systematically directed membership 
away from countries perceived as having high levels of corruption. In contrast to the 
regional groups, however, UNGA decisions do not appear influenced by regional turn-
taking norms or by a country’s population or income. Broadly speaking, there is a lack of 
consistent evidence across regions and the UNGA for a role of foreign aid, and only 
occasional and heterogeneous evidence for cultural influences.  
These findings speak to a number of literatures. For instance, our findings on the control of 
corruption inform the debate over whether corrupt governments receive more or less 
foreign aid (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 2002). Our finding that countries involved in armed 
conflict sacrifice foreign aid through fewer appearances on the UNSC suggests an 
additional cost of conflict that is yet to be considered in the literature that seeks to measure 
such costs (e.g., Bozzoli et al., 2011). Last, our finding that preferences over election to the 
UNSC exhibit heterogeneity across regions may prove useful, as a case study, to scholars 
interested in the evolution of norms (e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 1994; Bendor, 2001). 
Because Security Council participation is consequential for different types of foreign aid, a 
heterogeneous election process implies that UNSC membership may serve as an 
instrument that such scholars can use as a measure of international political importance. 
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We caution, however, that our results suggest the importance of controlling for population 
and income.
50
  
As no detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of UNSC election currently exists, 
we note that our study represents a first step and offer the following suggestions for future 
research. As an extension to our analysis, researchers may seek to augment country-level 
data with personal-level data on UN Ambassadors. Malone (2000), citing Dutch officials, 
notes that up to a quarter of UN representatives vote without instructions from their 
capitals. The personal characteristics and interactions of the individuals on the New York 
scene may therefore play a role in some elections. While we suspect that this avenue of 
research would prove fruitful, we note that it would involve intensive and detailed data 
collection.  
As for reform of the UNSC, we propose considering what currently determines 
representation: Election depends partly on a random draw of idiosyncratic factors, partly 
on how powerful a country is – in terms of population and income – and partly on a norm 
of giving everyone a turn. Those who feel that powerful countries should serve on the 
UNSC more often – perhaps because they play a crucial role in global politics – should try 
to undermine the regional nomination process and push for more contested elections at the 
UNGA level. After all, we find no evidence of a turn-taking norm when the UNGA 
decides contested elections. Allowing for reelection, for example, would enable powerful 
countries to run for election more often.  
Other reformers, who may feel that every country should have its turn on the world stage, 
should favour endowing the regional groups with the power to elect their own 
representatives. For, in contrast to the UNGA, all of the regions follow the turn-taking 
norm to some extent. Alternatively, one could ensure turn-taking if election relied on an 
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 We stress here that turn-taking is likely an exogenous source of variation that scholars can use, and it has a 
statistically significant effect for the 80 per cent of the sample, where regions make the decision. Turn-taking, 
however, does not hold for the UNGA, so scholars may wish to flag the contested elections (20 per cent of 
the sample) as factors such as voting with the Soviet Union/Russia appear to play a role. See, for example, 
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), Dreher et al. (forthcoming) and Dreher et al. (2013) for recent studies 
using UNSC membership as an instrument. 
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actual rotation across all UN members. We suspect that interests on both sides – in favour 
of powerful countries and in favour of taking turns – counterbalance each other so that the 
status quo is likely to prevail. 
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Appendix 
Table 2.1: Potential determinants of UNSC election 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (by region)* 
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Table 2.3: UNSC Membership (terms held 1971–2006) 
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Table 2.4a: Model 1 (results of maximising the likelihood function set out in equation 
(2.7), with dependent variable being election to the UNSC) 
 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. 
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Table 2.4b: Model 2 (results of maximising the likelihood function set out in equation 
(2.7), with dependent variable being election to the UNSC) 
 
 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1%. 
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Chapter 3 
Equitable Representation in the Councils of the 
United Nations: Theory and Application 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Decision-making within international organisations is sometimes made by voting bodies 
that comprise a proper subset of the membership (a “council”). The pre-eminent such 
council, and the primary motivator of this Chapter, is the UNSC, the only international 
body with the power to authorise the use of armed force. At any one time, the UNSC 
contains only 15 members from a total UN membership of 193. A second council 
operating within the UN, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
contains 54 elected member countries at any one time. It is responsible for coordinating the 
economic, social and related work of 14 UN specialised agencies including the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund.
51
  
In this Chapter we develop a theoretical framework for analysing democratic equitability in 
such Councils. We then apply the theory to the UNSC. The standard approach to formal 
quantitative appraisal of democratic equitability in international voting bodies is based 
upon Penrose’s (1946) square-root rule. As discussed in Chapter 1, the UNSC is essentially 
the only major international body that is yet to receive a formal quantitative appraisal of its 
democratic equitability. 
The research in this Chapter contributes to both the theory and application of democratic 
equitability in voting bodies. In respect of theory, our first contribution is to formally 
define a council voting game (CVG), to describe the Councils empirically observed in the 
                                                 
51
 Why do councils exist? In the case of military or emergency action, the lengthy deliberations of a fully 
representative body are thought to prevent such a body from being able to react with sufficient speed to 
developing security threats. Alternatively, councils may function in domains deemed to require detailed or 
specialised analysis (ECOSOC being an example). Councils can also arise at the national level. For instance, 
some countries have “Privy” or “Executive” Councils with the right to enact legislation during states of 
emergency, and/or committees that perform detailed tasks such as voting over proposed new legislation on a 
clause-by-clause basis prior to final approval by the parliament. 
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UN. In particular, we consider a setting in which a fully representative “assembly” 
allocates (by election or otherwise) members to a “council”. Existing measures of 
democratic equity with respect to fully representative bodies at time t require the triple (At, 
Qt, Vt), where At is the set of members, Qt is the set of member populations, and Vt is the 
set of member relative voting powers. By contrast equity measures for CVGs are defined at 
time t with respect to a 7-tuple, C, that nests (At, Qt), but in which Vt derives from two 
primitives – one that determines the total relative voting power of the countries belonging 
to a region, and a second that divides this total between countries. In addition, C also 
details (i) the regional partition on the members of the fully representative body (the UN 
membership is divided into five regions) (ii) the division of council seats to regions; and 
(iii) the stochastic process that determines the allocation of countries to the council. 
Second, we define three equity concepts for CVGs that distinguish between ex-ante and 
ex-post notions of equity, and between equity at the country and regional levels. Ex-ante 
equity requires that the democratic principle of one person one expected vote (OPOEV) 
applies among all world citizens before the allocation of countries to the council is known. 
Ex-ante equity, therefore, depends upon both a country’s voting power when a council 
member, and how often they are a council member. Ex-post equity requires that, once 
allocation to the council is known, the democratic principle of one person one vote 
(OPOV) applies among the citizens of member countries of the council. It is applicable if 
council members are viewed as representing only their own citizens, rather than the region 
they belong to as a whole. Region equity requires that the total voting power of a region on 
the council (if its members vote independently) corresponds to that which it would obtain 
in a fully representative body under the OPOV principle. It is applicable if members on the 
council are viewed as representing their region as a whole, rather than solely their own 
population. 
We show there is an equity rule that implements each equity concept. The ex-post equity 
concept is satisfied by the implementation among the members of the council of Penrose’s 
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(1946) square-root rule for voting power. Ex-ante equity also requires a square-root rule to 
hold, but on the expected voting powers before the allocation of countries to the council is 
known. Regional equity does not require any property of the individual voting powers, but 
requires that a form of aggregated square-root rule for voting power hold at the regional 
level. We establish an impossibility result among our notions of equity: no CVG can be 
both ex-post equitable and also region equitable. As such, a CVG that is equitable if 
council members only represent themselves (as opposed to their region) will necessarily 
fail to achieve the desired level of regional representation, and the reverse also holds.    
Given that no CVG can attain all three of our equity concepts, we look for (first-best) 
equity rules that implement two of the three concepts. We define a CVG as country first-
best if it attains both the ex-post equity and ex-ante equity concepts and as regional first-
best if it attains both the ex-ante equity and regional equity concepts. We find that 
attainment of the country first-best requires, first, that voting power on the council satisfies 
Penrose’s square-root rule, and, second, that every country have an equal probability of 
allocation to the council. The latter condition implies that the number of council seats 
allocated to each region must be in proportion to the number of countries within each 
region. The regional first-best, however, is consistent with a range of rules. These include, 
as a special case, a square-root rule on the allocation probabilities (rather than on the 
voting powers), together with a flat rule for voting power. 
With respect to application, this is the first research we are aware of to present a 
quantitative assessment against formal equity concepts of the equitability of the UNSC for 
both individual countries and regions. As we discuss in more detail in Section 3.3, the 
UNSC is witnessing a protracted reform debate that centres on national and regional 
representation (see, e.g., Franck, 2003). At the regional level, reformers argue that Africa 
and Asia have too little power, and there is a claimed north-south divide. At the national 
level, countries such as Germany and Japan – who are only eligible for NPM status on the 
UNSC – claim to be severely under-represented, and the Permanent Members (PMs) – who 
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wield an individual veto – are argued to have too much representation. 
Our analysis presents more nuanced conclusions. Our regional equity concept indeed 
shows that Africa, Asia and Latin America are under-represented as a whole, and that 
substantial north/south inequity exists. Within this picture, however, some countries in 
these regions actually receive too much voting power.  
We do not find that the PMs receive too much voting power according to our ex-post 
equity concept – indeed these countries are in some cases substantially under-represented. 
We do, however, find that the combination of preferential voting power and the right to be 
ever-present on the UNSC makes PMs substantially over-represented in the metric of 
expected voting power. Japan is under-represented from both an ex-ante and ex-post 
perspective, but Germany is, we find, over-represented according to our ex-ante equity 
concept. 
Our first-best concepts provide little support for the notion that the power of veto should be 
abolished. Both concepts are consistent with the existence of veto players, and our country 
first-best entails some countries receiving substantially higher voting power than do PMs 
under the present arrangements. We find, however, that no country is a veto player when a 
member of the UNSC and ever-present on the UNSC under either first-best concept. The 
analysis also suggests a case for allocating the right of veto to a different set of countries. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 develops a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of democratic equity in councils; Section 3.3 presents an application of the theory 
to the UNSC; and Section 3.4 concludes. All proofs are located in the Appendix.    
 
3.2 Theory 
In this section we consider a setting in which a fully representative “assembly” allocates 
members to a “council”. As with other aspects of the model, this setting is intended to 
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mirror the structure observed within the UN, in which context the assembly should be 
interpreted as the UNGA, the main deliberative body of the UN containing all 193 of its 
members, and the council could refer either to the UNSC or to ECOSOC. As in the 
UNGA, we partition the assembly membership into regional groups. Countries are then 
allocated to the council in fixed proportions from each of the regions.  
 
3.2.1 Council Voting Games 
In this section we formally develop a class of voting game we term a council voting game 
(CVG). We begin by describing the elements of a CVG at a given time t.   
Let the (fully-representative) assembly be denoted as the finite set At. We write At = j Rjt, 
where Rjt is the j
th
 region, j  J. Let Rt = {Rjt}jJ denote the set of regional partitions of At. 
Each region is a set of countries and we define aij as the i
th
 country within Rjt. Each country 
possesses a population denoted qijt  ℕ, and let Qt = {qijt}aijAt denote the set of member 
populations. 
The council is formed of a set of members Mt  At. The number of seats belonging to the 
members of each region j is given by the vector nt = (n1t, n2t,…,n|J|t)
T
, where it is assumed 
that the number of seats for each region is always smaller than the size of the region, |Rjt| > 
njt. The size of the council is denoted by Nt ≡ |Mt| = 1 ⋅ nt < |At|. 
Rather than specify a method of allocation of countries to the council, here we adopt a 
reduced form representation that allows for essentially any allocation method. An 
allocation process P is a stochastic process that induces, at every time t, a probability pijt ≡ 
Pr(aij  Mt) of council membership. By definition, the pijt must satisfy ∑aijRj pijt = njt. The 
allocation process applying at time t is denoted Pt.   
We assume that each country possesses a score sijt ≥ 0, where the set of scores is denoted 
as St = {sijt}aijAt. If allocated to the council, sijt translates into a realised voting power, βijt, 
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according to βijt = wjtsijt, where ∑aij  Mt wjtsijt = 1. The wjt are regional weights of the form 
wjt = wt( )∑aijMt∩Rjt.sijt . Note that the sijt are specified ex-ante (before Mt is realised), but the 
wjt are not, in general determined until Mt is realised.
52
 Thus, once Mt is known, the wjt may 
be employed to choose the sum of the voting powers of the countries belonging to a given 
region.    
We may now define a CVG in two parts:  
Definition 3.1 
(i) A council voting game at time t is a tuple Ct = (At, nt, Rt, Qt, Pt, St, wt). 
(ii) A council voting game is the set C = {Ct}t  T. 
 
3.2.2 Equity in CVGs 
In order to derive equity concepts for a CVG at a point in time t0 we conduct a thought 
experiment in which we hold constant the elements of C as at time t0, and examine the 
CVG formed by the resulting infinite repetition of Ct0.  
This approach may be interpreted as yielding a-priori measures of equity, for the 
assessment of equitability is based on the hypothetical continuation of a fixed state that is 
based only on information known up to time t0.
53
 This a-priori approach implies that to 
determine equity concepts for C at time t0, and regardless of the actual evolution of C 
beyond time t0, we may consider the CVG C′ described at every time t  T ′ by C′t = Ct0, 
where T ′ = 1,2,… is an infinite set. For notational emphasis, we drop all time subscripts 
with respect to Ct0, such that Ct0 = (A, n, R, Q, P, S, w). Accordingly, we write wt0(∙) = w(∙), 
qijt0 = qij, sijt0 = sij, and so on. 
                                                 
52
 In practice, once the βijt are known, they must be induced by an appropriate decision rule – a mapping from 
the space of voting outcomes of the council members to an outcome space, satisfying appropriate 
monotonicity conditions. See, e.g., Freixas and Zwicker (2003) for a general class of (j,k) decision rules. 
53
 The alternative a-posteriori approach is instead backwards looking, using historical data to estimate 
realised equitability over a period of time. 
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With respect to C′, let the expected voting power under P of country aij at time t (before the 
allocation to the council is realised) be given by αijt = pijtsijEMtMt(wjt), where EMtMt(wjt) 
denotes the expectation of wjt over Mt, where Mt  Mt if and only if |Mt ∩ Rj| = njt and pijt 
> 0 for all aij  Mt. Between the elements of two vectors x and y containing country-level 
statistics xij and yij, we write xij M yij to denote that there exists a λt > 0 at every time t such 
that xij = λtyij for all aij  Mt such that Mt  Mt. We define R and A analogously, but 
where R requires proportionality to hold for all aij  Rj; and A requires proportionality to 
hold for all aij  A. Likewise, we define J, which requires proportionality to hold for all j 
 J between the elements of two vectors containing region-level statistics. 
To focus on empirically relevant cases, we henceforth impose three further assumptions. 
First, as no two UN members have identical recorded populations, we assume that more 
than N of the qij are distinct. Second, we assume that pijt = 0 for less than |A| – N countries 
at any time t, to rule out degenerate cases in which the same N countries are allocated to 
the council every time an allocation is made. Together, these assumptions are sufficient to 
imply that ∑aijMt qij is a random variable before Mt is realised. Third, we assume that pijt 
≠ 0 on a non-empty subset of T ′ for every aij  A. This assumption rules out the existence 
of countries that can never be allocated to the council, hence sij M βijt implies sij A βijt.  
2.2.1 Equity concepts  
We base our concepts of democratic equity upon an idealised three-stage decision-making 
process. In Stage 1, a national ballot is held in each country aij  A under a simple majority 
decision rule. In Stage 2, a subset Mt  A of countries are allocated to the council. In Stage 
3, countries aij  Mt cast their vote according to the outcome of their national ballot in 
Stage 1.   
We develop three distinct equity concepts. Our first notion of equity we term ex-ante 
equity (AE). According to AE, it is desirable that the expected voting power of every 
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world citizen is equal before the allocation of countries to the council is made in Stage 2, 
i.e., OPOEV. The ex-ante perspective acknowledges that the power of a world citizen in 
the council depends not only on the voting power of his or her country when it is a member 
of the council, but also on how frequently his or her country is a member of the council. 
We develop two alternative concepts of ex-post equity. The first, which we term simply 
ex-post equity (PE), is that it is desirable that the democratic principle of OPOV hold 
among the citizens of council member countries, once these are known. This concept is of 
particular relevance if council members are viewed as representing their own populations, 
rather than their region at large.  
Our final concept of equity, regional equity (RE), is also ex-post in nature. According to 
RE, it is desirable that the combined voting power of the council members from each 
region be proportionate with the level of representation that each region would obtain in a 
fully representative voting body satisfying OPOV. This concept is of particular relevance if 
council members are viewed as representing their region, rather than only themselves, for 
it entails that voting power be commensurate with the population of the region a country 
belongs to (rather than with its own country-specific population).
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The distinction between our ex-ante and ex-post concepts of equity is analogous to the 
distinction made by scholars of law between “procedural” and “distributive” justice (e.g., 
Konovsky, 2000); and by scholars of psychology between “procedural” and “outcome” 
fairness (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2010). The AE concept requires procedural equitability, 
but not outcome equitability, whereas PE and RE require outcome equitability, but not 
procedural equitability. 
All three equity concepts need not apply to every council, or in equal degrees. In some 
contexts, country concerns may prevail over regional, while the opposite could apply in 
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 The logical ex-ante counterpart to RE is that the combined expected voting power of the council members 
from each region be proportional to the level of representation that each region would obtain in a fully 
representative voting body satisfying OPOV. We do not consider this equity concept separately, however, for 
if a CVG satisfies AE at time t, then the ex-ante counterpart to RE is necessarily satisfied too. See footnote 
59 for further details. 
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other contexts. The applicability of RE relative to PE, for instance, depends largely on 
whether countries are viewed as representing only themselves, or the whole of the region 
to which they belong, when a member of the council. In the case of the UNSC, we appear 
to observe evidence of a concern for each equity notion. As we detail later, both country- 
and regional-level equity concepts are frequently cited by those that propose reform. In 
respect of ex-ante equity, it is notable that several of the proposals for reform of the UNSC 
detailed in Cox (2009) leave the country voting powers unchanged, but modify the 
allocation probabilities, suggesting that world leaders understand (at least intuitively) the 
importance of allocation probability as well as voting rights.
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To help formalise each of these equity concepts we make the following assumption on 
voting in Stage 1: 
Assumption 3.1 Voting in Stage 1 is assumed, a-priori, to be independent within and 
across countries. 
As argued by, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover (1997c, 2003), Assumption 3.1 should be 
understood as reflecting Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient Reason: a-priori we do not 
know how countries will actually vote. An alternative a-priori assumption might be that 
voting is perfectly correlated within regions, but independent across regions, such that the 
regions act as unitary blocs. We note, however, that if regions become unitary players the 
council becomes a fully-representative body that may be analysed with existing theory. In 
this sense, the analysis of equity in CVGs differs from that in fully representative bodies 
only if individual countries are a-priori distinct from regions.
56
  
Proposition 3.1 Under Assumption 3.1:  
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 Examples include proposals that allow some current NPMs to be ever-present members, proposals that 
would extend the term length of some NPM seats, and proposals that would introduce seats that are allocated 
on a strict rotation basis within regions. 
56
 Empirically, countries on the UNSC do seem to act as distinct entities within regions. Each council 
member has full sovereignty over how it votes and countries pour large sums of money into campaigns for 
election to the UNSC (see, e.g., Malone, 2000), suggesting that they do not perceive membership by another 
of their regional group to be a perfect substitute for their own membership. Also, the voting behaviour in the 
UNGA of serving members of the UNSC is no more similar to that of their regional members than to the 
votes of the remaining UNGA members (Lai and Lefler, 2009). 
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(i) a CVG is AE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies αijt A qij; 
(ii) a CVG is PE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies βijt M qij; 
(iii) a CVG is RE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies 
aij  Mt ∩ Rj
∑ βijt J 
aij  Rj
∑  qij  . 
In interpreting Proposition 3.1, it is most straightforward to begin with part (ii), which 
restates the inspiration of Penrose (1946) that, under Assumption 3.1, OPOV is achieved 
by a decision rule that sets voting power in the council to be in proportion to the square-
root of each country’s population.57 Part (i) may then be understood as simply requiring the 
same square-root rule to hold, but this time on the expected voting powers (before the 
allocation to the council in Stage 2 is known). 
For part (iii), note that, under Assumption 3.1, it holds that the voting power of a region is 
the sum of the voting powers of the individual members.
58
 Hence, via Penrose’s square-
root rule, a region’s voting power in a fully representative body satisfying OPOV is 
proportional to ∑aijRj qij.
59
 
 
3.2.3 Equity Rules 
What restrictions are required on the underlying parameters to implement the conditions in 
Proposition 3.1? To assist in the analysis of this and later questions we first define some 
special cases in which either the sij, βijt or pijt are invariant on some dimensions: 
Definition 3.2 
(i) (regional s-invariance) C′ satisfies regional s-invariance if and only if sij = si′j = sj for 
all aij,ai′j  Rj and for all j  J; 
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 For equity rules under alternatives to Assumption 3.1 see Kirsch and Langner (2011). 
58
 If Assumption 3.1 were replaced with the assumption that voting is correlated across countries within a 
region, but independent across regions, then a different concept would be required as regions would vote as 
blocs on the council and, in general, the voting power of a bloc does not equal the sum of the individual 
voting powers of the members when voting independently. 
59
 Following on from footnote 54, if the condition for AE ( )αijt A
.
q
ij
 is summed over aij  Rj on both 
sides, then one obtains the natural statement of the ex-ante counterpart to RE. 
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(ii) (β-invariance) C′ satisfies β-invariance if and only if βijt = βi′j′t = βijt′ = β for all aij,ai′j′ 
 A and for all t,t′  T ′; 
(iii) (pt -invariance) C′ satisfies pt -invariance if and only if pijt = pijt′ = pij for all aij  A 
and for all t,t′  T ′; 
(iv) (regional p-invariance) C′ satisfies regional p-invariance if and only if pijt = pijt′ = pi′jt 
= pj for all aij,ai′j  Rj, for all t,t′  T and for all j  J; 
(v) (p-invariance) C′ satisfies p-invariance if and only if pijt = pijt′ = pi′j′t = p for all t,t′  
T ′ and for all aij,ai′j′  A. 
It is straightforward to observe that p-invariance and regional p-invariance both imply pt -
invariance, and that p-invariance implies regional p-invariance. Less obvious is that β-
invariance implies regional s-invariance. As the weights wjt are region specific, they cannot 
be used to adjust the sij of an individual country. Hence, β-invariance is implemented if and 
only if regional s-invariance holds and w(zjt) = nj(Nzjt)
-1
.  
We now state our implementation rules:  
Proposition 3.2 Under Assumption 3.1: 
(i) C is AE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies (a) pt-invariance; and (b) pAEij s
AE
ij  R qij; 
(ii) C is PE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies (a) 



Jj
jt
jt
z
zw
1
)(  ; and (b) sPEij  A qij; 
(iii) C is RE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies 
jt
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ij
RA
ij
jt
zq
q
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jij 1)(
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
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Part (i) of Proposition 3.2 establishes a rule for AE. Intuitively, it states that, under pt-
invariance, any choice of the sij and pij such that p
AE
ij s
AE
ij  R qij holds within region is 
implied by AE, and implies AE for an appropriate choice of w(∙). This result is consistent 
with a range of rules for the underlying sij and pij, including a flat rule for the pij together 
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with a square-root rule for the sij, and vice-versa. Part (ii) of Proposition 3.2 establishes an 
equity rule that implements PE. Condition (a) requires that wjt A ( )∑aijMt.sij
-1
, for this 
choice of w(∙) implies that, at each time t, the βijt are obtained by simply normalising the sij 
of the council members, such that sPEij  A βijt. Condition (b) then ensures Penrose’s square-
root rule by asking the sPEij  to satisfy a square-root rule. As PE does not require procedural 
equity, however, it imposes no requirements on the pijt. 
Part (iii) establishes an equity rule that implements RE. As RE imposes a requirement upon 
the sum of the voting powers of the council members from each region, a restriction must 
be placed on the regional weights in order to guarantee that ∑aijMt∩Rj βijt J ∑aijRj qij. 
Note, however, that RE imposes nothing upon the distribution of voting power within each 
region, so no restriction upon the sij is made.  
Although we show in the next section that AE is compatible with both PE and RE, we find 
that no CVG can be both PE and RE: 
Proposition 3.3 Under Assumption 3.1 no C is both PE and RE at time t0. 
The proof of Proposition 3.3 shows that for both PE and RE to hold, then ∑aijMt∩Rj qij 
must be non-random. The most general way this could occur is if the qij satisfied the 
following property:  
Definition 3.3 (q sub-regional invariance – qSRI) C′ satisfies qSRI if and only if qij = qi′j 
for all ai′j,aij  rkjj, where the rkjj partition Rj for each j, and kj = 1,…,gj, where gj is an 
integer belonging to [1,nj]. 
If nkjj seats are allocated to each sub-region rkjj, where ∑aijrkjj
 nkjj = nj, then under qSRI we 
have that ∑aijMt∩Rj qij = ∑kjgj nkjj qij, which is non-random. But we rule out qSRI by 
assumption in Section 3.2.2 (as, empirically, it is wholly implausible), from which the 
Proposition follows. Accordingly, in a world where country populations are distinct, it is 
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necessary for world leaders to accept that a CVG that achieves PE will necessarily entail 
some degree of regional inequity, and that the reverse also holds.  
3.2.3.1 The first-best 
Proposition 3.3 implies that no equity rule can achieve all three concepts we consider. It is 
possible, however, to derive equity rules that achieve two of the three concepts. The rule 
that achieves both AE and PE we term the country first-best (CFB), and the rule that 
achieves both AE and RE we term the regional first-best (RFB). 
We first prove a helpful Lemma: 
Lemma 3.1 If a CVG satisfies pijt A f ijt, then nj J 
aij  Rj
∑ f ijt. 
Lemma 3.1 follows from the observation that the allocation probabilities must, by 
definition, satisfy ∑aijRj pijt = nj, hence nj = ∑aijRj pijt J ∑aijRj fijt.
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Proposition 3.4 Under Assumption 3.1: 
(i) (Country first-best) C is AE and PE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies (a) 

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1
)( ; (b) p-invariance – hence nCFBj  J |Rj|; and (c) s
CFB
ij  A qij. 
(ii) (Regional first-best) C is AE and RE at time t0 if and only if C′ satisfies (a) 
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According to Proposition 3.4, the country first-best is achieved by the combination of 
Penrose’s square-root rule for voting power (which is implied by conditions a and c) 
together with a flat rule for allocation probability. The proof is a straightforward 
consequence of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3.2. The result illustrates that, although the 
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 As the nj are integers, this proportionality condition cannot hold exactly unless (N∑aijRj fijt)(∑jJ∑aijRj
 fijt
)
-1
 is an integer for every j. We therefore interpret the condition nj J ∑aijRj fijt to imply that, for given fijt, the 
nj are set to achieve maximal proximity to exact proportionality (under an appropriate metric). 
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AE and PE concepts are compatible, potential tensions exist between them. On the one 
hand, there is no inherent conflict if all countries share the same allocation probability. On 
the other hand, if the major world powers desire to be members of bodies such as the 
UNSC and ECOSOC on a more regular basis than are lesser powers, then unequal 
allocation probabilities are required. With unequal allocation probabilities, AE implies that 
a country with a low allocation probability must be compensated for longer expected spells 
outside the council by the exercise of greater voting power when a member of the council. 
In this case, AE is in conflict with PE, for it results in systematic deviations from Penrose’s 
square-root rule.  
Part (ii) of the Proposition, which is a straightforward consequence of parts (i) and (iii) of 
Proposition 3.2, establishes the conditions needed for AE and RE. The Proposition clarifies 
that pAEij s
AE
ij  R qij is a necessary condition for RFB, but it is not sufficient, for (unlike 
under AE alone) we can now no longer choose w(∙) arbitrarily. As there remains a degree 
of flexibility over the choice of the underlying sij and pijt that satisfy RFB, in the following 
corollary we highlight some special cases.  
Corollary 3.1 If C satisfies AE and RE at time t0 then: 
(i) If C′ satisfies regional s-invariance then it also satisfies (a) 
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(ii) If C′ satisfies β-invariance then it also satisfies (a) 
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)(  ; (b) pt-
invariance; and (c) pRFBij  A qij. 
(iii) If C′ satisfies regional p-invariance then it also satisfies 
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(iv) If C′ satisfies p-invariance then it also satisfies 
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If the sij in part (ii) of Proposition 3.4 are restricted to satisfy regional s-invariance then we 
have ∑aijMt∩Rj s
RFB
ij  = njs
RFB
j . As this is non-random, ∑aijMt∩Rj s
RFB
ij  may be removed from 
the expectation in condition (b) of part (ii) of Proposition 3.4 to give part (i) of Corollary 
3.1. Part (ii) uses Lemma 3.1 to additionally impose nRFBj  = N( )∑aijRj. qij ( )∑aijA. qij
-1
. 
According to part (i), therefore, RFB is consistent with a flat rule for voting power together 
with a square-root rule for allocation probability (where both rules hold within, but not 
across, regions). Part (ii) clarifies, that, if the division of seats to regions is made 
proportional to ∑aijRj qij, then RFB is consistent with a flat rule for voting power together 
with a square-root rule for allocation probability (where both rules hold within and across 
regions). Thus, the RFB concept is consistent with a square-root rule that – unlike 
Penrose’s – holds on the allocation probabilities rather than the voting powers.  
Part (iii) of the Corollary considers the RFB concept when the allocation probabilities 
satisfy a flat rule within regions. Under this assumption, the sij follow a complex rule that 
relates to (but does not correspond to) a within-region square-root rule. Part (iv) is obtained 
by further setting nRFBj  = N|Rj||A|
-1
 in part (iii).
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 Despite their apparently complex forms, 
these two rules for sij have a straightforward intuition. Suppose that we assert the 
approximation EMtMt( )( )∑aijMt∩Rj.sij
-1
 ≈ ( )EMtMt( )∑aijMt∩Rj.sij
-1
 and, in violation of 
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 As discussed in footnote 60, if N|Rj||A|
-1
 is not an integer for some j, then that N|Rj||A|
-1
 must be replaced in 
part (iv) of Corollary 3.1 with either ⌊N|Rj||A|
-1⌋ or ⌈N|Rj||A|
-1⌉ as appropriate.  
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Jensen’s inequality, proceed under the basis of equality holding between these two entities. 
Under regional p-invariance, we then obtain EMtMt( )∑aijMt∩Rj.sij  = nj|Rj|
-1∑aijRj s
RFB
ij . 
Substituting this expression into condition (b) in part (ii) of Proposition 3.4 we then obtain 
a within-region square-root rule for sij, which becomes a square-root rule within and across 
regions under p-invariance. Therefore, the rules for sij in parts (iii) and (iv) of the Corollary 
deviate from square-root rules to the extent that EMtMt( )( )∑aijMt∩Rj.sij
-1
 deviates from 
proportionality with ( )EMtMt( )∑aijMt∩Rj.sij
-1
. 
Note that all the rules in Corollary 3.1 are monotonic within region in the sense that sij  si′j 
 qij  qi′j for all aij,ai′j  Rj and for all j  J; and that an equivalent condition holds on the 
pijt at all times t  T ′. If C′ satisfies both of these conditions, we say it is regional 
monotonic. Rules that imply regional monotonicity seem the most relevant empirically, 
and we concentrate upon this class accordingly. We note, however, that AE may be 
satisfied by a range of less empirically plausible rules in which one of sij or pij is a strictly 
decreasing function of qij, and the other is an increasing function of qij that increases faster 
than qij.            
 
3.3 Application 
In this section we apply the theory of Section 3.2 to the case of the UNSC, the most 
powerful organ within the United Nations, with the authority to make legally binding 
resolutions to fulfil its mandate of maintaining international peace and security. To that 
end, it can suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, impose 
blockades, and authorise the use of armed force.  
Under the present arrangements – which have been in place since 1965 – the UNSC is 
comprised of 15 members, of which five – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States – are ever-present and wield a veto on all non-procedural matters. 
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The remaining ten members are elected NPMs who serve time-limited two-year terms. The 
ten NPM seats are divided between five regional caucusing groups: one country from 
Eastern Europe (EE); two countries from each of the Western European and Others Group 
(WEOG), the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – el Grupo 
Latinoamericano y Caribeño) and Asia; and three countries from Africa.
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Both country and regional perspectives on equity are frequently cited by those that propose 
reform (e.g., Russett, O’Neill and Sutterlin, 1996; Hammer, 2002; Schwartzberg, 2003; 
Annan, 2005; Blum, 2005). From the country perspective, it is commonly argued that the 
right of veto of the five PMs gives these countries too great an influence; and that other 
countries are more deserving of PM status than are France and the UK (Germany and 
Japan both have larger populations and economies, and contribute more to the UN regular 
budget).
63
 Nearly all governments wish to abolish or limit the right of veto, which is 
viewed as an unfair and anachronistic legacy of the Second World War (Fassbender, 2004; 
Schwartzberg, 2003). 
From the regional perspective it is argued that Africa and Asia are under-represented as 
together they account for around 75 per cent of the UN population, but are allocated only 
20 per cent of the PM seats, and 50 per cent of the NPM seats; and that there exists a 
broader representational imbalance between the north – defined in Zifcak (2006: footnote 
9) as comprising EE, and the WEOG – and south (Africa, Asia and the GRULAC).  
In the absence of a formal theoretical framework for measuring the equitability of CVGs, 
or for addressing issues relating to region- and country-specific notions of equity, existing 
quantitative analyses are unable to directly assess these claims. Instead, extant studies use 
the voting power of a PM relative to a NPM as an informal indicator of equitability (see, 
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 See Table 3.1 for the full membership of each of the regional groups (excluding PMs). Of the PMs, China 
is a member in Asia, Russia in EE, and France and the UK in the WEOG. Technically, the United States is 
not a member of any regional group, but it attends meetings of the WEOG as an observer and is 
considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes (UN, 2012). For the purposes of this Chapter, 
therefore, we give the United States membership in the WEOG.   
63
 As of 2012, Japan contributes 12.5 per cent of the UN regular budget, Germany 8.0 per cent, the UK only 
6.6 per cent, and France only 6.1 per cent (UN Secretariat, 2011). 
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e.g., Hosli et al., 2011; O’Neill, 1996; Strand and Rapkin, 2011; Straffin, 1993: 180). The 
theoretical framework of Section 3.2 permits, for the first time, a formal quantitative 
assessment of the equitability of the UNSC for both individual countries and regions.           
Another contribution with respect to the extant literature is the choice of decision rule to 
represent the UNSC. The studies above model the UNSC decision rule as a binary rule in 
which members can vote only for or against a resolution, yet – as discussed in Chapter 1 – 
this framework does not faithfully represent voting rules in the UNSC. We therefore allow 
here for a ternary decision rule, which is a map from the set {-1, 0, 1}N to the set {-1, 1}, 
satisfying the monotonicity conditions set out in Felsenthal and Machover (1997c: 
Definition 2.2). 
 
3.3.1 Measuring Deviations from Equitability 
It is desirable to be able to measure, in an objective sense, the proximity of the CVG 
representing the UNSC, CUNSC = {CUNSC,t}tT, to each equity concept at time t0, where we 
set t0 = 2012. To this end, we adopt the metric d(X,Y) = ½  |Xi – Yi|, where X and Y are 
unit-vectors, which corresponds to the index of distortion used in Felsenthal and Machover 
(2004, 2007), and commonly attributed to Loosemore and Hanby (1971).  
Let PM be the set of PMs and OM be the set of the remaining 188 “ordinary” members. 
We model the UNSC in the framework of the previous section by setting sij = βPM for aij  
PM, sij = βNPM for aij  OM, and w(zjt) = ( )∑jJ.zjt
-1
 = 1. As PMs are guaranteed allocation 
to the UNSC, we have pijt = 1 for these countries. We then obtain αijt = βPM for aij  PM 
and αijt = pijtβNPM for aij  OM. From part (i) of Proposition 3.1 and condition (b) of part 
(ii) of Proposition 3.2, we define proximity measures on C 'UNSC (as at 2012) with respect to 
our two country-based equity measures as  
AE = 1 – EtT ′ (d(αt, α
AE
));     PE = 1 – d(β, βPE); 
 79 
where αt is the scaled |A|  1 unit vector of the αijt; α
AE
 = βPE is the scaled |A|  1 unit 
vector of the qij; and β is the scaled |A|  1 unit vector of the UNSC voting powers.
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Note that these two measures lie on the unit interval, with unity indicating maximal 
proximity, and zero indicating the minimum possible proximity. 
To define an analogous proximity measure for C 'UNSC with respect to RE we note that we 
may write 
                                              
aij  Mt ∩ Rj
∑ βijt = nj,PMβPM + (nj – nj,PM)βNPM. (3.1) 
Hence, using part (iii) of Proposition 3.1, we define  
RE = 1 – d(β, βRE), 
where β is the scaled |J|  1 unit vector of the right-side of equation 3.1, and βRE is the 
scaled |J|  1 unit vector of the ∑aijRj qij. To measure proximity to each of our two 
concepts of the first-best we examine the average proximity to the relevant two equity 
concepts: 
CFB = 1 – 
1
2
 (EtT ′ (d(αt, α
AE
)) + d(β, βPE)) = 
1
2
 (AE + PE); 
RFB = 1 – 
1
2
 (EtT ′ (d(αt, α
AE
)) + d(β, βRE)) = 
1
2
 (AE + RE). 
 
3.3.2 Computing equity measures 
As is by now conventional in the literature, we adopt the normalised Banzhaf index as our 
measure of relative a-priori voting power. Note, however, that we adopt the ternary 
interpretation of the normalised Banzhaf index, as set out by Felsenthal and Machover 
(1997c), rather than the more conventional binary interpretation. We compute the ternary 
normalised Banzhaf index using the method of generating functions (see, e.g., Freixas, 
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 In the case of the UNSC we have w() of the form in condition (a) of part (ii) of Proposition 3.2. Hence, for 
PE, it is sufficient to test for proximity to condition (b). 
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2012). In this way we obtain the relative voting power of a PM as βPM ≈ 0.10 and βNPM ≈ 
0.05, implying that a PM has almost exactly twice the voting power of a NPM.
65
 
Using country population data for 2012 we compute the vectors βPE, β, and βRE defined 
in Section 3.3.1.
66
 To compute αAE, however, requires knowledge of the pijt for aij  OM. 
We specify the allocation process PUNSC by assigning each country in OM with a 
probability, ρij  [0,1], where ∑aijRj ρij = 1, with which it will be allocated to the UNSC if 
it is in competition with all members of its region and if only a single seat is being 
allocated. 
We use empirical estimates of the ρij that apply in the actual UNSC. These are taken from 
our earlier analysis of Chapter 2, in which we empirically estimate the systematic 
determinants of the election of OMs to the UNSC, accounting for the two-stage process by 
which such members are presently elected.
67
 There we show that three country 
characteristics systematically predict UNSC election: population, gross national income 
per capita, and waiting time since last serving on the UNSC. The estimated co-efficients 
for these three variables can be used in a straightforward way to compute estimates of the 
ρij.
68
 The resulting estimates are listed in Table 3.2.  
In practice, the UNGA simultaneously allocates OMs to the UNSC. For the purposes of 
developing a tractable simulation model, however, we suppose that when the UNGA must 
elect more than one NPM from the same region in a given year, countries are elected 
sequentially, one-by-one. Hence, if there are two seats to be allocated to members of 
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 Note, in contrast, that if the UNSC decision rule is modeled as binary, then we obtain βPM ≈ 0.167 and βNPM 
≈ 0.017, which implies that a PM has around ten times as much voting power as a NPM. 
66
 Population data are from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html#). 
67
 In the first stage, the regions make nominations to the UNGA and, in the second stage, the UNGA votes. 
See Chapter 2 for a detailed account. 
68
 Because the dataset used in Chapter 2 ends at 2006, we obtain estimates of country population and gross 
national income per capita (current USD) for 2012 from the CIA World Factbook (see footnote 66). We 
update the variable measuring waiting time since last serving on the UNSC to 2012 using historical UNSC 
membership data from the UNSC Web site (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc). To produce the estimates in Table 
3.1, these data, along with the co-efficient values for population, gross national income per capita, and 
waiting time since last serving on the UNSC reported in Table 2.3a, are fed into equation 2.5, where we 
assume that the sum in the denominator is over all countries in the region (i.e., their “Ejt” – the set of 
countries competing for the seat – is assumed to be Rjt).     
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region j, then, in each of two rounds, there is a new realisation of a random variable that, if 
all countries in the region are competing for the seat, elects country aij with probability ρij. 
Because, however, UNSC rules prohibit countries from having dual membership, if the 
same country is elected in both rounds the process is repeated again in full. This continues 
until distinct countries are elected. 
What does this procedure imply for the relationship between the ρij and the pijt? In a given 
year, a first set of countries, those half-way through their two-year term, gain automatic 
renewal of their NPM status in the following year (Rt); a second set of countries, It, are 
those ineligible for election to the UNSC in the following year (UNSC rules prohibit 
NPMs from seeking immediate re-election); and a final set of countries is eligible for 
election to the UNSC (Et). Hence we can write 
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Note that the numerator of pijt
2  is the binomial probability of observing a distinct country 
pair containing aij, and that the denominator corrects for the impossibility of a country 
obtaining dual UNSC membership. 
 
3.3.2 Simulating the UNSC 
The complexity of PUNSC precludes analytical derivation of EtT ′ (d(αt, α
AE
)). We therefore 
compute an estimate of this statistic from the realisation (via computer simulation) of a 
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CVG, C ΩUNSC , which is the finite-repetition analogue of C 'UNSC on t  Ω (Ω a finite set). For 
the purposes of simulation, we choose Ω to be the set of natural numbers from one to 
100,000.
69
  
We adopt the same pattern of elections as occurs in the present UNSC: the term of the 
single EE NPM begins in even years. The two NPMs of the WEOG begin their terms in 
odd years. The terms for the two NPMs of the GRULAC are staggered; one is elected each 
year. The Asia’s two NPM seats are similarly staggered. The three Africa NPM seats are 
also staggered with two terms beginning in even years and one term beginning in odd 
years.  
 
3.3.3 Results  
Simulating the UNSC according to the approach of the previous section, our proximity 
measures are found as 
AE = 0.45;      PE = 0.66;      RE = 0.70; 
CFB = 0.56;      RFB = 0.68. 
These measures show that the UNSC is (i) more inequitable from a country perspective 
than from a regional perspective; and (ii) more inequitable from an ex-ante (procedural) 
perspective than from an ex-post (outcome) perspective.  
To explain these findings, in Table 3.2 we show country-by-country measures for each of 
our three equity concepts. Whereas our proximity measures above are based upon absolute 
deviations, the measures reported in Table 3.2 report individual relative deviations from 
each of our equity concepts. In particular, we report the measure R where 
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 Precisely, we realise marginally more than 100,000 periods, but discard the very earliest periods. This is 
necessary as we begin with a UNSC containing the five PMs and ten vacant seats. In each period we elect 
five new NPMs, hence, it is not until the completion of the election in period two that there remain no vacant 
seats on the elected UNSC. We discard the first four periods, which corresponds to twice the term length of a 
NPM, as, in all periods beyond the fourth, the elected UNSC contains no vacant seats, and eligibility for 
election to the UNSC does not depend upon whether a country was elected to the UNSC in either of periods 
one or two (when, abnormally, It = Ø). 
 83 
AE
AE
)(
ij
ijtt
ijR



E
;     ;
PE
PE
ij
ij
ijR


     
 
.
 
RE
RE
j
j
jR


  
We begin with an analysis of the UNSC from a country perspective. The conclusions are, 
however, sensitive to whether this is done from an ex-ante or ex-post perspective. Taking 
the ex-post perspective first, the relevant equity concept is PE. The relatively middling 
score achieved by the UNSC largely reflects two factors. First, within the PM and NPM 
categories, each country is awarded the same voting power regardless of its population. As 
may be seen in the first column of Table 3.3, a consequence is that, within each 
membership category, the most populous countries receive a voting power that is much too 
low. The most extreme example is India, which receives only 10.7 per cent of its voting 
power under PE. In spite of receiving the voting power of a PM, China receives only 21 
per cent of its voting power under PE. Two further PMs – Russia and the United States – 
are also substantially underweighted. In the remaining regions, countries such as Brazil (27 
per cent), Nigeria (30 per cent), Germany (41 per cent) and Ukraine (56 per cent) also find 
themselves substantially under-represented according to PE.  
An analogous consequence, which principally manifests itself among the NPMs, is that the 
least populous countries receive a voting power that is much too high. The most extreme 
example is Tuvalu, which receives 37.9 times its voting power under PE. In the remaining 
regions, countries such as San Marino (21 times), St. Kitts and Nevis (16 times), The 
Seychelles (13 times), and Montenegro (5 times) also find themselves substantially over-
represented under PE. 
The second factor is the division of voting power between the five PMs and the remaining 
UN membership. It is conventionally assumed that this division is too favourable to the 
PMs, but we conclude the opposite. Consistent with our comments regarding the 
underweighting of China, the United States, and Russia above, we calculate the total voting 
power of the PMs to be only 47 per cent of that consistent with PE. The remaining UN 
members therefore receive, on average, too much voting power on the UNSC under PE. 
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When we repeat the same analysis from an ex-ante perspective, however, we observe some 
important differences. For instance, the balance of power between PM and OM remains a 
problem, but now because far too much expected voting power is given to citizens of PM 
countries. On average, the PMs wield around 4.6 times too much expected voting power: 
the UK, in particular, wields some 9.6 times more expected voting power than that 
consistent with AE, and even China wields around twice too much expected voting power. 
How can the PMs be simultaneously under-represented according to PE, and over-
represented according to AE? The answer lies in the observation that PM countries are 
always able to cast their vote in Stage 3, whereas all other countries can do so only 
periodically. It is the combination of their right to be ever-present, together with their right 
of veto, which gives the PMs a disproportionately large share of the expected voting 
power.    
Accordingly, ordinary members suffer a deficit of expected voting power. Therefore, only 
a small proportion of such countries exceed their expected voting power under AE, and the 
major individual deviations are for countries that receive too little expected voting power. 
For instance, under the estimated membership distribution in Table 3.1, Dominica receives 
just 0.6 per cent of its expected voting power under AE. In other regions, countries such as 
Chad (11 per cent), Samoa (1 per cent), Montenegro (3 per cent) and Liechtenstein (0.7 per 
cent) also receive much too little expected voting power. 
In summary, the current UNSC deviates significantly from both the AE and PE concepts. 
The deviations from AE are the more severe, because PMs enjoy the highest voting power 
and the highest allocation probability, whereas these should be traded-off under AE. 
Whether the PMs are favoured hinges, however, on whether an ex-ante or ex-post 
perspective is adopted: PMs obtain decisively too much expected voting power ex-ante, 
but too little realised voting power ex-post. Accordingly, proposals for reform of the 
UNSC should not seek to erode the voting power of the existing PMs when members of the 
UNSC (indeed, this should be increased), but should instead focus upon eroding the right 
 85 
of these countries to be ever-present on the UNSC.   
We now analyse the UNSC from a regional perspective using the RE concept. We find 
evidence in the third column of the table in Table 3.3 to support the widely-made claim 
that Africa and Asia are under-represented. We find that Asia is the most under-
represented region, with only 55 per cent of its voting power under RE, closely followed 
by Africa with just 57 per cent. The GRULAC is also under-represented, but by a smaller 
margin – it receives 76 per cent of its voting power under RE. Balancing off the under-
represented regions are the WEOG – which receives around 2.6 times its voting power 
under RE, and EE, which is over-represented by 61 per cent. These results imply the 
existence of a substantial north/south inequity. We find that, overall, the south receives just 
60 per cent of its voting power under RE. Accordingly, proposals for reform of the UNSC 
should principally seek to shift voting power away from the WEOG, and towards Asia and 
Africa.   
Last, we use our theoretical framework to address some of the remaining issues raised by 
reformers. Should some countries be ever-present on the UNSC? If so, which ones? Under 
the CFB concept the answer is negative: all countries receive a common allocation 
probability p = N|A|
-1
 < 1. The RFB concept does not preclude ever-present members, but 
only if the country is sufficiently populous. To see this, note that within the class of 
regional monotonic C′ satisfying RFB, the maximal variation in the pijt across countries is 
achieved under a flat rule for voting power. In this case, by Corollary 3.1, the allocation 
probabilities are set such that pRFBij  A qij, in which case a country is ever-present if 
1RFB 

Aa
ij
ij
ij
ij
q
q
Np . 
We find, however, that no country is sufficiently populous to meet this condition. Rather, 
in this case, China would be represented on the UNSC most often, obtaining membership 
in around 73 out of every 100 years. India would be represented next most often, obtaining 
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membership in around seven years in every ten. The United States would qualify for 
membership in only around seven years in every twenty, while the UK and France would 
qualify for membership in only around four in every 25 years. 
Our first-best concepts can also shed some light on whether the right of veto should be 
abolished and, if not, which countries should exercise a veto. A direct analysis is not 
feasible, however, for, even when we know the first-best voting power of each country, 
this information is insufficient to determine whether a country exercises a veto. The 
difficulty is that voting power indices mix two distinct concepts – the power to prevent 
action by voting against a resolution, and the power to initiate action by voting for a 
resolution (Coleman, 1971). Hence, the degree of preventative power associated with a 
given vector of voting powers is a-priori unknown.  
By Corollary 3.1, under RFB and β-invariance council members receive a common voting 
power β = N-1. This case is sufficiently simple that we can conclude that either all council 
members exercise a veto (under a unanimity decision rule), or none do. Hence the RFB 
concept does not preclude a veto right. Under the CFB concept – in which voting powers 
are set such that βij A qij – we can instead examine which, if any, countries obtain a 
voting power that is at least as large as that currently wielded by a PM. Under CFB, 
countries do not obtain the same voting power every time they are allocated to the UNSC 
as the wjt are random variables. To investigate this case we therefore examine each of the 
100,000 realised Mt from the simulation of C
 Ω
UNSC under the CFB voting powers. We 
measure the proportion of a country’s appearances on the UNSC for which it votes with a 
power βij > βPM under CFB. We find that, in our 100,000 realisations, China and India 
always receive a voting power higher than βPM under CFB. China, in particular, receives, 
on average, a voting power of around 0.23, which is slightly more than double βPM.
70
    
In summary, we do not find clear support for the abolition of the veto: RFB does not 
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 The remaining countries that sometimes (but not always) receive βij > βPM are the United States (77 per 
cent of council appearances), Indonesia (33 per cent), Brazil (3.5 per cent), Pakistan (0.6 per cent), Russia 
(0.06 per cent) and Nigeria (0.04 per cent). 
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preclude veto countries, and the CFB concept suggests that some countries warrant more 
voting power than currently received by a PM. Three points are of note, however: first, our 
first-best concepts imply that no country should have a veto and be ever-present on the 
UNSC. Second, the CFB concept suggests that if a veto right is to be allocated to five 
countries it should be the five most populous: China, India, the United States, Indonesia, 
and Brazil. Thus we agree with reformers that, if the right of veto is to remain, attention 
should be focused upon its allocation. As, however, we consider democratic ideals rather 
than economic might, or peacekeeping contributions, our analysis does not suggest that 
either Germany or Japan should be the recipients of a veto.
71
 Last, a possible avenue for 
reform based on our findings may be for the PMs to trade-off extra voting power when a 
UNSC member with the loss of the right to be ever-present. 
The final issue we address is how the 15 UNSC seats should be divided between regions. 
According to Proposition 3.4, the CFB concept implies that the nj should be set 
proportional to |Rj|, i.e., four each to Africa and Asia, three to the GRULAC, and two each 
to EE and the WEOG. The RFB concept is consistent with a number of rules for nj. Under 
p-invariance RFB yields the same rule as under CFB, but, under β-invariance, RFB 
requires nj J ∑aijRj qij. Relative to the rule for nj under CFB, this rule gives one extra 
seat to Asia (five seats), one less to the GRULAC (two seats), and leaves the entitlements 
of the remaining regions unchanged. Thus the WEOG, with four seats in the present 
UNSC, has twice its entitlement under either first-best concept, while Asia and Africa – 
which both receive three seats – are under-represented by at least one seat (and Asia by 
two seats under the RFB rule above).  
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 As seen in Table 3.2, Japan and Germany – like the PMs – are heavily under-represented according to PE. 
Both countries have historically achieved election to the UNSC on a regular basis, however, hence their 
representation under AE tells a different story. Japan’s expected voting power is roughly in accordance with 
AE, while Germany is actually over-represented by 65 per cent under AE.   
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3.4 Conclusion 
The Councils of the United Nations – the UNSC and ECOSOC – play an important role in 
global wealth and security. Yet, to our knowledge, no previous analysis has developed 
formal equity principles for the analysis of such bodies, in which only a subset of member 
countries may vote at a point in time.  
In this Chapter we develop a new class of voting game we term a council voting game. We 
then develop three democratic equity concepts for this new class of game. These three 
concepts differ according to whether equity is in an ex-ante (or procedural) sense, or in an 
ex-post (or outcome) sense; and whether council members are viewed as regional 
representatives, or solely as representatives of themselves. Fundamental trade-offs exist 
between these concepts, for if a CVG is PE then it cannot be RE. The AE concept is 
consistent with either PE or RE on their own, but even here the conditions required are 
stringent: either allocation probabilities must be equal across all countries (under the CFB 
concept) or a more general trade-off between voting power and allocation probability must 
hold (under the RFB concept).      
We demonstrate the utility of our theoretical framework with an application to the UNSC. 
Significant degrees of inequity exist irrespective of the precise equity concept used, but we 
find that the UNSC is more inequitable in an ex-ante sense than in an ex-post sense, and 
more inequitable if countries are viewed as representing themselves, than if they are 
viewed as representing their region.  
What do our findings imply for the ongoing debate on UNSC reform? First, we believe our 
framework clarifies the nature of the underlying trade-offs. For instance, simultaneous 
achievement of PE and RE is unfeasible; and, if realpolitik makes giving every country an 
equal probability of council allocation unfeasible, then some trade-off between AE and PE 
is unavoidable. Second, our analysis highlights that a successful reform of the UNSC must 
simultaneously address the distribution of voting power and the distribution of allocation 
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probability, for attempting to achieve our equity concepts by changing only one or the 
other will lead to extreme outcomes. For instance, if the current allocation probabilities are 
retained, then our calculations show that attainment of AE requires that (tiny) countries 
such as Nauru, Micronesia, Palau, and San Marino receive a voting power well in excess of 
the current βPM when a member of the UNSC, as compensation for being a member very 
infrequently.   
The apparent tension between realpolitik and the first-best concepts we develop suggests 
that the latter should be understood as purely theoretical benchmarks against which to 
assess the equitability of the UNSC and the desirability of alternative reforms. While this 
in no way undermines the usefulness of these concepts, an avenue for future research 
might, therefore, be to investigate second-best rules that move a CVG as “close” as 
possible to our first-best benchmarks under an additional realpolitik constraint. While this 
idea must await a proper treatment, however, we hope the present contribution at least 
marks a first step in the analysis of democratic equitability in councils.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: For a proof of Penrose’s square-root rule (from which the 
Proposition follows) see Felsenthal and Machover (1998).  ■  
 
Proof of Lemma 3.1: If pijt A fijt then nj = ∑aijRj pijt J ∑aijRj fijt.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2 
(i)  Under AE we have αijt = pijtsijEMtMt(wjt) and αijt A qij, so pijtsij A (EMtMt(wjt))
-1
qij
. For this condition to hold at all t implies pt-invariance (for the pijt have a fixed sum across 
each region, so increasing one pijt implies another must fall, leading to a violation of 
regional proportionality between these two countries). Hence pijsij A (EMtMt(wjt))
-1
qij. 
Then (EMtMt(wjt))
-1
qij R qij so pijsij R qij. Now suppose pijsij R qij then there 
exists a w(∙) such that pijsij A (EMtMt(wjt))
-1
qij, which is AE.  ■ 
(ii) Under (a) we have wjt A (∑aij  Mt sij)
-1
, hence sij M βijt. Then, by condition (b), sij M 
βijt M qij, which is PE. Now suppose βijt M qij holds, which implies condition (a). 
Then βijt M sij, hence sij M qij, which implies sij A qij.  ■ 
(iii) We have ∑aijMt∩Rj βijt J ∑aijRj qij by construction. Conversely, suppose we have 
∑aijMt∩Rj βijt J ∑aijRj qij, then ∑aijMt∩Rj wjtsij J ∑aijRj qij. As this condition must hold 
for arbitrary sij   0, it implies that w(zjt) is of the form w(zjt) = xj(zjt)
-1
, where xj J 
∑aijRj qij. Then the condition that ∑aijMt wjtsij = 1 implies ∑aijMt xj = 1.  ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Under RE we have ∑aijMt∩Rj βijt J ∑aijRj qij. Under PE we 
have βijt M qij, hence ∑aijMt∩Rj βijt J ∑aijMt∩Rj qij. For both conditions to hold we must 
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have ∑aijRj qij J ∑aijMt∩Rj qij. For this to hold ∑aijMt∩Rj qij must be non-random, but 
this contradicts the assumptions of Section 3.2.2.  ■   
 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 
(i) Conditions (a) and (c) yield PE by part (ii) of Proposition 3.2. Then, by condition (a) we 
have EMtMt(wjt) A sij, hence αijt A pijtsij. By condition (b) we have αijt A pijsij A sij so, 
by (c), we obtain αijt A pijsij A qij, which is AE. Now suppose AE and PE hold. Then, as 
(a) must hold for PE, we have αijt = pijtsijEMtMt(wjt) A pijtsij A qij, which implies that 
pijtsij must be time invariant, i.e., αijt A qij. By PE it also holds that sij A qij, which is 
condition (c): both conditions hold if and only if condition (b) is satisfied.  ■ 
(ii) We have αijt = pijtsijEMtMt(wjt). Under AE pijtsijEMtMt(wjt) A qij. Then substituting 
for wjt using condition (a) yields condition (b).  ■  
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Table 3.1: Estimated ρij (t = 2012) 
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Table 3.2: Entitlements and relative deviations 
 
Country PE AE RE 
 βPEij  R
PE
ij  α
AE
ij  R
AE
ij  β
RE
j  R
RE
j  
       
Africa – – – – 0.259 0.573 
Algeria 0.0080 0.631 0.0080 1.301 – – 
Angola 0.0059 0.861 0.0059 0.523 – – 
Benin 0.0040 1.264 0.0040 0.556 – – 
Botswana 0.0019 2.654 0.0019 0.811 – – 
Burkina Faso 0.0054 0.927 0.0054 0.500 – – 
Burundi 0.0039 1.299 0.0039 0.253 – – 
Cameroon 0.0059 0.849 0.0059 0.283 – – 
Cape Verde 0.0009 5.339 0.0009 0.789 – – 
Central African Republic 0.0028 1.792 0.0028 0.361 – – 
Chad 0.0045 1.122 0.0045 0.113 – – 
Comoros 0.0012 4.387 0.0012 0.423 – – 
Congo 0.0027 1.870 0.0027 1.256 – – 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0060 0.846 0.0060 0.574 – – 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.0109 0.463 0.0109 0.129 – – 
Djibouti 0.0013 3.989 0.0013 0.889 – – 
Egypt 0.0121 0.418 0.0121 0.507 – – 
Equatorial Guinea 0.0011 4.493 0.0011 0.171 – – 
Eritrea 0.0031 1.641 0.0031 0.398 – – 
Ethiopia 0.0122 0.413 0.0122 0.268 – – 
Gabon 0.0016 3.065 0.0016 1.386 – – 
Gambia 0.0018 2.860 0.0018 0.608 – – 
Ghana 0.0066 0.761 0.0066 0.834 – – 
Guinea 0.0042 1.190 0.0042 0.822 – – 
Guinea-Bissau 0.0017 3.055 0.0017 0.230 – – 
Kenya 0.0085 0.591 0.0085 0.550 – – 
Lesotho 0.0020 2.552 0.0020 0.721 – – 
Liberia 0.0027 1.882 0.0027 0.140 – – 
Libya 0.0034 1.492 0.0034 0.878 – – 
Madagascar 0.0061 0.826 0.0061 0.434 – – 
Malawi 0.0052 0.974 0.0052 0.513 – – 
Mali 0.0053 0.959 0.0053 0.707 – – 
Mauritania 0.0025 2.022 0.0025 1.024 – – 
Mauritius 0.0015 3.299 0.0015 1.286 – – 
Morocco 0.0076 0.665 0.0076 0.895 – – 
Mozambique 0.0065 0.778 0.0065 0.726 – – 
Namibia 0.0020 2.489 0.0020 0.955 – – 
Niger 0.0053 0.955 0.0053 0.653 – – 
Nigeria 0.0169 0.299 0.0169 0.404 – – 
Rwanda 0.0044 1.154 0.0044 0.203 – – 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.0005 9.246 0.0005 0.610 – – 
Senegal 0.0047 1.066 0.0047 0.972 – – 
Seychelles 0.0004 12.784 0.0004 0.241 – – 
Sierra Leone 0.0033 1.552 0.0033 0.442 – – 
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Country PE AE RE 
 βPEij  R
PE
ij  α
AE
ij  R
AE
ij  β
RE
j  R
RE
j  
       
Somalia 0.0041 1.231 0.0041 0.193 – – 
South Africa 0.0095 0.531 0.0095 0.517 – – 
South Sudan 0.0042 1.192 0.0042 0.378 – – 
Sudan 0.0078 0.649 0.0078 0.327 – – 
Swaziland 0.0015 3.453 0.0015 0.604 – – 
Togo 0.0033 1.532 0.0033 0.718 – – 
Tunisia 0.0043 1.162 0.0043 1.254 – – 
Uganda 0.0078 0.650 0.0078 0.359 – – 
United Republic of Tanzania 0.0089 0.570 0.0089 0.612 – – 
Zambia 0.0049 1.039 0.0049 0.957 – – 
Zimbabwe 0.0048 1.061 0.0048 1.020 – – 
       Asia – – – – 0.362 0.552 
Afghanistan 0.0075 0.671 0.0075 0.016 – – 
Bahrain 0.0015 3.348 0.0015 0.166 – – 
Bangladesh 0.0164 0.308 0.0164 0.225 – – 
Bhutan 0.0011 4.413 0.0011 0.050 – – 
Brunei 0.0008 5.954 0.0008 0.196 – – 
Cambodia 0.0050 1.000 0.0050 0.022 – – 
China 0.0487 0.211 0.0487 2.072 – – 
Cyprus 0.0012 4.180 0.0012 0.278 – – 
DPR Korea 0.0066 0.762 0.0066 0.021 – – 
Fiji 0.0012 4.053 0.0012 0.240 – – 
India 0.0470 0.107 0.0470 0.547 – – 
Indonesia 0.0208 0.243 0.0208 0.261 – – 
Iran 0.0115 0.437 0.0115 0.095 – – 
Iraq 0.0076 0.668 0.0076 0.071 – – 
Japan 0.0151 0.334 0.0151 0.941 – – 
Jordan 0.0033 1.512 0.0033 0.727 – – 
Kazakhstan 0.0054 0.939 0.0054 0.072 – – 
Kiribati 0.0004 11.918 0.0004 0.019 – – 
Kuwait 0.0022 2.273 0.0022 0.434 – – 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0031 1.628 0.0031 0.022 – – 
Laos 0.0033 1.510 0.0033 0.020 – – 
Lebanon 0.0028 1.829 0.0028 0.042 – – 
Malaysia 0.0072 0.706 0.0072 0.938 – – 
Maldives 0.0008 6.691 0.0008 0.054 – – 
Marshall Islands 0.0003 16.176 0.0003 0.016 – – 
Micronesia (Federated States of) 0.0004 11.284 0.0004 0.013 – – 
Mongolia 0.0022 2.265 0.0022 0.043 – – 
Myanmar 0.0093 0.543 0.0093 0.089 – – 
Nauru 0.0001 37.133 0.0001 0.015 – – 
Nepal 0.0073 0.687 0.0073 0.118 – – 
Oman 0.0022 2.254 0.0022 0.232 – – 
Pakistan 0.0177 0.285 0.0177 0.667 – – 
Palau 0.0002 26.282 0.0002 0.026 – – 
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Papua New Guinea 0.0035 1.436 0.0035 0.089 – – 
Philippines 0.0130 0.389 0.0130 0.178 – – 
Qatar 0.0018 2.835 0.0018 0.397 – – 
Republic of Korea 0.0093 0.542 0.0093 0.678 – – 
Samoa 0.0006 8.788 0.0006 0.009 – – 
Saudi Arabia 0.0070 0.718 0.0070 0.139 – – 
Singapore 0.0030 1.667 0.0030 0.974 – – 
Solomon Islands 0.0010 5.126 0.0010 0.046 – – 
Sri Lanka 0.0061 0.823 0.0061 0.278 – – 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.0061 0.832 0.0061 0.044 – – 
Tajikistan 0.0035 1.434 0.0035 0.020 – – 
Thailand 0.0112 0.452 0.0112 0.241 – – 
Timor Leste 0.0014 3.546 0.0014 0.022 – – 
Tonga 0.0004 11.657 0.0004 0.027 – – 
Turkmenistan 0.0030 1.675 0.0030 0.029 – – 
Tuvalu 0.0001 37.933 0.0001 0.022 – – 
United Arab Emirates 0.0037 1.372 0.0037 0.576 – – 
Uzbekistan 0.0070 0.718 0.0070 0.034 – – 
Vanuatu 0.0007 7.681 0.0007 0.014 – – 
Vietnam 0.0126 0.401 0.0126 0.042 – – 
Yemen 0.0066 0.767 0.0066 0.101 – – 
       EE – – – – 0.093 1.613 
Albania 0.0024 2.101 0.0024 0.160 – – 
Armenia 0.0024 2.138 0.0024 0.086 – – 
Azerbaijan 0.0041 1.241 0.0041 0.267 – – 
Belarus 0.0042 1.214 0.0042 0.375 – – 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0026 1.939 0.0026 0.113 – – 
Bulgaria 0.0037 1.374 0.0037 0.332 – – 
Croatia 0.0028 1.792 0.0028 0.259 – – 
Czech Republic 0.0043 1.161 0.0043 0.727 – – 
Estonia 0.0016 3.247 0.0016 0.080 – – 
Georgia 0.0028 1.802 0.0028 0.173 – – 
Hungary 0.0042 1.190 0.0042 0.821 – – 
Latvia 0.0020 2.506 0.0020 0.110 – – 
Lithuania 0.0024 2.063 0.0024 0.152 – – 
Montenegro 0.0011 4.732 0.0011 0.032 – – 
Poland 0.0083 0.608 0.0083 1.767 – – 
Republic of Moldova 0.0025 1.989 0.0025 0.198 – – 
Romania 0.0062 0.811 0.0062 1.034 – – 
Russian Federation 0.0160 0.641 0.0160 6.292 – – 
Serbia 0.0036 1.386 0.0036 0.380 – – 
Slovakia 0.0031 1.609 0.0031 0.289 – – 
Slovenia 0.0019 2.639 0.0019 0.169 – – 
TFYR Macedonia 0.0019 2.620 0.0019 0.108 – – 
Ukraine 0.0090 0.558 0.0090 1.299 – – 
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GRULAC – – – – 0.130 0.760 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.0004 12.625 0.0004 0.047 – – 
Argentina 0.0085 0.592 0.0085 1.174 – – 
Bahamas 0.0008 6.422 0.0008 0.318 – – 
Barbados 0.0007 7.193 0.0007 0.119 – – 
Belize 0.0007 6.736 0.0007 0.130 – – 
Bolivia 0.0042 1.193 0.0042 0.126 – – 
Brazil 0.0187 0.269 0.0187 1.237 – – 
Chile 0.0056 0.909 0.0056 1.064 – – 
Colombia 0.0091 0.553 0.0091 0.695 – – 
Costa Rica 0.0029 1.742 0.0029 0.301 – – 
Cuba 0.0045 1.121 0.0045 0.335 – – 
Dominica 0.0003 14.446 0.0003 0.006 – – 
Dominican Republic 0.0042 1.193 0.0042 0.281 – – 
Ecuador 0.0051 0.989 0.0051 0.508 – – 
El Salvador 0.0033 1.511 0.0033 0.077 – – 
Grenada 0.0004 11.633 0.0004 0.007 – – 
Guatemala 0.0051 0.991 0.0051 0.165 – – 
Guyana 0.0012 4.329 0.0012 0.562 – – 
Haiti 0.0042 1.190 0.0042 0.006 – – 
Honduras 0.0037 1.364 0.0037 0.284 – – 
Jamaica 0.0022 2.271 0.0022 0.260 – – 
Mexico 0.0143 0.353 0.0143 1.273 – – 
Nicaragua 0.0032 1.563 0.0032 0.165 – – 
Panama 0.0025 2.005 0.0025 0.292 – – 
Paraguay 0.0034 1.480 0.0034 0.176 – – 
Peru 0.0072 0.697 0.0072 0.503 – – 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.0003 16.427 0.0003 0.006 – – 
Saint Lucia 0.0006 9.008 0.0006 0.034 – – 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.0004 11.372 0.0004 0.011 – – 
Suriname 0.0010 5.192 0.0010 0.099 – – 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.0016 3.247 0.0016 0.419 – – 
Uruguay 0.0025 2.049 0.0025 0.813 – – 
Venezuela 0.0072 0.699 0.0072 2.294 – – 
       WEOG – – – – 0.155 2.592 
Andorra 0.0004 12.908 0.0004 0.020 – – 
Australia 0.0063 0.797 0.0063 0.254 – – 
Austria 0.0039 1.298 0.0039 2.033 – – 
Belgium 0.0044 1.149 0.0044 0.638 – – 
Canada 0.0078 0.645 0.0078 0.570 – – 
Denmark 0.0032 1.596 0.0032 0.920 – – 
Finland 0.0031 1.624 0.0031 0.750 – – 
France 0.0108 0.953 0.0108 9.351 – – 
Germany 0.0122 0.415 0.0122 1.652 – – 
Greece 0.0045 1.116 0.0045 0.149 – – 
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Iceland 0.0008 6.646 0.0008 0.008 – – 
Ireland 0.0028 1.779 0.0028 1.088 – – 
Israel 0.0037 1.381 0.0037 0.022 – – 
Italy 0.0104 0.483 0.0104 1.101 – – 
Liechtenstein 0.0003 19.810 0.0003 0.008 – – 
Luxembourg 0.0010 5.279 0.0010 0.032 – – 
Malta 0.0009 5.827 0.0009 0.059 – – 
Monaco 0.0003 19.984 0.0003 0.051 – – 
Netherlands 0.0055 0.923 0.0055 1.001 – – 
New Zealand 0.0028 1.799 0.0028 0.472 – – 
Norway 0.0030 1.702 0.0030 0.720 – – 
Portugal 0.0044 1.151 0.0044 0.508 – – 
San Marino 0.0002 21.176 0.0002 0.021 – – 
Spain 0.0091 0.554 0.0091 0.921 – – 
Sweden 0.0041 1.228 0.0041 0.926 – – 
Switzerland 0.0037 1.358 0.0037 0.878 – – 
Turkey 0.0114 0.441 0.0114 1.299 – – 
United Kingdom 0.0106 0.973 0.0106 9.552 – – 
United States of America 0.0236 0.435 0.0236 4.270 – – 
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Chapter 4 
Reform of the United Nations Security Council: 
Equity and Efficiency 
 
 
 “No reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council” 
 
- Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The UN is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The UNSC is its most powerful organ, with the authority to make 
legally binding resolutions to fulfil its mandate of maintaining international peace and 
security. To that end, it can suspend economic and diplomatic relations between countries, 
impose blockades, and authorise the use of armed force. 
Our study appraises possible reforms to the UNSC. Since its beginnings in 1946, the 
UNSC has undergone reforms only once: in 1963, the UNGA – which includes delegates 
from all UN member countries – voted to expand the UNSC from 11 to 15 members 
(UNGA, 1963).
72
 Momentum for a second round of reforms can be traced back to 1993, 
when an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) was established to explore proposals for 
UNSC reform.
73
 This Working Group, now often dubbed the “Never-ending Working 
Group”, has entered its 20th consecutive year of deliberations. 
Many proposals for UNSC reform have been put forward. This Chapter presents, to our 
knowledge, the first formal quantitative study of the equity and efficiency properties of 
these proposals. We apply new formal equity measures developed in Chapter 3 to 
                                                 
72
The reforms did not come into effect until 1965, however, due to opposition among two of the Permanent 
Members. 
73
In full, the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the 
Membership of the Security Council (OEWG, 1994). The call for the creation of the OEWG, UNGA (1993), 
followed an overwhelming response to an earlier UNGA Resolution, UNGA (1992), which invited members 
to submit written comments on a possible review of the Security Council.  
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understand the effects of eight “structural reforms” contained within eleven reform 
proposals currently under consideration by world leaders. A key aspect of the 
implementation is a computer simulation of the UNSC under each structural reform over a 
period of 100,000 years.   
Under the present arrangements, the 15 UNSC members comprise five PMs – China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – that are ever-present and 
wield a veto on all non-procedural matters. The remaining ten members are elected NPMs, 
who serve time-limited two-year terms. The ten NPM seats are divided between five 
regional caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe (EE); two countries from 
each of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), the Latin America and 
Caribbean Group (GRULAC) and Asia; and three countries from Africa.
74
 
Two distinct sets of criticism are widely levelled against these arrangements: one relating 
to the efficiency with which they allow the UNSC to respond to its member’s preferences, 
and another relating to the degree to which they achieve equity in the allocation of political 
power. 
On efficiency, critics argue that the UNSC is too often impotent, not least because a 
preference against a resolution by a single PM can override a preference for the resolution 
by all remaining members. For instance, the UNSC is presently under criticism for its 
inability to respond decisively to the Syrian crisis. The UNSC has also appeared slow to 
react to earlier conflicts, notably the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Barnett, 2002). This lack 
of efficiency has sometimes led powerful countries to bypass the UNSC in favour of 
multilateral action. For instance, in 1999 NATO undertook military action in Kosovo, and 
                                                 
74
 See Table 3.1 for the full membership of each of the regional groups (excluding PMs). Of the PMs, China 
is a member in Asia, Russia in EE, and France and the UK in the WEOG. Technically, the United States is 
not a member of any regional group, but it attends meetings of the WEOG as an observer and is 
considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes (UN, 2012a). For the purposes of this 
Chapter, therefore, we give the United States membership in the WEOG.   
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in 2003 the US and its allies invaded Iraq, both lacking a UNSC mandate.
75
  
On equity, Chapter 3, finds, first, that the voting power of a NPM is far too low for a 
populous country such as India, but far too high when awarded to smaller countries. 
Second, although, in isolation, the voting power of a PM is not excessive, we find that the 
conjunction of preferential voting power when a member of the UNSC and the right to be 
an ever-present member gives the PMs substantially too much representation. Third, 
although we do not find compelling support for the abolition of the veto, we find that if the 
right does remain, it should be re-allocated to different countries. From a regional 
perspective we find that Asia and Africa are each substantially under-represented, as is the 
GRULAC (but to a lesser degree), which implies a broader representational imbalance 
between North (EE and the WEOG) and South (Africa, Asia and the GRULAC).  
We find that only two of the eight structural reforms considered, and only one of the 
eleven reform proposals considered, improve upon the status quo in both the equity and 
efficiency dimensions. One structural reform strictly worsens both equity and efficiency 
relative to the status quo, and another three worsen equity, leaving efficiency unchanged. 
These findings are relatively robust to variations in methodology. Part of the problem is, 
first, that expansion, although good for equity, is harmful to efficiency. Second, many of 
the structural reforms concentrate the distribution of expected voting power, when they 
should ideally do the opposite. The most promising structural reform we consider is to 
require two PMs to vote against a resolution for a veto to be constituted. This improves 
both equity and efficiency, but the gains are still relatively modest. For instance, if this 
reform is accompanied with UNSC expansion by five or more members, then the 
efficiency gain is entirely eliminated. Accordingly, we fail to see that any of the reform 
proposals presently under consideration will (or should) break the reform impasse.      
Earlier quantitative studies of UNSC reform include Hosli et al. (2011), O’Neill (1996), 
                                                 
75
 Perhaps owing to this disenfranchisement with the organisation, many countries fail to pay their assessed 
contributions: as of the end of 2011, the UN was owed USD 454 million by member states (UN, 2012b). 
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and Strand and Rapkin (2011). These studies, however, lack a formal theoretical 
framework for measuring equity in such bodies, or for addressing issues relating to region- 
and country-specific notions of equity. Instead, they use the voting power of a PM relative 
to a NPM as an informal indicator of equitability. The theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 3 permits, for the first time, a formal quantitative assessment of the equitability of 
UNSC reforms for both individual countries and regions, and of how equity interacts with 
efficiency.  
As in Chapter 3, we allow for the UNSC decision rule to be ternary in nature. Last, in 
analysing reform of the UNSC, this Chapter contributes to the wider literature discussed in 
Chapter 1 that uses measures of a-priori voting power to appraise reform options for 
international voting bodies.  
The plan of the Chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 sets out the theoretical framework; 
Section 4.3 outlines the structural reforms contained in the reform proposals of UN 
members; Section 4.4 details the simulation analysis; Section 4.5 presents the results; 
Section 4.6 considers whether the findings are robust to some alternative methodological 
assumptions; and Section 4.7 concludes.    
 
4.2 Equity and Efficiency in the UNSC 
The UNSC in its current form (and under the structural reforms we consider) may be 
represented as a Council Voting Game (CVG), in the sense proposed in Chapter 3. In a 
CVG, a fully representative “assembly” allocates (by election or otherwise) members to a 
“council”. For the purposes of this Chapter the assembly should be interpreted as the 
UNGA, the main deliberative body of the UN containing all 193 of its members, and the 
council should be interpreted as the UNSC.  
In the context of the CVG describing the present arrangements, let UNGA denote the set of 
UNGA members, and UNSCt  UNGA denote the UNSC members (in year t). We partition 
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UNGA into regional groups Rj, and we denote by aij the i
th
 member of region j. We also 
allow for the UNSC to have different membership categories, indexed by k. To encompass 
the various reform proposals, we allow membership categories to vary according to, for 
instance, the mode of granting UNSC membership (e.g., by right or by election), the length 
of term, the provision for immediate re-election, and voting rights. The present UNSC, for 
instance, has two membership categories: permanent and non-permanent. PMs are UNSC 
members in every year by Charter (NPMs by election to two-year terms) and have 
preferential voting rights in the form of an individual veto. 
 
4.2 Equity Principles 
In order to appraise alternative UNSC reform proposals we employ concepts of democratic 
equity that prescribe rules for the appropriate representation of countries and regions. Here 
we outline three such equity concepts based upon those we developed in Chapter 3.  
We base our concepts of democratic equity upon an idealised three-stage decision-making 
process. In Stage 1, a national ballot is held in each country aij  UNGA under a simple 
majority decision rule. In Stage 2 a proper subset of countries are elected to the UNSC. In 
Stage 3, countries elected to the UNSC cast their vote according to the outcome of their 
national ballot in Stage 1.   
Our first notion of equity we term expected ex-ante equity (EAE). According to EAE, it is 
desirable that, over time, the expected voting power of every world citizen is equal before 
the allocation of countries to the UNSC is made in Stage 2, i.e., one person, one expected 
vote (OPOEV).
76
 The ex-ante perspective acknowledges that the power of a world citizen 
in the UNSC depends not only on the voting power of his or her country when it is a 
member of the UNSC, but also on how frequently his or her country is a member. 
                                                 
76
 EAE is a mathematically weaker equity concept than the “ex-ante equity” (AE) concept we develop in 
Chapter 3. AE requires that OPOEV hold at every point in time, whereas EAE requires OPOEV to hold over 
time on average. As we discuss further in footnote 93, the reason for using a weaker concept is that we are 
able to compute proximity measures for EAE, but not for AE. 
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We use two alternative concepts of ex-post equity. The first, which we term country ex-
post equity (CPE), is that it is desirable that the democratic principle of one person one 
vote (OPOV) hold among the citizens of UNSC member countries, once these are 
known.
77
 This concept is of particular relevance if UNSC members are viewed as 
representing their own populations, rather than their region at large.  
Our second ex-post concept of equity, regional ex-post equity (RPE), is that it is desirable 
that the combined voting power of the UNSC members from each region be consistent 
with the level of representation that each region would obtain in a fully representative 
voting body satisfying OPOV.
78
 This concept is of particular relevance if UNSC members 
are viewed as representing their region, rather than only themselves, for it entails that 
voting power be commensurate with the population of the region a country belongs to 
(rather than with its own country-specific population).
79
  
The distinction between our ex-ante and ex-post notions of equity is analogous to the 
distinction made by scholars of law between “procedural” and “distributive” justice (e.g., 
Konovsky, 2000); and by scholars of psychology between “procedural” and “outcome” 
fairness (e.g., De Cremer et al., 2010). The EAE concept requires procedural equitability 
hold over time, but not outcome equitability, whereas CPE and RPE require outcome 
equitability, but not procedural equitability. 
All three equity concepts need not apply to every council, or in equal degrees. In the case 
of the UNSC, however, we appear to observe evidence of a concern for each notion of 
equity. As discussed in the Introduction, both country- and regional-level equity concepts 
are frequently cited by reformers. In respect of ex-ante equity, it is notable that several of 
the reform proposals we consider leave the country voting powers unchanged, but modify 
                                                 
77
 CPE is identical to the “ex-post equity” (PE) concept we define in Chapter 3. The renaming here is purely 
for emphasis and clarity (see also footnote 78). 
78
 RPE is identical to the “regional equity” (RE) concept we define in Chapter 3.  
79
 The logical ex-ante counterpart to RPE is that the combined expected voting power of the regional 
members be proportional to the level of representation that each region would obtain in a fully representative 
voting body satisfying OPOV. We do not consider this equity concept separately, however, for if a CVG 
satisfies EAE at time t, then the ex-ante counterpart to RPE is necessarily satisfied too. See Chapter 3 for 
further details. 
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the probabilities of membership, suggesting that world leaders understand (at least 
intuitively) the importance of membership probability as well as voting rights.  
 
4.3 Equity Rules 
To derive formal rules for each equity concept we make the following assumption:  
Assumption 4.1 Voting in Stage 1 is assumed, a-priori, to be independent within and 
across countries. 
As argued by, e.g., Felsenthal and Machover (1997c, 2003), Assumption 4.1 should be 
understood as reflecting Bernoulli’s Principle of Insufficient Reason: a-priori we do not 
know how countries will actually vote. Empirically, countries on the UNSC do seem to act 
as distinct entities. Each member has full sovereignty over how it votes and countries pour 
large sums of money into campaigns for election (see, e.g., Malone, 2000), suggesting that 
they do not perceive membership by other countries to be a perfect substitute for their own 
membership. Also, the voting behaviour in the UNGA of serving members of the UNSC is 
no more similar to that of their regional members than to the votes of the remaining UNGA 
members (Lai and Lefler, 2009). 
Let pijt be country aij’s ex-ante probability of gaining UNSC membership in year t (across 
all categories of membership). Denote the population (as of a fixed time) of country aij as 
qij, and let its relative voting power (according to a given notion of this concept) if a 
member of the UNSC be βij, where ∑aijUNSCt βij = 1.
80
 As, when not a member of the 
UNSC, a country has a voting power of zero, the expected voting power of country aij is 
given by αijt = βijpijt. The expectation of αijt over time we denote by α‾ij = EtT (αijt) = βijp‾ij, 
where p‾ij = EtT (pijt). 
                                                 
80
 The existing UNSC and all reforms we consider may be analysed without requiring country voting powers 
to be time-variant. See Chapter 3 for a consideration of the more general case, however. 
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With this notation, and under Assumption 4.1, the EAE, CPE and RPE concepts are 
equivalent to the following conditions: 
                EAE:  α‾ij  qij;     CPE: βij  qij;     RPE: 
aij  UNSCt ∩ Rj
∑ βij  ∑aijRj qij. (4.1) 
It was the inspiration of Penrose (1946) that, under Assumption 4.1, the condition for CPE 
in (1), which must hold for all countries, achieves the OPOV principle among the citizens 
of member countries of a voting body. The condition for EAE in (4.1) may then be 
understood as simply requiring the same square-root rule to hold, but this time for expected 
voting power. The condition for RPE in (4.1), which must hold across all regions, states 
that the combined voting powers of UNSC members from each region must be 
proportional to the sum of the square-root populations of the region members. This follows 
as, under Assumption 4.1, it holds that the voting power of a region is the sum of the 
voting powers of the individual members. Hence, via Penrose’s square-root rule, a region’s 
voting power in a fully representative body satisfying OPOV is proportional to ∑aijRj qij .
81
 
In Chapter 3 we show that no CVG can simultaneously achieve CPE and RPE, but that it is 
possible for a CVG to satisfy either both EAE and CPE, or both EAE and RPE.   
 
4.4 Measuring Deviations from Equitability 
It is desirable to be able to measure, in an objective sense, the proximity of a given CVG to 
each of our equity notions. Accordingly, we adopt the metric d(X,Y) = ½ |Xi – Yi|, where 
X and Y are unit-vectors, which corresponds to the index of distortion used in Felsenthal 
and Machover (2004, 2007), and commonly attributed to Loosemore and Hanby (1971). 
                                                 
81
 If Assumption 4.1 were replaced with the assumption that voting is correlated across countries within a 
region, but independent across regions, then a different concept would be required as regions would vote as 
blocs on the UNSC and, in general, the voting power of a bloc does not equal the sum of the individual 
voting powers of the members when voting independently. 
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We then define proximity measures on the unit interval (where unity indicates maximal 
proximity) for each of our equity concepts as 
EAE = 1 – d(α,αEAE);     CPE = 1 – d(β,  βCPE); 
where α is the scaled |A|  1 unit vector of the α‾ij; α
EAE
 = βCPE is the scaled |A|  1 unit 
vector of the qij; and β is the scaled |A|  1 unit vector of the βij. To define an analogous 
proximity measure with respect to RE we note that we may write 
                                              
aij  UNSCt ∩ Rj
∑ βij = nj,PMβPM + (nj – nj,PM)βNPM, (4.2) 
where nj,PM is the number of PM seats for members of region j and nj is the total number of 
UNSC seats for members of region j.  Hence, from equation 4.1, we define  
RE = 1 – d(β,  βRPE), 
where β is the scaled |J|  1 unit vector of the right-side of (4.2), and βRPE is the scaled |J| 
 1 unit vector of the ∑aijRj qij. 
2.4.1 A summary measure 
It is helpful for the purposes of comparison between reforms to have a single 
encompassing measure of equity. To present our main results we utilise a weighted 
average, or “utilitarian”, measure of the form 
E = EAEEAE + CPECPE + RPERPE, 
where i is the preference weight assigned to equity concept i, with i i = 1. If the 
preference weights of world-leaders were known, we would clearly utilise these. As, 
however, these are not known, we weight the concepts of ex-post and ex-ante equity 
equally to reflect this Bernoullian uncertainty. As we have two ex-post measures to one ex-
ante, we halve the weight on ex-post measures, giving EAE = ½ and CPE = RPE = ¼. The 
findings arising under this choice of preference weights will not hold for all such choices, 
however. Accordingly, in Section 4.6 we discuss the main qualitative changes that arise as 
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the weights are varied, and also show our results under an alternative “Rawlsian” measure 
for E. 
 
4.5 Efficiency 
Our notion of efficiency relates to the decision rule that governs whether UNSC 
resolutions pass or fail. As discussed in the Introduction, we assume a ternary decision 
rule: a map from the set of all possible votes by UNSC members (each member may vote 
either no, yes, or abstain) to an outcome (which is either “pass” or “fail”), that satisfies the 
monotonicity conditions set out in Felsenthal and Machover (1997c: Definition 2.2). The 
efficiency of a decision rule refers to the efficiency with which it responds to the 
preferences of the members. The more difficult, a-priori, it is for a resolution to pass, the 
lower the efficiency of the decision rule.  
Our formal measure of efficiency is based on the ternary extension of the “power of a 
collectivity to act” (PTA) of Coleman (1971), which is the a-priori probability of a 
resolution being approved rather than blocked. For ternary decision rules this is given in 
Freixas (2012) as PTA = ω(3N )-1, where ω is the is the number of divisions of the N UNSC 
members for which a resolution is passed.
82
 As our remaining measures are scaled to the 
unit interval, but PTA lies on the interval (0, ½), we report 2PTA as our measure of 
efficiency.
83
 
 
4.3 Proposed UNSC Reforms 
Since the 1990s many different proposals for a second reform of the UNSC have been 
                                                 
82
 For a good introduction to PTA, and its relationship to the Banzhaf index, see Leech (2002c). 
83
 The minimum and maximum possible values of PTA when there are N voters are PTAmin = 3
–N
 and PTAmax 
= ½{1 – 3–N ∑
⌊2-1N⌋
i = 0  N!(i!)
-1
((N – i)!)-1}. PTAmin, which converges to zero with N, is attained under the 
unanimity decision rule in which, for a resolution to pass, all members must vote in favour. PTAmax, which 
converges to ½ with N, is attained under the simple majority decision rule in which the simple majority is 
taken over all members that do not abstain. 
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made.
84
 A difficulty, however, with taking these reform proposals themselves as the unit of 
analysis is that most bundle several distinct reforms. Most reform proposals advocate 
expansion of the category of NPM alongside one-or-more “structural” reforms (for 
instance, the introduction of a new membership category).
85
 Analysis of reform proposals 
is, therefore, unable to isolate the effects due to the structural reform from those due to 
expansion.  
A more informative approach, which we adopt here, is to take individual structural reforms 
as the unit of analysis. We analyse eight structural reforms that encompass eleven reform 
proposals put forward by actors within the UN (Table 4.3).
86
 A detailed description of each 
of the structural reforms in Table 4.3 is contained in Table 4.1, and of each of the reform 
proposals in Table 4.2. As we discuss further in Section 4.4, we initially impose each 
structural reform holding the size of the UNSC constant, so as to capture the pure effect of 
the structural reform. We then expand the resulting council along an “expansion path” to 
separately observe the effects of expansion.    
The earliest proposed structural reform we consider is the creation of a new membership 
category that gives permanent membership of the UNSC, but not the right of veto 
(Permanent Non-Veto Member – PNVM). The “2+3” reform proposal, which, according 
to Davis (2010: 23), was put forward in 1995 by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), was 
one of the first to embrace the PNVM structural reform.
87
 The creation of a PNVM 
category is also the only structural reform in the reform proposal of the “Group of Four” 
(G4), comprised of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G4, 2006); and the 1997 reform 
                                                 
84
 See, e.g., Cox (2009) and von Freiesleben (2008) for recent qualitative reviews of these reform proposals. 
85
 The UNSC has not increased in size in line with the growth in UN membership: the ratio of UNSC 
members to UN members has gone from 13.5 per cent in 1966, to only 7.8 per cent in 2012. Accordingly, 
there is widespread agreement on the need to expand the membership of the UNSC (although by what degree 
is hotly disputed). 
86
 We focus on the structural reforms associated with reform proposals that are sufficiently concrete to be 
simulated. This rules out some recent, but vague, reform proposals such as those found in OEWG (2008) and 
in UfC (2010), and the two NAM reform proposals discussed in Weiss (2005: 18). We also ignore a number 
of structural reforms associated with UNSC reform proposals made in the academic literature, notably Model 
C (Hoffmann and Ariyoruk, 2005), Model X (Hoffmann, 2006) and the reform proposals found in Russett, 
O’Neill and Sutterlin (1996), Schwartzberg (2003) and Strand and Rapkin (2010). We do this as, so far as we 
know, none of these reform proposals is under active consideration by UN members. 
87
 For more on the origins of this reform proposal, see Fassbender (2004: 346) and Bourantonis (2005: 49). 
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proposal of Ismail Razali (Razali), then Chair of the OEWG (OEWG, 1997).  
Nearly all governments wish to abolish or limit the right of veto, which is viewed as an 
unfair and anachronistic legacy of the Second World War (Fassbender, 2004; 
Schwartzberg, 2003). It is widely believed, however, that the five PMs would resist any 
such change (Weiss and Young, 2005). The position of the African Union (AU) is, 
therefore, that although it opposes the right of veto, if some countries are to have the right 
of veto, then this right must be extended. Accordingly, the AU reform proposal (AU, 2005) 
has as its structural reform the extension of the right of veto to eleven UNSC members 
(Veto+). As a fall-back position, the AU has joined with several other states (Italy, 
Mongolia, Singapore and Tunisia), to advocate particular structural reforms aimed at 
weakening the right of veto. In particular, we analyse the Weak Veto reform proposal, 
(WV), which contains as its structural reform that at least two PMs must vote against a 
resolution for it to necessarily fail (Veto–).88  
A further structural reform we consider is the redefining of the existing regional groups 
(RR). In 2003, the then UN Secretary-General set up the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (HLP). The Panel’s report (HLP, 2004) contains two different 
reform proposals – HLPA and HLPB – each incorporating a modified set of regions. While 
HLPA additionally allows for PNVMs, HLPB instead features two new structural reforms. 
First, it calls for a new category of long-term NPM seat (Term+) with a four-year term. 
Second, it proposes that the long-term NPM membership category allow immediate re-
election (Renew) – at present, NPMs must allow one year before seeking re-election. 
Allowing renewable membership is also the principal structural reform in the reform 
proposal of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group (UfC, 2005) headed by Italy. In 2007 
Panama put forward a reform proposal (Panama) that also allows for renewable 
membership, but with the twist that members elected to the UNSC for four consecutive 
                                                 
88
 Fassbender (2004: 351) and Wouters and Ruys (2005: 22) discuss further the origins of this reform 
proposal. 
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terms would acquire PNVM status (Panama, 2007). 
We consider two further structural reforms, each associated with Italy (which plays an 
especially active role in the UNSC reform debate). Italy (2005) put forward a reform 
proposal (Italy) that, as its structural reform, creates a new category of seat that rotates 
among the members of each regional group (Rotate). A more radical structural reform – 
regional members (RM) – is to create a category of seat held by a region, rather than by 
any individual country. In this vein, Italy has advocated the creation of a permanent 
European Union (EU) seat on the UNSC, endowed with the right of veto (the EU reform 
proposal).
89
 In April 2011 this idea received the backing of the European Parliament, 
which passed a resolution stating that “...a seat in an enlarged UNSC remains a central, 
long-term goal of the European Union” (European Parliament, 2011).90  
  
4.4 Simulation 
In this section we detail our approach to simulating the UNSC under each reform process. 
The reader not interested in these details may skip this section.  
 
4.4.1 Election to the UNSC 
We begin by determining, for each region, the number of seats of each membership 
category that are vacant in a given year: as only a subset of UNSC members complete their 
terms in a given year, this is not unique. For instance, in the present UNSC the GRULAC 
and the WEOG both receive two NPM seats: the GRULAC elect one of their seats each 
year – the sequence {1,1} – whereas the WEOG elect both their seats in odd years, and 
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 See, e.g., Kirkup (2009). 
90
 The EU already enjoys observer status in the UNGA under Resolution A/65/L.64/Rev.1 (UNGA, 2011). 
As an observer the EU has the right to speak at UNGA meetings and to present proposals agreed by EU 
members, but not the right to vote on resolutions and other substantive matters. Note that our EU reform 
proposal assumes that the veto for the EU replaces the separate vetoes presently wielded by France and the 
UK. It is unclear whether this is also envisaged by the European Parliament, or whether it seeks an EU seat in 
addition to the France and the UK retaining their existing PM status.      
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hold no elections in even years – the sequence {2,0}. As, the WEOG aside, the remaining 
regions display a preference for temporal smoothing of vacancies we look (under each 
structural reform) for the set of sequences that makes maximally smooth the number of 
vacant seats per year within each region, and which also makes maximally smooth the total 
number of vacancies per year across regions.
91
 
With the number of vacant seats decided, we specify an election procedure for membership 
categories that require members to be elected. At present, the UNGA simultaneously elects 
new NPMs to the UNSC in an annual ballot. In order to obtain a tractable model for 
purposes of simulation, however, we suppose that elections are conducted sequentially, 
with countries elected one-by-one to each membership category in turn. As countries that 
win UNSC membership in the category elected first become ineligible for election to the 
membership category elected second, and so on, we assume that the elections for each 
membership category are held in order of desirability, with seats belonging to the most 
desirable membership category elected first. This assumption rules out the possibility a 
country might not participate in the elections for the first membership category, so as to 
ensure eligibility for a later membership category. PNVM membership is deemed the most 
desirable, with further membership categories ranked by term length, followed by 
renewable status. The least desirable membership category – two years non-renewable – is 
therefore elected last.
92
 
As in Chapter 3, we model the p‾ij as deriving from a (time-invariant) probability ρijk, where 
∑
k
∑
aijRj
 ρijk = 1, with which country aij will be elected to the UNSC in membership 
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 Specifically, we employ a lexicographic procedure in which, first, we identify the sets of sequences that 
makes maximally smooth the number of vacant seats per year within each region. Second, among these sets 
of sequences, we identify those that maximally smooth the total number of vacant seats across regions. Last, 
if a unique set of sequences is not yet determined, a final choice is made according to a random draw from 
the remaining sequence sets.  
92
 The Rotate structural reform is the introduction of ten regional rotating seats to replace the ten existing 
NPM seats. To analyse this structural reform, for each region, we draw the countries one-by-one without 
replacement under a uniform distribution to determine the order of rotation. In some instances a country may 
be elected to a more desirable membership category when its “turn” for a rotating seat comes, in which case 
its turn as a rotating member is delayed until its UNSC term has ended. Similarly, a country may be ineligible 
to serve on the UNSC when its “turn” for a regional seat comes, in which case its turn is delayed until it next 
becomes eligible. 
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category k when in competition with all members of its region and if only a single seat is 
being elected. If, in year t, there are njkt seats of membership category k to be filled by new 
members from region j, then, in each of njkt rounds, there is a new realisation of a random 
variable that elects country aij with probability ρijkt. The only complication is that countries 
cannot have dual membership of the UNSC, so, if the same country is elected in more than 
one round, the process is repeated again in full until distinct countries are elected. The 
probability, therefore, of country aij being elected to one of njkt seats in membership 
category k from a set of eligible countries Ejkt is given by 
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, (4.3) 
the sum in the numerator being over all njkt-subsets of Ejkt containing country aij and in the 
denominator being over all njkt-subsets of Ejkt. The numerator of equation 4.3 is the 
probability of observing a distinct country sequence of length njkt containing country aij, 
and the denominator is the probability of observing any distinct country sequence of length 
njkt. When a country is eligible for only one elected membership category then equation 4.3 
corresponds to pijt. If, however, a country is eligible for more than one elected membership 
category, its pijt will reflect the probabilities with which it is elected to each of the 
membership categories for which it is eligible.
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How should the ρijk be chosen? One perspective is that, for countries without a specified 
UNSC election probability in the either structural reform or the UN Charter, Bernoulli’s 
Principle of Insufficient Reason applies. According to this Principle, the ρijk for such 
countries should be set equal within each region. An alternative perspective is that past 
behaviour offers the best guide to future behaviour, in which case it is necessary to 
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 In this case the precise form of pijt is complex, as it must reflect all possible orderings in which a country 
could be elected to the UNSC. Moreover, the denominator of (3) will frequently contain a (prohibitively) 
large number of terms as the size of the UNSC is increased. With the individual pijt unobservable, we are 
unable to compute proximity measures for the AE concept we use in Chapter 3. We are, nonetheless, able to 
compute proximity measures for the weaker EAE concept we employ here.    
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understand empirically the implied ρijk arising from the current system of election to the 
UNSC. In Chapter 2 we detail the systematic determinants of election to the UNSC, 
accounting for the two-stage process by which members are presently elected.
94
 The 
analysis finds that UNSC election is non-random, depending instead on three country 
characteristics: population, gross national income, and waiting time since last serving on 
the UNSC.
95
 The estimated co-efficients for these three variables can be used in a 
straightforward way to compute estimates of the ρijk.
96
 These are presented in Table 3.1. 
Our main results are based upon this latter approach, but – as a robustness check – in 
Section 4.6 we re-run the analysis under the assumption that, within each region, the ρijk for 
countries without a specified membership probability in either the structural reform or the 
UN Charter are equal. 
 
4.4.2 Structural reforms and expansion path 
We would like to distinguish the effects of each structural reform, s, separately from those 
of expansion. Therefore, we write the structural reforms in Table 4.1 such that each leaves 
the size of the UNSC unchanged at N = 15. We then create the CVG Cs associated with 
each structural reform s. For example, CPNVM, is created from CPresent by reducing by one 
the number of NPM seats for Africa, Asia, GRULAC and the WEOG in the present UNSC, 
and adding one new PNVM seat for each of these regions. Under each structural reform we 
denote the total number of UNSC seats (of all categories) belonging to region j with a 
vector n
0
 = (n01,n
0
2,…,n
0
|J|)
T
.   
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 In the first stage, the regions make nominations to the UNGA and, in the second stage, the UNGA votes. 
See, Chapter 2 for further details. 
95
 As noted by Lucas (1976), however, the parameter estimates of Chapter 2 may be conditional on the 
existing institutional arrangements. If so, they may no longer apply if these arrangements were to change. 
96
 We obtain estimates of country population and gross national income per capita (current USD) for 2012 
from the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html#). 
We update the variable measuring waiting time since last serving on the UNSC (which ends in 2006 in the 
data used in Chapter 2) to 2012 using membership records from the UNSC Web site 
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc). To produce the estimates in Table 3.1, these data, along with the co-efficient 
values for population, gross national income per capita, and waiting time since last serving on the UNSC 
reported in Table 2.3a, are fed into equation 2.5, where we assume that the sum in the denominator is over all 
countries in the region (Ejt = Rjt). We assume, a-priori, that election to new membership categories different 
from the existing NPM category, also follows the probabilities in Table 3.1, i.e., ρijk  = ρij,NPM for all k.  
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To then observe separately the effects of expansion, we increase the size of the UNSC 
under each structural reform by adding new NPM seats one-by-one until N = 30.
97
 
Expansion of the UNSC is performed according to a probabilistic “expansion path”. 
Specifically, for a given s, to allocate x new NPM seats we give each region γjx = ⌊ψjx⌋ 
extra seats for sure, and consider all possible divisions of the remaining hx = x – ∑j γjx 
seats.
98
 Let an outcome of this procedure for a given x be represented by the vector xx = 
(x1,x2,…,x|J|)
T
, where 1 ⋅ xx = x; and let Ψxx be the set of all feasible xx for a given x, i.e., xx 
 Ψxx if and only if xj ≥ γjx for all j  J. We assume a multinomial probability distribution 
over xx  Ψxx such that a given xx is realised with probability 
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Last, for each structural reform, we denote as Cx = {Cxx}xx  Ψxx the set of CVGs that enter 
into the computation of the expansion path at expansion x. 
How to choose the ψj? According to the UN Charter, NPM seats on the UNSC should be 
given to regions according to the principle of “equitable geographical distribution” (Article 
23(1)), but there is no agreed upon interpretation of this principle, however. Instead, we 
note that one of our equity concepts – RPE – makes a clear prediction regarding the 
division of council seats to regions. From equations 4.1 and 4.2, RPE requires that 
                                           nj,PMβPM + (nj – nj,PM)βNPM  ∑aijRj qij. (4.5) 
As the left-side sums to unity across regions, (4.5) can be used to re-arrange for nRPEj  as 
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 We do not analyse the cases N > 30 as there is broad agreement among UN members that, in order to be 
able to perform its role effectively, the UNSC must contain a limited number of members (e.g., Zifcak, 
2006). The largest UNSC expansion advocated in the reform proposals we consider is 11 new members (AU), 
bringing total membership to N = 26 countries. 
98
 Hence, we do not consider extreme divisions of seats to regions in which the number of new NPM seats 
given to one or more region deviates significantly from its expected value ψjx.   
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We choose the ψj such that, for each s, the UNSC would attain the RPE concept at the 
maximal expansion x = 193 – 15 = 178. To do this, for each s, we (i) add 178 new NPM 
seats to n
0
 to give n
178
; (ii) compute βPM and βNPM for n
178
; (iii) use (4.6) to determine the 
nRPEj  that implement RPE for n
178
, (iv) compute the vector of implied xj: x = n
178
 – n0; and 
(v) set ψj = (178)
-1
xj. 
 
4.4.3 Voting power and decision rule  
As is by now conventional in the literature, we adopt the normalised Banzhaf index as our 
measure of relative a-priori voting power. Note, however, that we adopt the ternary 
interpretation of the normalised Banzhaf index, as set out by Felsenthal and Machover 
(1997c), rather than the more conventional binary interpretation. We compute the ternary 
normalised Banzhaf index using the method of generating functions (see, e.g., Freixas, 
2012). 
At present, the UNSC decision rule requires, as a necessary condition, that nine of 15 
members vote in favour of a resolution for it to pass. It is only possible to retain the ratio 
0.6 when N is divisible by five, however. One option, when N is not divisible by five, is to 
set the threshold number of members required for a decision to pass, QN, such that the 
fraction QNN  
-1
 is made as close as possible to 0.6. This, however, introduces marked 
jaggedness into the results. Instead we adopt a probabilistic approach with mean 0.6N. We 
assume QN ≥ ⌊0.6N⌋ and N – QN ≥ ⌊0.4N⌋ for sure, and allocate the remaining quantity N – 
⌊0.6N⌋ – ⌊0.4N⌋ to QN with probability 0.6, and to N – QN with probability 0.4. Under this 
procedure, if 0.6N is an integer then QN = 0.6N; otherwise QN = ⌊0.6N⌋ with probability 
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⌈0.6N⌉ – 0.6N, and QN = ⌈0.6N⌉ with probability 0.6N – ⌊0.6N⌋. This is sufficient to 
remove much of the jaggedness associated with a deterministic QN. 
 
4.4.4 Computation of Measures   
For a given s, at every point on the expansion path (x = 1,2,...,15) we, first, realise the set 
of CVGs Cx. We choose the number of years over which each CVG is realised in the 
following way. For every x, we perform a total of 100,000 realisations across the CVGs 
belonging to Cx. We divide these 100,000 realisations equally between each CVG in Cx 
such that each CVG is realised over 100,000/|Cx| periods.99 Second, we compute an 
estimate of p‾ij for each country from the realisations of each CVG. If a CVG is realised 
over T years, the estimated p‾ij is computed as p‾
T
ij = T   
-1
#aijUNSC , where #aijUNSC is the 
number of realisations in which country aij is a member of the UNSC. We take the mean of 
the p‾
T
ij across realised CVGs according to the probabilities in (4.4) as our final estimate of p‾
ij. Last, we then able, for each x, to compute β
CPE
, βRPE and αEAE for each CVG in Cx. Our 
final estimates of these measures are, again, the mean across realisations under the 
probabilities in (4.4). We are then able to compute EAE, CPE and RPE for each structural 
reform at each point on the expansion path.  
 
4.5 Results 
Our main results are shown in Figure 4.1. On the horizontal axis is our summary equity 
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 When 100,000/|Cx| is not an integer we realise ⌈100,000/|Cx|⌉ years. Precisely, for each CVG we realise 
marginally more than ⌈100,000/|Cx|⌉ periods, but discard the very earliest periods. This is necessary as we 
begin each CVG with a UNSC containing just the PMs (with the remaining seats vacant). Hence, it requires a 
number of years before the elected UNSC becomes filled with members. The number of initial years we 
discard corresponds to twice the maximum term length.  
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measure E, and on the vertical axis is our efficiency measure 2PTA. As, however, 2PTA 
becomes very close to zero as the UNSC is expanded, we show the logarithm of 2PTA for 
visual ease. 
The left-most point of each expansion line in Figure 4.1 records the equity and efficiency 
of the unexpanded UNSC under each structural reform. Each expansion line is then is 
formed as the locus of equity and efficiency results we obtain as the membership of the 
UNSC is expanded according to the relevant expansion path. Accordingly, the right-most 
point of each expansion line records the equity and efficiency of the expanded council at 
the maximum expansion x = 15 under each structural reform. Comparison of the left-most 
points of each expansion line therefore reveals the pure effect of the structural reform 
separate from the effects of expansion. Comparison of the expansion lines away from the 
left-most point reveals the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC under each structural 
reform. 
The equity and efficiency measures for each UNSC reform proposal appear in Figure 4.1 
as a point estimate, marked “×”. To help interpret the findings in Figure 4.1 we show, in 
Figure 4.2, the three components to our summary equity measure (EAE, CPE and RPE) on 
an expansion-by-expansion basis under each structural reform. 
 
4.5.1 Structural reforms 
We begin with an appraisal of the structural reforms (separate from the effects of 
expansion). We say that structural reform i “0-dominates” j if, at expansion x = 0, it holds 
that 2PTAi > 2PTAj and Ei > Ej, and that structural reform i “weakly 0-dominates” j if one 
or both of these inequalities is weak. We see in Figure 4.1 that the structural reforms fall 
into two categories: three alter both efficiency and equity (RM, Veto+ and Veto–), but the 
remaining five alter equity only. Structural reforms in the latter category can, at best, 
weakly 0-dominate Present, but we find that three of the five are actually weakly 0-
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dominated by Present. Of the structural reforms in the former category, two strictly 0-
dominate Present, and one is strictly 0-dominated by Present.  
The only structural reform to be strictly 0-dominated by Present is Veto+, under which six 
existing NPM seats are replaced by six new PM seats. The effect of this structural reform 
upon efficiency is deleterious: it reduces the a-priori probability of a resolution being 
approved from one per cent at present to just 0.2 per cent, leaving the UNSC barely able to 
pass a resolution. Veto+ also leads to a fall in overall equity: Figure 4.2 shows this to be 
the result of an improvement against CPE and RPE, but a worsening against EAE. The 
improvement against CPE arises as the veto right is awarded to countries such as India and 
Brazil who are presently heavily under-represented by this concept. The improvement in 
RPE arises as Veto+ gives four of the six new vetoes to countries from the under-
represented regions of Africa and Asia. The worsening against EAE, which transpires to be 
the dominant effect, arises as Veto+ concentrates (rather than dilutes) expected voting 
power in the hands of the countries selected to be new PMs. 
Of the three structural reforms that are weakly 0-dominated by Present, the one that is 
weakly dominated by the remaining two such reforms is seen to be PNVM, under which 
four NPM seats are converted into PNVM seats. As this proposal affects only the 
membership probabilities, and not the voting powers, PNVM leaves proximity to the CPE 
and RPE concepts unchanged, but results in a worsening against EAE. The reason is, 
again, that the proposal concentrates (when it would ideally dilute) the distribution across 
countries of expected voting power. 
The second worst of these three structural reforms is Rotate, under which NPM seats are 
replaced with seats that rotate within region. Like PNVM, Rotate alters only proximity to 
the EAE concept. The worsening against this concept arises as Rotate does not shift 
expected voting power away from the PMs to the remainder of the UN membership (as 
would be desirable), but instead re-allocates (equalises) expected voting power within 
those remaining members. This equalisation of expected voting power is counter-
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productive, for, under EAE, more populous countries warrant greater expected voting 
power than less populous countries. 
The final structural reform in this group of three – which weakly 0-dominates Rotate and 
PNVM, but remains weakly 0-dominated by Present – is Renew, under which NPM seats 
allow re-election. Once again, Renew alters only proximity to the EAE concept. The 
worsening against this concept arises as permitting re-election benefits disproportionately 
those countries that gain election more often, but such countries already receive at least 
their share of expected voting power under Status quo.  
Only two structural reforms weakly 0-dominate Present: Term+ and RR. Term+ allows for 
a new category of membership with a four-year term. As may be seen in Figure 4.1, 
however, the equity gain vis-à-vis Present at expansion 0 is so small as to be nugatory. To 
a first, approximation, therefore, the Term+ structural reform at expansion 0 simply 
replicates Status quo. Under RR the five existing regional groupings would collapse to 
four. Voting rights are left unchanged, so the proposal does not alter CPE. RR does lead to 
a very slight improvement in proximity to the EAE concept, but the principal improvement 
is in proximity to the RPE concept. This improvement arises as RR disperses some of the 
excess representation of the WEOG by moving the United States and Canada into the 
Americas group, and countries such as Australia and New Zealand into the Asia and 
Pacific group.     
RM, under which all EU members act as a single PM, is one of only two structural reforms 
that 0-dominate Present. By reducing the number of players that wield the right of veto 
from five at present to four (for the UK and France would no longer exercise separate 
vetoes) RM improves efficiency: it increases the a-priori probability of a resolution being 
approved from 1.02 per cent at present to 1.68 per cent. Although it worsens proximity to 
both CPE and RPE, RM leads to an overall improvement in equity, for it dilutes the 
distribution of expected voting power by reducing the number of PMs – which improves 
proximity to EAE in Figure 4.2a. Why does RM worsen CPE? The reason is that the voting 
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power of a PM substantially under-represents these countries, giving them just 35 per cent 
of their voting power under CPE. RM additionally worsens proximity to the RPE concept, 
for the remainder (less EU members) of both the EE group and the WEOG become 
substantially over-represented. 
The only other structural reform to 0-dominate Present is Veto–. Under Veto– two PMs 
would need to vote against a resolution for this to constitute an automatic veto. By 
reducing the blocking power of each PM, Veto– increases the a-priori probability of a 
resolution being approved to 2.21 per cent. As may be seen in Figure 4.2a the improvement 
in overall equity is due to a substantial improvement in ex-ante equity (EAE). This arises 
as Veto– succeeds in diluting the share of expected voting power held by the PMs by 
reducing their voting power. Note, however, that Veto– worsens proximity to the CPE 
concept (Figure 4.2b), which offsets some of the improvement against EAE in the 
summary measure of equity. The worsening against CPE may be explained as follows: in 
Chapter 3 we find that the PMs exercise too little voting power, but exercise too much 
expected voting power. The implication of these joint findings is that UNSC reform should 
seek to erode the right of the existing PMs to be ever-present on the UNSC, rather seeking 
to reduce their voting power when UNSC members. Thus, Veto– reduces the expected 
voting power of the PMs in the “wrong” manner: by reducing their voting power rather 
than by reducing their time as a UNSC member.    
 
4.5.2 Expansion 
We now consider the effects of expansion. Strengthening the definition of 0-dominance, 
we say that structural reform i “expansion-dominates” j if it holds that 2PTAi > 2PTAj and 
Ei > Ej for all expansions x = 0,1,…,15. Recall that, in Figure 4.1, the UNSC under each 
structural reform is expanded so as to attain (in expectation) the RPE concept at expansion 
178. Although there is some modest variation across structural reforms, the typical 
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proportion of new NPM seats given to each region by this procedure is: Africa 27 per cent, 
Asia 38 per cent, EE nine per cent; the GRULAC 13 per cent and the WEOG 13 per cent. 
Under these proportions the first ten additional NPM seats would be allocated three to 
Africa, four to Asia, and one to each of EE, the GRULAC and the WEOG.   
The effects of UNSC expansion are seen in Figure 4.1 to be similar under each of the 
different structural reforms:
100
 it improves equity, but worsens efficiency. Our simulations 
show that equity is increasing, but concave, in the size of the UNSC, which indicates 
diminishing equity returns to expansion. Efficiency, however, is decreasing and convex in 
the size of the council, indicating that the marginal loss of efficiency from adding one 
additional NPM falls with the size of the UNSC. Thus, the largest marginal gains in equity 
from expansion are associated with the largest losses of efficiency. 
One structural reform expansion-dominates all the remaining seven: Veto–. In this sense, 
this structural reform wins out among those we consider. The only other structural reform 
to expansion-dominate Present is RM. At the other end of the scale, Veto+ is expansion-
dominated by all the remaining seven structural reforms, making it, in this sense, the worst 
of the structural reforms we consider. Two further structural reforms are weakly 
expansion-dominated by Present: PNVM and Renew. 
 
4.5.3 Reform proposals 
Last, we consider our results for the reform proposals. We say that a reform proposal i 
“dominates” j if 2PTAi > 2PTAj and Ei > Ej. In Figure 4.1 we shade the space that is 
dominated by Status quo (the “south-west” corner), and the space that dominates Status 
quo (the “north-east” corner). Note that, in Figure 4.1, not all reform proposals lie on the 
                                                 
100
 One exception is Rotate, which is 0-dominated (but not expansion-dominated) by Renew, Term+ and 
Present. The reason Rotate generates stronger equity effects from expansion than, e.g., Present, is that it 
promotes a clean division of duties between membership categories: the more populous countries utilise the 
additional NPM seats, while the rotating seats substantially increase the membership probability (and 
therefore expected voting power) of the least populous countries (that, in Chapter 3, we find to be 
substantially under-represented in an ex-ante sense).  
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expansion line of a particular structural reform. There are two reasons for this. Most 
straightforwardly, some reform proposals combine more than one structural reform, and 
therefore appear somewhere between the relevant expansion lines. Alternatively, a second 
reason is that some reform proposals imply expansion proportions (in terms of the 
proportion of new NPM seats that are allocated to each region) that are different from the 
“optimal” proportions we employ in the simulation.101 Indeed, we find that none of the 
reform proposals considered fully exploits the potential equity improvements from 
expansion, typically because the proportion allocated to Asia is too low (relative to the 
optimal proportion of 40 per cent), and too high a proportion is given to either the 
GRULAC or the WEOG.  
Only one reform proposal dominates Status quo: WV. Indeed, Figure 4.1 shows that it is 
possible to augment WV with expansion of the UNSC by up to four members and still 
dominate Status quo. It is not possible, however, to augment WV with expansion of the 
UNSC such that all the remaining reform proposals would be dominated. On its own EU 
does not dominate Status quo. Figure 4.1 indicates, however, that if it is augmented with 
expansion of the UNSC by one member (which moves us to the left-most point of the RM 
expansion line), then it too dominates Status quo, but not if expansion is by more than a 
single member.  
Of the remaining nine reform proposals, each improves upon equity relative to Status quo, 
but worsens efficiency. Of these, only four – 2+3, HLPB, Italy, and Panama – are 
undominated proposals. Of the five reform proposals that are at least weakly dominated by 
at least one other proposal, the most heavily dominated is AU, which is dominated by four 
reform proposals. If world leaders were willing to reduce QNN 
-1
 – the proportion of the 
                                                 
101
 Two clarifications: first, the EU reform proposal in Table 4.2 reduces the size of the UNSC to N = 14 as 
France and the UK are no longer separate members. The RM structural reform in Table 4.1 adds back this 
lost member to retain the size of the UNSC at N = 15. The EU reform proposal therefore appears to the left of 
the left-most point of the RM expansion line in Figure 4.1. Second, as detailed in Table 4.2, 2+3, G4 and 
Razali each specify different numbers of new PNVM seats. Technically, we should treat the replacement of 
one NPM seat by a PNVM seat as a distinct structural reform from the replacement of two NPM seats by two 
PNVM seats, and so on. To reduce the number of lines in Figure 4.1, however, in Table 4.1 we simply define 
a single PNVM structural reform that replaces four NPM seats with four PNVM seats.   
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total votes required to be affirmative for a resolution to pass – as part of any reform 
proposal, then the point estimates in Figure 4.1 would all shift upwards. For a sufficient 
reduction in QNN 
-1
, some or all of these nine reform proposals would dominate Status quo. 
There appears, however, little appetite among world leaders to relax QNN 
-1
, which is why, 
in our simulation, we set it to be consistent with the current requirement that, as a 
necessary condition, three-fifths of members must vote in favour of a resolution for it to 
pass.             
 
4.6 Robustness 
The results of the previous section are predicated upon a number of assumptions. In this 
section we explore how our findings change under variants of these assumptions.  
 
4.6.1 Equity Measure 
The results of Section 4.5 are for a summary equity measure that employs a weighted 
average of EAE, CPE and RPE, with the weights chosen to reflect the a-priori uncertainty 
over their true values. We first discuss the implications of different weights, which may be 
assessed using Figure 4.2. According to panel (a) Veto– and RM would be the chief 
winners from a rule that placed a higher weight on the EAE concept, which would benefit 
the associated WV and EU reform proposals. The principal loser would be Veto+, and the 
associated AU reform proposal. Conversely, Veto+ would be the principal winner if more 
weight were placed on either the CPE or RPE concepts; and RM and the associated EU 
reform proposal, would be the principal loser.       
A second perspective is to construct E in a different way. A prominent alternative is the 
“Rawlsian” measure E = min(EAE, CPE, RPE), the results under which are shown in 
Figure 4.3. The majority of the findings of the previous section remain. In particular, that 
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Veto– 0-dominates Present is robust to the Rawlsian interpretation, and now RM also 0-
dominates Present (and the associated EU reform proposal now dominates Status quo). 
Present continues to 0-dominate Veto+, and weakly 0-dominate PNVM, Renew, and 
Rotate. Turning to the reform proposals, WV continues to dominate Status quo, and the 
2+3, HLPB, Italy and WV reforms continue to be undominated. The principal difference 
between results is that Veto– no longer expansion-dominates all other structural reforms, 
for it is held back by its weak performance against the CPE equity concept beyond a given 
degree of expansion.  
  
4.6.2 Decision rule, voting power index, and membership probability 
We now investigate the sensitivity of our qualitative findings to (i) the measurement of 
voting power; (ii) the representation of the UNSC decision rule; and (iii) the estimated 
membership probabilitiies. To address part (i) above we repeat the analysis of Section 4.4 
using the principal alternative to the Banzhaf index of voting power – the (ternary) 
Shapley-Shubik index – as defined in Felsenthal and Machover (1997c). To address part 
(ii) we repeat the analysis with the (normalised) binary Banzhaf index.
102
 To address part 
(iii) we repeat the analysis under the a-priori assumption that the ρijk are equal within 
region for all countries without a specified membership probability within the UN Charter, 
or within the rules of the structural reform. We reason that if our qualitative results are 
robust to this (significant) perturbation of the estimated ρijk in Section 4.4 then we may 
conclude that our results are not sensitive to the precise estimates employed. 
The results of these three analyses are presented in Table 4.4, which summarises our 
findings for the structural reforms in respect of 0-dominance (part a) and expansion 
dominance (part b); and for dominance with respect to the reform proposals (part c). In 
Table 4.4a, for instance, a “>” in the ith row and jth column would imply that structural 
                                                 
102
 The normalised binary Banzhaf index is computed using the method of generating functions applied to 
binary games (see, e.g., Bilbao et al., 2000). A good introductory account of these methods may be found in 
Leech (2002d). 
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reform i 0-dominates j in the analysis of Section 4.4 and all three analyses (i)-(iii) above. 
Conversely, “>TB,SS,EP” would indicate that structural reform i 0-dominates j in the 
ternary Banzhaf (TB) analysis of Section 4.4, in the Shapley-Shubik (SS) analysis of part 
(i), and in the “equal ρijk” (ER) analysis of part (iii), but not in the binary Banzhaf (BB) 
analysis of part (ii).      
Our key qualitative conclusions are robust to these additional analyses. We see in Table 
4.4a that the finding that RM and Veto– 0-dominate Present is robust across all four 
analyses considered, as are the findings that Present 0-dominates Veto+, and weakly 0-
dominates PNVM and Rotate. In Table 4.4b we see that Veto– expansion-dominates all 
other proposals across all four analyses, confirming this structural reform as the best 
among those we consider. RM also expansion-dominates Present in all four analyses. 
Under ER the Present, Renew, Rotate and Term+ structural reforms become equivalent, so 
some weak-dominance relationships hold in both Tables 4.4a and 4.4b under ER that do 
not hold in the remaining analyses. In Table 4.4c, which considers the reform proposals, 
we see that WV always dominates both Status quo and EU, and is the only reform proposal 
that is undominated in each analysis, confirming its position as the most promising of the 
reform proposals we consider. AU is always dominated by four reform proposals G4, 
HLPB, Italy and UfC; and HLPB always dominates AU, G4, HLPA, and Razali. 
The analysis under SS is seen, however, to produce several dominance relations in Table 
4.4c that do not hold in any of the three remaining analyses. This arises as, under SS, the 
voting power of a PM is much higher than under TB. Under, Status quo, for instance, a PM 
has almost exactly twice as much voting power as a NPM according to TB, but almost 
exactly 9.5 times as much voting power under SS. Accordingly, under SS, voting power 
shifts from the PMs to the remaining UNSC members much more slowly with expansion 
of the UNSC, making the analysis more pessimistic concerning the equity benefits of 
expansion. The point estimates of those reform proposals that expand the UNSC therefore 
shift to the left in Figure 4.1. The two reform proposals that do not expand the UNSC – EU 
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and WV – therefore dominate additional reform proposals (and WV dominates all other 
proposals). 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The UNSC plays an important role in ensuring global peace – the bedrock of 
macroeconomic stability. Although reform of the UNSC is one of the most pressing issues 
facing the international community, as yet no previous analysis has appraised the options 
for UNSC reform against formal equity and efficiency desiderata. 
In this Chapter we present such an appraisal. Nearly all countries support expansion of the 
UNSC membership, but, so far, no expansion has taken place, as some countries worry that 
an expansion-only reform would be merely a “sticking plaster” that ultimately delayed the 
implementation of the deeper “structural” reforms needed for a lasting solution to the 
Council’s difficulties. On the basis of our analysis we agree that expansion at the levels 
currently under consideration will provide only modest improvements in equity, and will 
also come at the expense of efficiency, unless world leaders are also willing to relax the 
threshold for the proportion of members that must vote in favour of a resolution for it to 
pass. On the other hand, we find that at least two of the structural reforms under 
consideration – PNVM and Renew – seem sure to make the Council’s woes worse rather 
than better, for in Table 4.4a both these proposals are weakly dominated by the present 
UNSC under all analyses. Also, the Veto+ structural reform is (strictly) dominated by the 
present arrangements in our main results. As such, an expansion-only reform would be 
preferable to expansion with structural reform in these cases. 
The most promising reform proposal among those we consider is one in which two PMs 
would have to cast a vote against a resolution for this to constitute a veto (WV). Its success 
owes to the fact that, by reducing the voting power of the PMs, it dilutes the distribution of 
expected voting power away from these countries. By contrast, many of the other reform 
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proposals advocate structural reforms that fail to dilute the distribution of expected voting 
power, or even further concentrate it in the hands of the PMs (e.g., the African Union’s 
proposal). But WV is still far from being “optimal” in respect of our equity concepts, for it 
reduces the expected voting power of the PMs by reducing their voting power, rather than 
by requiring them to lose their right to permanent representation. As such, WV conflicts 
with the CPE equity notion, under which the PMs (individually and collectively) warrant 
more voting power when a UNSC member. 
Realpolitik would appear to impose heavily upon the set of feasible reforms. In the case of 
WV, the PMs would be reluctant to relinquish their veto right, and enjoy an apparently 
impregnable right of double-veto – they exercise a veto on all non-procedural matters and 
over whether matters should be treated as procedural or non-procedural (see, e.g., Köchler, 
1995).  
More generally, it has is recognised by political scientists that when the interests and 
responsibilities of the members of an organisation are not shared equally, the functioning 
of such organisations may be impaired if these inequalities are not reflected in the voting 
system.
103
 This observation might stimulate future research into “second-best” reforms that 
are as proximate as possible to the equity concepts adopted in this Chapter, but which 
satisfy a “functionality” or realpolitik constraint. While this idea must await a proper 
treatment, we believe that the present contribution has at least clarified what (little) can be 
achieved with the reform proposals presently on the table.    
    
  
                                                 
103
 The League of Nations and the International Trade Organization are two now deceased international 
organisations whose demise has been attributed to a failure to accommodate the interests of the United States 
and other Western powers in voting procedures (see, e.g., Zamora, 1980; Malone, 2004). 
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Appendix 
Table 4.1: Structural Reforms 
 
Reform Details 
PNVM Four new PNVM seats (replacing one NPM seat for each of Africa, 
Asia, the GRULAC and the WEOG).
1
 
Present Implement no structural reform. 
Renew All NPM seats made renewable. 
RM  All EU members act jointly as a single PM with the right of veto 
within the WEOG. One new NPM seat (to restore the UNSC to 15 
members) allocated to regions according to the relevant expansion 
path (see Section 4.4.2).  
Rotate Ten seats that rotate among the region members (replacing existing 
NPM seats). 
RR New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the 
Americas (three NPMs for Africa; 2.5 for each of the Asia and Pacific 
and the Americas; two for Europe).
2
 
Term+ Eight seats with a four-year term (replacing two NPM seats for each of 
Africa, Asia and the GRULAC; one NPM seat for each of EE and the 
WEOG). 
Veto+ Six new PM seats with the right of veto (replacing two NPM seats for 
each of Africa and Asia; one NPM seat for each of the GRULAC and 
the WEOG).
3
 
Veto– Two PM votes against a resolution required to form a veto. 
1
 We assume on the basis of Table 3.1 that the PNVM seats are given to Nigeria in Africa, India in 
Asia, Brazil in the GRULAC, and Germany in the WEOG. 
2
 These proportions are chosen to maintain, insofar as possible, the regional allocation of NPM seats 
between the existing five regional groups. The two NPM seats currently allocated to the WEOG are 
split one to Europe, and the other shared (rotated) between the Americas and Asia and Pacific (hence 
the fractional number of NPMs for these two regions). The new regional groupings are based on the 
report of the UN’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP, 2004). The report does 
not detail the precise membership of each group, but does indicate the number of countries belonging 
in each (allowing some inference to be made over the intended membership). We assume the Africa 
group to correspond to the existing Africa group; the Europe group to correspond to the existing EE 
group and the European countries in the WEOG; Asia and the Pacific to correspond to the existing 
Asia group with the addition of New Zealand and Australia; and the Americas group to correspond to 
the existing GRULAC plus Canada and the United States.   
3
 As this structural reform is associated with the AU reform proposal we follow Table 4.2 (note 2) in 
assuming that the new PM seats are given to Nigeria and Egypt in Africa, India and Japan in Asia, 
Brazil in the GRULAC and Germany in the WEOG. 
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Table 4.2: Reform Proposals 
 
Proposal Details 
2+3 Two new PNVM seats and three new NPM seats (one each for Africa, 
Asia and the GRULAC).
1
 
AU Six new PM seats with the right of veto (two each for Africa and Asia; 
one each for the GRULAC and the WEOG) and five new NPM seats 
(two for Africa; one each for Asia, EE and the GRULAC).
2
 
EU  All EU members act jointly as a single PM with the right of veto. 
G4 Six new PNVM seats (two each for Africa and Asia; one each for the 
GRULAC and the WEOG) and four NPM seats (one each for Africa, 
Asia, EE and the GRULAC).
3
 
HLPA New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the 
Americas. Six new PNVM seats (two each for Africa and Asia and 
Pacific; one each for Europe and the Americas). A total of 13 NPM 
seats (four for Africa and Americas; three for Asia and Pacific; two for 
Europe).
4
 
HLPB New regional groupings: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the 
Americas. Eight new renewable four-year seats (two for each region). 
A total of 11 NPM seats (four for Africa; three each for Asia and 
Pacific and the Americas; one for Europe). 
Italy  Ten new regional rotating seats (three each for Africa and Asia; two 
for the GRULAC; one each for EE and the WEOG).
5
 
Panama Six new renewable five-year seats (two each for Africa and Asia; one 
each for the GRULAC and the WEOG). Any country elected for four 
consecutive terms to these new seats to become a PNVM.  
Status quo Do nothing. 
Razali Five new PNVM seats (two for Asia; one each for Africa, the 
GRULAC and the WEOG). Four new NPM seats (one each for Africa, 
Asia, EE, the GRULAC).
6
 
UfC All NPM seats to be renewable. Ten new renewable NPM seats (three 
each to Africa and Asia; two for the GRULAC; one each for EE and 
the WEOG).
7
 
WV Two PM votes against a resolution required to form a veto. 
1
 According to Davis (2010), Germany and Japan were widely seen as deserving the two NPVM seats. 
We therefore allocate these seats on this basis. 
2
 As the identities of the new PMs is not specified, we assume that the new PM seats are allocated to 
Nigeria and Egypt in Africa, India and Japan in Asia, Brazil in the GRULAC and Germany in the 
WEOG. 
3
 We assume the six new PNVMs to be the same six countries assumed to be PMs in the AU reform 
proposal. 
4
 We assume that the six new PNVMs are identical those in the G4 reform proposal.  
5
 Italy (2005) terms the ten new seats as “Regional” seats. Rotation is not proposed explicitly, but, 
according to Martini (2009: 7), is implicit in the Italian position. 
 6
 Specifically, the reform proposal allocates two new PNVM seats to the “industrialized states”. 
According to Macqueen (2010), these two seats were intended for Germany and Japan. The reform 
proposal then allocates one PNVM seat to “developing states” in Africa, Asia and the GRULAC 
respectively. We allocate these seats to Nigeria, India and Brazil respectively. 
7
 The UfC reform proposal we examine here superseded two earlier reform proposals made by the UfC 
(the “Blue” and “Green” Models). For a discussion of these reform proposals see Hoffmann and 
Ariyoruk (2005). 
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Figure 4.2a: EAE by expansion 
 
Figure 4.2b: CPE by expansion 
 
  
Figure 4.2c: RPE by expansion 
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Table 4.3: Structural reforms and associated reform proposals 
Structural Reform Associated Reform Proposals 
PNVM seats (PNVM) 2+3, G4, HLPA, Panama, Razali 
Renewable seats (Renew) HLPB, Panama, UfC 
Regional members (RM) EU 
Regional rotating seats (Rotate) Italy 
Region re-allocation (RR) HLPA, HLPB 
Increase term length (Term+) HLPB, Panama 
Expand right of veto (Veto+) AU 
Weaken right of veto (Veto–) WV 
 
 
Table 4.4a: 0-dominance (structural reforms) 
 
 
Veto+ RM PNVM Present RR Renew Rotate Term+ Veto– 
Veto+ 
         RM > 
 
> > >BB,SS > > > 
 PNVM >TB,BB,ER 
     
≥BB,TS 
  Present >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥ 
  
≥TB,ER ≥ ≥ER 
 RR > 
 
≥ ≥ 
 
≥ ≥ ≥ 
 Renew >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥ ≥ER 
  
≥ ≥ER 
 Rotate >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥TB,ER ≥ER 
 
≥ER 
 
≥ER 
 Term+ >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥ ≥TB,ER 
 
≥TB,ER ≥ 
  Veto– > > > > > > > > 
  
 
Table 4.4b: Expansion-dominance (structural reforms)  
 
 
Veto+ RM PNVM Present RR Renew Rotate Term+ Veto– 
Veto+ 
         RM > 
 
>TB,BB,SS > >BB,SS > >BB,SS,ER > 
 PNVM >TB,BB,ER 
     
≥BB,TS 
  Present >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥TB,BB,TS 
  
≥TB,BB,ER ≥BB,TS,ER ≥BB,ER 
 RR > 
 
≥ ≥ 
 
≥ ≥ ≥ 
 Renew >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥TS ≥ER 
  
≥BB,TS,ER 
  Rotate >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥TB ≥ER 
 
≥ER 
 
≥ER 
 Term+ >TB,BB,ER 
 
≥TB,BB,TS 
  
≥TB,BB,TS ≥BB,TS,ER 
  Veto– > > > > > > > > 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this thesis we have examined the election of representatives to a council from a fully-
representative assembly, with particular focus on the UNSC. 
In Chapter 2 we aimed to determine the influence of the attributes of a country on their 
chances of being elected to the UNSC. We began by developing a multiple discrete choice 
model for choosing more than one alternative without allowing for duplications. This 
removed the potential bias arising from not accounting for the impossibility of one country 
occupying more than one seat in the UNSC, which would be present if using a model such 
as the conditional logit, without too significant a computational cost. We then applied this 
model to data of elections of UN representatives to the UNSC. We employed a two part 
utility function allowing us to capture the two preferences at play (that of the UNGA as a 
whole and the Caucusing Groups). We found that there was significant heterogeneity 
between the preferences of the five caucusing groups. However, we did find evidence of a 
common norm of allowing every country their turn on the council, mediated by a norm for 
allowing more powerful countries greater representation. We also found that countries who 
were engaged in conflict were less likely to be represented on the UNSC, and that there has 
been a shift in preferences since the last reform of the UNSC.  
A secondary outcome of the model of Chapter 2 was that it allowed us to compute 
estimates of how likely each country in the UN was to be elected to the UNSC. This then 
permitted us to investigate how fair the distribution of power in the UNSC is currently and 
under various proposed reforms. 
In Chapter 3 we first set out a series of equity ideals which can be applied to non-fully 
representational councils elected from a wider assembly, as is the case for the UNSC. We 
developed three tests based on these ideals, looking at representation from a regional or 
country perspective and comparing long-run expected power vis a vis the power achieved 
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if elected. We demonstrated that these three ideals were mutually incompatible, it is only 
possible to achieve two of the ideals for a given CVG. This led us to propose two first best 
concepts, according to whether regional or country based representation was desirable. We 
then applied these tests to the specific example of the UNSC using the ternary Banzhaf 
index as our measure of voting power. We found that the UNSC is worse in terms of our 
ex-ante measure that from an ex-post perspective. We found that contrary to the popular 
focus on the reduction of the power of permanent members, actually the situation is more 
nuanced and it could be argued that certain countries warrant more power than a PM 
currently achieves. That said, this would have to come at the cost of giving up the right to 
permanent representation. 
Finally in Chapter 4 we used the equity tests from Chapter 3 in conjunction with a test of 
how efficiently the council can reach decisions to appraise the main reform proposals for 
restructuring the UNSC. Furthermore, we considered the core structural reforms making up 
this set of proposals separately from a pure expansion of the council. We found that of the 
eight structural reforms considered, most made only modest changes to the status quo. Of 
those that did have an impact we found increasing the number of permanent members with 
veto was strictly worse than the present rules and the best performing structural reforms 
were those that reduced the PM power, either by reducing their number by subsuming UK 
and France into an EU seat or by requiring two PM votes against to activate a veto. This 
was echoed by the specific reform proposals we considered, the best performing being that 
which implemented the weakened veto as above. Overall, we found that any reform 
discussion necessarily involves a compromise between achieving a council which can 
operate efficiently and one which is equitable. Our results also indicate that to enact real 
change, quite significant changes to the current system would need to be made.
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